Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

274. Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower¹

Washington, November 25, 1960

Carrying out your directive to report to you on the methodology used in the preparation of the Optimized Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), my associates (Dr. H.E. Scoville and Dr. George Rathjens) and I studied the relevant aspects of the activities of the Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSPS), and I have come to the following conclusions:

1. The staff is following the directives received from the JCS which, in turn, are based on your approval of the NSC action following the presentation of “Study 2009” by General Hickey. The JSPS is making effective use of available intelligence information. I believe that the presently developed SIOP is the best that could be expected under the circumstances and that it should be put into effect.

2. I recommend that an effort be initiated now to review the directive to, and the procedures used by, the JSPS in anticipation of the preparation of subsequent SIOPs for the following reasons:

(a) [text not declassified]

(b) [text not declassified]

(c) The staff is making extensive use of computers, but I believe that their programming could be improved and that the most competent people (such as available in WSEG, for instance) should become involved. This refinement, the revision of damage criteria, and possibly a re-evaluation of the importance of “counter force” strikes, will become especially important when operational plans are developed for less than our total alert force (the force that may survive a surprise attack by the enemy).

(d) [text not declassified]

I attach herewith a summary of our detailed observations, made on the basis of briefings from the Joint Strategic Planning Staff.

Attachment

Comments on Briefings by the Joint Strategic Planning Staff, November 3–5, 1960

The JSPS staff is following quite closely the so-called “Study 2009”—General Hickey’s presentation to NSC—as regards criteria for the selection of targets and the assessment of damage required. Since that study, in turn, followed rather closely the earlier War Plans of SAC, so-called ALPHA and BRAVO, the emerging SIOP is in these respects a refinement, a combination and expansion of earlier SAC plans, rather than a brand new approach.

Much of the briefing emphasized the objective character of the plan of procedure and the extensive use of machine calculations. Actually, however, we found so many consecutive steps involving judgment that this so-called point system of military worth of targets and the machine calculations based on it appear to be of very secondary importance. In fact, some of the machine uses may be unsound. So long as the plan is designed for the entire alert force, this has no grave consequences because of the large number of weapons assumed to be available and, therefore, of exceedingly high expected damage to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. However when, subsequently, operational plans based on smaller forces (assumed to survive surprise attack) will be developed, it will be most important to review the entire procedure and introduce more effective use of mathematical procedures, as otherwise the assignment of forces to targets may be inefficient, and less than optimum effect may be calculated for the retaliatory force still available to us; thus “evidence” may be obtained that we have inadequate forces and the attack, if carried out, will not be optimized.

The steps which are involved in the preparation of SIOP are as follows:

[text not declassified]

In a number of cases the urban and military targets are close enough together that they can be thought of as co-located and, as explained below, ground zeros (DGZ) are so selected as to maximize damage on the complex of targets by quasi-objective machine operations.

[text not declassified]

The next step involves the assignment of available forces against the strategic DGZ (target) list. [text not declassified] The assignment is done by a complex procedure, the logic of which is not wholly clear. It is first assumed that every weapon that will be used [text not declassified].

Thus, two very important aspects of the plan, although they are worked out on the machines, are then redone on the basis of judgment, so that the machine calculations are in effect not used. [text not declassified]

1. Source: Comments on Joint Strategic Planning Staff work on targeting and SIOP. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.