127. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Counselor (Reinhardt)0
Reports reaching us from Baghdad indicate that the new regime in Iraq (1) desires friendly relations with the West, (2) will maintain existing international agreements, (3) at least for the time being will retain membership in the Baghdad Pact, (4) will not nationalize the production of oil, and (5) recognizes the UAR but is not joining.
Although the new government came into power in an extremely bloody and completely illegal way, there can be no doubt but that its popular support is far broader than that behind King Faisal. Furthermore, although the Republic of Iraq has indicated it plans to establish relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, Communist influence in the government appears so far to be limited.1
Informal approaches to the new government requesting assurances regarding the first four points mentioned above would therefore seem justified. They would tend to give support to moderate and secretly pro-Western elements in the new government and might aid in stabilizing the situation in Iraq in a pattern not entirely unfavorable to us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/7–2058. Secret. Initialed by Reinhardt.↩
- In a third memorandum to Reinhardt, also July 20, Cumming provided INR’s assessment of the “composition and leanings of the Iraqi Revolutionary Cabinet.” INR characterized the cabinet as representing “a complete spectrum from the extreme-right xenophobes” and former Nazi collaborators to “far-leftists, including a few consistent fellow travellers” and perhaps a Communist party member. The cabinet also contained “many sincere reform-minded, even pro-United States personalities.” (Ibid., 787.13/7–2058)↩