Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

186. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 27, 1956—1 p.m.

1024. Deptel 621.² Balance sheet on results of Sukarno state visits western and Communist countries difficult and necessarily tentative pending opportunity gain clearer picture real effects of trip to Communist countries on Sukarno and members his party and extent their reactions on returning to realities of local Indonesian situation. Most members of party now resting in locations outside Djakarta, and Sukarno outside city and may not return until early November.

However much Sukarno and party may have been impressed by USSR and Red China, I see basic situation facing US policy here little changed as result of trip.

Sukarno’s expressions approval USSR and Red China here perhaps more enthusiastic than required by appreciative guest, notwithstanding extent to which Indonesians tend to over-reciprocate in matters this kind. Apparent, however, that Sukarno’s enthusiastic reactions grow in part out of several previous personal convictions and experiences, such as:

1. Communist lip service in support anti-colonialism during early days Indonesian independence movement and especially Soviet bloc and Red China support Indonesian claim to west Irian.

2. Broad Indonesian agreement on Socialist organization for Indonesia’s society coupled with Indonesian political immaturity and consequent inability to distinguish clearly between socialism and communism, for example marhaenism.

3. Indonesian sense of kinship with Communist China as fellow Asian country in alleged struggle against “colonialism and imperialism” and admiration for what Indonesians conceive to be Chinese success in economic development with general Indonesian tendency gloss over totalitarian means used.

Foregoing factors no doubt conditioned Sukarno and members of party to more ready acceptance apparent achievements, especially material, under Communist regimes. Consequently, not surprising that statements made in USSR and Communist China abound with enthusiasm and superficially at least provide large measure of implied endorsement. From reports which have appeared in Indonesian press and remarks Foreign Minister Abdulgani (mytel 978³), I agree Moscow estimate that Sukarno’s words in USSR “convey general implication of approval of Soviet policies” (Moscow telegram 566 to Department repeated Djakarta 3).⁴ I do not believe however that this was Sukarno’s full intent, for otherwise there would be conflict with tenets of Pantjasila which he sincerely devoted to and repeatedly emphasized during trip.

Sukarno’s statement, speeches and general behavior in Red China also largely endorse Chinese Communist policies, and from previous talks with and public statements by members Sukarno’s party since their return, I judge Sukarno was especially impressed by confidence displayed by top Red Chinese in their leadership, and by outward appearance economic progress in Communist China. Mr. Sukiman, strongly anti-Communist Vice Chairman Masjumi, reportedly told press in Medan when returning October 17 that he was “amazed about reconstruction activities conducted by countries behind the iron curtain,” that “reconstruction activities in Indonesia meant nothing compared to seriousness Soviet and Chinese people in their countries.” Whether Sukiman’s remarks accurately reported, I fear report reflects general impression Sukarno and party.

While too early predict whether and how soon Sukarno will emerge from euphoria to which he succumbed particularly in Red China, I believe some developments during trips will be work to persuade him to regain his balance, such as:

1. His pleasure during US visit was unmarred by any adverse reactions in Indonesia.

2. Widespread and largely successful information play of US trip contrasted lack enthusiasm here for TASS reporting Soviet trip except by Indonesian Communist press.

3. Sukarno’s apparently sincere statement before US Congress “I hope the friendship which will exist between Indonesia and US will be the closest which has ever existed between two countries”.

4. His Semarang speech endorsing US democracy (mytel 289⁵).

5. Seriously adverse reaction here to joint Soviet-Indonesian communiqué which has shown Sukarno there is limit to distance he can go toward accommodation with Communist countries without incurring wrath Moslem and other religious groups as well as elements PNI who anxious hold coalition together.

With few exceptions Sukarno said little in USSR and Red China which he had not said before or which was inconsistent with Indonesia’s “independent” foreign policy as it had developed up to time he left on trips.

Fact Sukarno lent himself to general condemnation “military pact” in Moscow communiqué not so significant to me (it is consistent with previous stand taken by Indonesian leaders) as fact they refused lend themselves more specific condemnation NATO and SEATO in negotiations with Czechs (Prague despatch 127, October 2⁶). Also Masjumi opposition to joint statement with Soviets strongest on this point. Masjumi leaders have made point strongly that Bandung conference did not condemn pacts to which Pakistan, Turkey, Philippines and Thailand and other Asian-African countries belonged, although Indo rejected military pacts system for itself.

Sukarno’s linking Taiwan and west Irian more serious indication his willingness lend Indonesian support to policies opposing those US. However, Chinese Communists gave Indonesians impression they will seek recover Taiwan by peaceful means, apparently suggesting to Indonesians along lines Chou En-lai used at Bandung that they are holding out blandishments to Chiang Kai-shek who they imply they have reason believe will eventually open direct negotiations and agree settlement.

While Sukarno has perhaps verbally gone further on some points than consistent with balanced position between east and west which is avowed goal Indonesia’s independent foreign policy, Sukarno’s statements and actions upon his confrontation political realities here will be more important indications whether he has in fact departed materially from views he held before trip. There are number indications already that his re-immersion into Indonesian political broth working to redress balance. Some those who accompanied him on trip and who were also worried from things he had said that he was losing balance, have expressed to me their reassurance that he has not changed for worse. While there will undoubtedly be lingering effects USSR and Red Chinese trips which will incline Sukarno at times in directions distasteful to US, I am confident there are also lasting effects of his visit to US which will produce results beneficial to US. In my talks with Foreign Minister since his return, he requested we proceed with FCN, Fulbright and other pending negotiations. I can only interpret this as concrete evidence that Indonesian Government desires move toward establishing balance to President’s trip and recently concluded Soviet-Indonesian credit and trade agreements.

Has [As] result Sukarno’s exposure to Tito⁷ and Mao Tse-tung⁸ he may well try to play more active role as “revolutionary President” (one his favorite phrases) to unify and concentrate Indonesia’s political and economic efforts. But there has been healthy reaction here on part Moslem and other religious parties to verbal extravagances to which he lent himself during tours Communist countries and I believe will keep him and country balanced politically.

Whatever outcome various forces working within and influences working on Sukarno, I see basic situation facing US here little changed as result Sukarno’s trips. I believe fact Sukarno trip to US made first and was solid success gave US hold on him which later experiences have not and will not erase.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/10–2756. Secret; Priority. Repeated by the Department to The Hague on October 29. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 621 to Djakarta, October 19, requested the Embassy’s assessment of Sukarno’s visits to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China as soon as possible. (Ibid., 756D.11/10–1856)
3. Telegram 978 from Djakarta, October 22, reported a conversation between Cumming and Abdulgani concerning the latter’s impressions of the countries he had visited on his trip with Sukarno. (Ibid., 756D.11/10–2256)
4. Dated September 12, not printed. (Ibid., 756D.11/9–1256)
5. See footnote 3, Document 167.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/10–256)
7. Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia.
8. Chairman of the People’s Republic of China.