Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

359. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter, at Istanbul⁰

Washington, May 1, 1960, 4:21 p.m.

Tosec 56. Pending Embassy’s assessment of recent developments in Turkey, we are passing on for Secretary’s use how we now see these developments from this vantage point.

Recent Turkish domestic political developments appear to have their longer term origin in Menderes’ intolerance of Opposition and Bayar-Inonu personal feud. Their more immediate origin we believe lies in alleged misconduct of 1957 elections and their results and in subsequent maneuvering for next election. It seems to us important to disentangle basic causes, such as Government’s posture towards political opposition generally, from more immediate symptoms such as student demonstrations which in this case may have been inspired in part by the coincidence of immediately preceding Korean developments.

Aspects of recent Turkish developments that give us special trouble are:

1. Deterioration of morality in Turkish politics that threatens the multiparty system which first came to flower with organization of DP in 1946. Sweeping powers accorded special GNA investigative committee appear threaten present constitutional framework;

2. Doubts that Menderes’ tactics cast upon his stability as individual and his capacity to sense temper of important segments of Turkish political life and world opinion. We are particularly concerned over possibility his taking drastic action against prominent and respected leaders of Opposition;

3. Reported injection of anti-Americanism in Turkish domestic political struggle. It is not clear to us whether RPP is as deeply involved as DP suggests or whether DP is imputing this to RPP in order involve U.S. Government.

4. Anti-Government and particularly anti-Menderes tone of student demonstrations. Noteworthy also is persistent character of demonstrations which now have extended through three days;

5. Critical tone of American press. Continued trend toward authoritarianism and further bloodshed might revive in U.S. ugly memories of past Turkish treatment of minorities and create serious difficulties for U.S. Government in dealing constructively with Turkish-American problems, particularly in aid field.

6. Dangers of protracted political stalemate with RPP going underground and promoting civil disobedience; this might have serious implications for future operations U.S. missions in Turkey as well as U.S. access to Turkish facilities.

With respect to demonstrations themselves, we have been reassured by lack of anti-Americanism, apparent loyalty and restraint of Army, and failure of movement to spread significantly beyond student nucleus. With respect to DP posture towards Opposition, we find little grounds for reassurance either in type of actions taken or in sense of timing. It seems to us that net effect of recent Turkish domestic political developments has been clearly negative in terms of orderly development of democracy, Menderes’ domestic and international influence, and U.S. maneuverability in dealing with Turkish problems.

At this distance there appear to be number of things that GOT might do to liberalize and relax political climate in Turkey. Any suggestions on our part along these lines would in all likelihood be regarded as intervention in Turkish domestic affairs. At moment, struggle between top leadership in DP and RPP appears so bitter and of such depth that we would be well advised to stay out. We believe best U.S. posture for time being is to regard recent developments as an internal political affair and as part of uneven progress to be expected in political evolution of young democracy.

Within these limitations, Ambassador Warren’s timely initiative on April 23¹ might be followed up when responsible Turkish leaders seek to discuss their problems with us. While making clear at such times that we view this as an internal political problem, and making our points in spirit of comment rather than that of suggestion, we might inform both sides of this internal struggle of its unfortunate impact on American and world public opinion and damage it does to Turkish influence here and elsewhere abroad.

Henderson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/5–160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Owen T. Jones, cleared in draft by Easum of S, and approved by Hart who signed for Acting Secretary Henderson. Repeated to Ankara. Herter was in Istanbul to attend the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting.
1. See Document 356.