198. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
1514. Saw Prime Minister this morning by appointment arranged last week. He immediately brought up situations North and Central Sumatra.2 He differentiated between actions in the two areas taken by military commanders pointing out that Banteng group had not disassociated area from central government and that contact is being maintained with them both in Padang and in Djakarta. Ali does not presently anticipate disorders in Central Sumatra and said government probably would not take any action against Banteng group but would try work out problem through negotiation and Indonesian capacity “compromise, forgive and forget”.
On other hand, Ali bitter against Simbolon who had been regarded by government as man of honor and patriotism regardless of his agreements with central government and political personages Djakarta. Ali said Simbolon had agreed to transfer of Command Territory I but had asked for postponement from December 23 to December 28 so he could carry on through Christmas and government had acceded to this knowing Simbolon to be devout Christian. Arrangements had been agreed to for changeover ceremony. On December 19 Ali received intelligence report Simbolon planning not turn over command and that apparently something was brewing. Government was about to send investigator to Medan when Central Sumatran affair broke on December 20.
Ali said there is evidence collusion between Hussein and Simbolon although noted difference their approaches and stated objectives. [Page 335] Both have stated desire Cabinet’s downfall, both claim allegiance to President and Indonesian Republic but in government’s view Banteng group not in rebellion whereas Simbolon is. Ali said some advisers are pressing him use force against Simbolon but he commented wryly “I have to be practical”. He added with emphasis that whatever government’s capability of enforcing its authority may or may not be it could not acquiesce in Simbolon’s “rebellious act,” without losing all prestige and opening way for other dissidents, especially Communists, to take law in their own hands. Ali said Cabinet would defer only to Parliament in determining whether or not remain in office.
In expressing thought that Communist workers on estates might take action against Simbolon’s seizure of power, Ali said he anticipates bloodshed at some stage in North Sumatra. He told me in confidence that while decision not yet made, government was contemplating asking for evacuation American women and children from area. He also said that government might officially inform me near future that it could no longer be held responsible for safety American lives and property in Simbolon’s area. (Note:AP correspondent says he has been told by Secretary General Foreign Office and Ministry Information that such statement will be forthcoming.)
I said that until such statement made, which in effect recognition Simbolon’s de facto authority, I would continue look to Indonesian Government for protection our interest. Ali said he realized we would want to keep Consular officials in Medan look after our interests and asked me for numbers of Americans in North Sumatran area which I gave him in round numbers. Ali asked me for expression US attitude towards Indonesian Government in present situation. I said I had no instructions but obviously in absence some positive statement in my opinion we continued regard government in Djakarta as legal government with which we were in diplomatic relations although situation might develop where we would have to look to de facto authorities in North Sumatran areas under their control for protection American lives and property. Referring to press stories that both Simbolon and Banteng groups have announced assumption control over banks their respective areas (Banteng group has prohibited more than 5,000 rupiahs being taken out of area by any one person and Simbolon has limited withdrawals to 2,000 rupiahs), Ali mentioned possibility two groups attempting collect taxes et cetera, from oil and rubber exports and asked what US attitude would be. I said again that I had no instruction on this point but since he had copy of Hackworth Digest International Law3 on his shelves I suggested he might [Page 336] wish read section in Volume I commencing page 128 on our attitude towards de facto authorities Mexico. I repeated however, that I assumed our specific attitude would depend upon developments.
Ali said he was continuing maintain commercial, air and shipping communications with Central Sumatra but had ordered discontinuation air and Indonesian shipping services to north Sumatra (he said Simbolon had already seized Garuda plane in Medan). In reply my question he said no official blockade of North Sumatra yet ordered.
I responded negatively to his question whether I had direct wireless communication with Medan and added that while I had sent number of messages via commercial services, I had no indication they had been received.
Ali promised keep me informed on intelligence he receives on developments North and Central Sumatra which might affect American interests. Regarding South Sumatra he said that while there are some persons in Palembang who are sympathetic to Simbolon and Banteng group he had [no] evidence as yet of any move away from central government.
Ali said he was disappointed to see in newspapers report that Consular Corps Medan had attended ceremony transferring authority from acting governor to Simbolon. I said I had no information as to whether American Consul attended and speculated that perhaps if he had gone, he might not have had advance information as to what ceremony entailed.
Ali expressed hope that minimum contact would be maintained between our Consul and “rebels”. I made no comment except to say that our Consul would, of course, have to keep in contact with local authorities regarding protection American lives and property.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2456. Secret; Priority.↩
- On December 20, local governmental authority in Central Sumatra had been assumed by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, acting on behalf of the Banteng Council of Central Sumatra military officers. Two days later, the commander of North and Central Sumatra, Colonel Simbolon, took control of North Sumatra and severed relations between his command and the Central Government.↩
- Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law (8 vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940–1944).↩
Cumming reported in telegram 1543 from Djakarta, December 27, that in a conversation with an Embassy officer, the Indonesian Chief of Protocol had requested that the American Consulate in Medan avoid any contact with Simbolon and had expressed the hope that if Simbolon tried to force “recognition” from the Medan Consulate, the United States would withdraw its consular officers from Medan. Cumming stated that during a conversation the following day with Secretary General Subandrio, he intended to take the same general line that he had taken with Ali, commenting:
“Because of importance from standpoint protection American lives and property, of maintaining our consular establishment Medan, I believe that oral reply along such lines would satisfy Foreign Office for moment without conceding possibility that we would remove or reduce our consular establishment at Medan, maintenance of which is essential in my opinion not only to protection American lives and property but also continuance contact with Simbolon and political groups in support of him. I will however, unless otherwise instructed, telegraph [Consul John P.] Coffey to avoid in personal contacts and written communications any statements which could give occasion to Indonesian Government charges that we were extending de facto recognition to Simbolon group.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2756)
Telegram 1027 to Djakarta, December 27, replied that the Department concurred in the necessity of maintaining the Medan Consulate, but that the Consulate should avoid acts that might be construed as de facto recognition. (Ibid.) The Central Government’s control of North Sumatra was restored on December 27, when Lieutenant Colonel Djamin Gintings took control from Simbolon.
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