106. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
447. Ambassador Matthews and I are faced with same problem: Both Dutch and Indo are adamant on settlement of New Guinea satisfactory to their aims which at present are incompatible. There seems to be in both countries, however, moderate elements, which I assume we are encouraging, whose aim is not to freeze irrevocably present position of their respective countries. Indonesian position in past has been complicated by Sukarno’s successful efforts to turn deep-seated Indo desire to obtain New Guinea into emotional irredentism in which he has been aided and abetted particularly by PKI and extremist elements PNI who remain in control party. But desire for return New Guinea shared by all parties with moderates and responsible elements, however, calling for negotiation rather than [Page 180] direct action. Abu Hanifah, for example, made particular effort point out to us his remarks (Embtel 3932) designed head off press outcry which might have forced incoming government make strong statement. These latter parties now in control of new government which is oriented much more than outgoing government toward advancement US interests. But even this Cabinet has plank in program calling for “return West Irian to Republic of Indonesia”. Our efforts last year to induce Indonesia not to take Irian question to UN failed and this year it already clear subject will at least be put on provisional agenda. With chance to encourage moderate elements now in government and in respect of US relations with Asia and our Asian allies as well as our Dutch and Australian allies it seems to me only thing we can do is continue policy of neutrality which we followed previously. I, personally, at this distance from center, do not believe it would be departure from neutrality if when asked by individual nations we state that American abstention does not imply we believe others should pursue same policy. (The Hague’s 175 to Department.3) I do not believe however, that any effort should be made by us to change views of Turkey or any other country which signed AA resolution which urged Netherlands “to reopen negotiations as soon as possible to implement their obligations under (Dutch-Indo) agreements and expressed earnest hope that UN would assist parties concerned in finding peaceful solution to dispute”. Effort to effect change in position AA conference country would, in my view, be departure from neutrality and would be viewed with misgivings by opinion in all AA countries.
As seen from here, if we accord to new, much more satisfactory Indo Government less neutral treatment than given Ali Cabinet on New Guinea issue our Asian and Indo friends would question our motives. This would reflect on our general policy toward Indo and discourage favorable orientation new government. In coming year, Indonesia will make decisions which may affect its political orientation for generation to come. Any departure from neutral position on New Guinea will weaken our effectiveness in influencing general Indo policy this particular period, a fact which I believe should be [Page 181] carefully weighed in any consideration of a change in our neutral position.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/8–1655. Secret. Repeated to The Hague and Canberra.↩
- Telegram 393 from Djakarta, August 11, reported that, during a press interview, Abu Hanifah took exception to a statement in the Indonesian press attributed to Robertson that implied that Indonesia wanted to colonize West New Guinea. (Ibid., 656.56D13/8–1155) Telegram 253 to Djakarta, August 13, replied that Robertson’s remarks were evidently misquoted. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 175 from The Hague, August 5, reported that the Secretary General of the Netherlands Foreign Office had urged that the United States should so inform the Latin American countries and Turkey. (Ibid., 756.00/8–555)↩