Office of the Historian

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia0

Washington, August 18, 1960, 6:54 p.m.

128. Dhahran for Acting CHUSMTM. Paris for CINCEUR. Now that appropriate warnings have been conveyed to Faisal and King (Embtels 103 and 95)1 Dept believes USG interests best served by disengaging from any further initiatives re reported military coup plans. All witting US officials, civilian and military, should be cautioned avoid being drawn into further discussion re [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] plans or expressing undue interest therein, although if queried they should continue to be guided by views set forth Deptel 44 rpt Dhahran 362 and should report fully pertinent conversations. We regard it as especially important that no US officials, civilian or otherwise, speculate on what USG might or might not do in event of coup. Lewis Jones discussed foregoing with General McGehee who will on his return to Dhahran next week take appropriate measures notify witting officers under his command re above instruction.

Contents Embtels 71 and 803 brought to General McGehee’s attention who will take such steps as he feels necessary and will advise Embassy of action taken.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.00/8–1160. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Dhahran and Paris. Drafted by Eilts; cleared by Henderson; cleared in draft with Defense, Thacher, and Howard Elting, Jr., of INR, and in substance with CIA; and approved by Jones.↩
  2. In telegrams 95 and 103, August 6 and 11, the Ambassador reported that he had sent Russell to Riyadh to inform King Saud that Heath himself told Faisal of the possible coup against them. In both cases, the details of the plot and the sources were omitted. Neither Saudi seemed unduly concerned; the King noted that he often learned of rumors of plots and as a matter of course took precautions to foil them. (Ibid., 786A.00/8–660 and 786A.00/8–1160)↩
  3. Document 339.↩
  4. In telegrams 71 and 80, August 1 and 2, Heath recommended that the USMTM officers who had dealt with [text not declassified] should be reassigned discreetly, [text not declassified] Heath thought they had become too closely involved [text not declassified]. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.00/8–160 and 786A.00/8–260)↩