276. NSC Report1

NSC 6019
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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

EVACUATION AND PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD

REFERENCES

  • A. NSC 106/3
  • B. NSC Action No. 2259–b–(1)
  • C. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 8, 1960
  • D. Executive Order 10893, dated November 8, 1960
  • E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 29, 1960

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting.

The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 106/3 and the Record of Action on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 29, 1960.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; and direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

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Enclosure

Statement of Policy

EVACUATION AND PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Every reasonable effort must be made to protect U.S. citizens abroad in the event of imminent or actual general hostilities, localized hostilities or civil disturbances; including the evacuation of such citizens to relatively safe areas, and provision for their welfare if such evacuation is not possible. Primary factors influencing any decision to implement emergency plans for the protection of U.S. citizens abroad are:

a. The imminence of danger.

b. The capability and willingness of local authorities to provide adequate protection.

c. The effect of an evacuation on the local or international situation.

d. The availability of evacuation facilities and relatively safe holding areas.

e. The essentiality of reducing the numbers of U.S. noncombatants in probable combat areas in order to:

(1) Avoid impairment of the combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied military commanders necessitated by their care, and to

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(2) Minimize the hazards of their capture as hostages.

2. It is essential that flexibility be provided in planning for the protection and welfare of U.S. noncombatants in danger areas overseas, since the probability of successful evacuation of such persons to the United States or their movement to relatively safe holding areas could be substantially reduced by:

a. Political considerations prior to actual outbreak of hostilities, and

b. The disruption of transportation, port and airport facilities incident to a massive attack.

In view of these factors, emergency planning should provide for the disposition and welfare of U.S. citizens overseas within their host countries as well as for evacuation to the United States or movement to relatively safe holding areas. This “standfast” planning is applicable to the eventualities of localized hostilities and civil disturbances as well as general hostilities.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

3. In the event of imminent or actual general hostilities, localized hostilities or civil disturbances:

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a. To protect U.S. citizens including, if necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.

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b. To reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens subject to the risk of capture as hostages.

c. To reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in probable combat areas in order not to impair the combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied military commanders.

POLICY GUIDANCE

4. In furtherance of the foregoing policy objectives, the Secretaries of State and Defense shall:

a. Conduct a continuing review of conditions abroad with respect to:

(1) Imminence of general or localized hostilities or civil disturbances which may involve U.S. citizens.

(2) The capability and willingness of local authorities to provide adequate protection.

(3) The numbers and locations of U.S. citizens.

(4) The evacuation and protection capability, including availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas.

b. Make recommendations to the President if required for the timely reduction of the number of U.S. citizens in an area.

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c. Maintain plans for: (1) evacuation of U.S. citizens to the United States or their movement to and welfare in other relatively safe areas; and (2) “stand-fast” and welfare of U.S. citizens in the countries where appropriate.

5. Normally, the decision to initiate evacuation shall be made in Washington, taking into consideration the recommendation of the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the country concerned, or of the appropriate U.S. Military Commander. The following additional considerations apply in initiating evacuations:

a. Evacuation not Involving the Use of U.S. Military Forces and Facilities: When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or are so imminent as to jeopardize the safety of U.S. citizens and conditions do not permit communication with Washington, the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative is authorized to initiate such action as the gravity of the situation warrants.

b. Evacuation Involving the Use of U.S. Military Forces and Facilities: Because of the grave international consequences that may be involved, the President’s advance approval for the use of U.S. military forces and facilities is required except:

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(1) Where such use would be limited to non-combatant military forces and facilities which are normally assigned to the diplomatic or consular mission concerned or which are used routinely for the [Typeset Page 1148] transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment into and out of the country from which evacuation is to take place;2 and

(2) In those extreme cases where conditions do not permit either the principal diplomatic or consular representative in the area concerned or the appropriate military commander to obtain Presidential approval in time to initiate effective action.

c. Responsibility for initiating action under the circumstances described in b–(1) and (2) above devolves in the following order:

(1) The principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the country or countries concerned has primary responsibility for making the decision that immediate use of military forces and facilities is necessary for evacuation or protection of U.S. citizens and for requesting assistance from the appropriate military commanders, who will respond to the extent which he considers militarily possible. [Facsimile Page 7] Responsibility for the execution of such evacuation centered military operations rests wholly with the military commander, coordinating, [illegible in the original] with policies of the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative.

(2) If timely communications cannot be established between the principal diplomatic or consular representative in the country concerned and the appropriate military commander, the military commander concerned shall assume the responsibility for undertaking the above actions.

6. In implementing the guidance outlined in 5, the Secretary of State shall have over-all responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens abroad. In certain areas the Secretary of Defense shall have primary responsibility for the protection and evacuation of those U.S. citizens specified jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Secretary of Defense has supporting responsibility for the evacuation of all other U.S. citizens abroad.

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NOTE ON FINANCING

1. The cost of the preparation of evacuation plans and the necessary support thereof, in times of peace, is absorbed by the several Departments concerned out of their regular operating budgets.

2. It is impossible, at this time, to estimate the cost of evacuation in time of emergency, because conditions under which evacuation will occur can not be foreseen.

  1. Source: “Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad.” Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/SNSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6019.
  2. As requested, attache aircraft; scheduled MATS flights and MSTS runs which fall within the above criteria. [Footnote is in the original.]