Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

183. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, January 27, 1955—7 p.m.

543. Pursuant Department telegram 311,² I called this morning on Prime Minister Leng Ngeth in his capacity as Minister Foreign Affairs and left with him note in English and French using September 17 text as modified Department telegram 190. I likewise left with him secret draft of proposed written declaration as set out in English text Department telegram 311 and French text Department telegram 312³ as amended Department telegram 314.⁴

Prime Minister said his energies had been almost completely absorbed in assisting King in preparations for referendum February 7⁵ and he doubted if his government, which was provisional one, would be able to reach decision on US note and accompanying draft declarations until after referendum. However, he promised experts concerned both in Foreign Office and Ministry of Defense would at once study our proposals. I said I was in no hurry, but obviously I could not be expected to authorize direct support of Cambodian armed forces unless I had MAAG to give me expert counsel. Re proposed declaration by Cambodian Government on training, I stressed US did not seek to impose its views on Cambodia, but that if Cambodian Government desired MAAG to assume training function, it was obvious responsibility should be vested in one authority and not two.

I likewise apprised Gorce of my instructions and told him I intended to propose a MAAG bilateral to Cambodian Government. I said bilateral as drafted did not specifically incorporate any engagement re training, but I had made no secret during recent months in conversations with himself and members of French Military Mission that if US undertook to provide ARK with equipment it would be logical to expect US to train ARK in use of such equipment. If Cambodian Government asked us to institute a training mission we would insist on sole responsibility therefor although, of course, we confidently hoped to be able to utilize French instructors, and had no desire abruptly to oust present French Military Mission.

Gorce said he had not yet informed Cambodian Government because French budget had not been voted, but he could inform me in confidence that he thought it probable French would pay for salaries of Military Mission to Cambodia. He likewise hoped French would be able to contribute modest amount of direct military aid to Cambodia in connection with activities of Military Mission. Gorce thought this would include funds for improvement of existing training facilities, but he was not precise on this point.

Once new Minister of Defense gets settled in his job, I shall pursue these matters further directly with him. French, meanwhile, may be expected sedulously to press Cambodians to firm up status of their Military Mission. However, King is fully cognizant of our position and, in fact, had authorized secret engagement by his government for phased withdrawal of French. In consequence, I do not anticipate undue difficulty in making arrangements desired by Department and Defense. However, I continue to feel it would be wise for us to modify language in proposed secret declaration along lines suggested Embassy telegram 532.⁶ This would give us opportunity to make graceful concession without in substance altering our relationship in MAAG or training mission, since obviously no MAAG commander unilaterally fixing a date when he proposes to start training can force Cambodians to accept that decision unless they are ready to accept US training.

Request, therefore, Department respond affirmatively re final sentence first paragraph my telegram 532.⁷

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/1–2755. Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, and Vientiane.
2. Supra.
3. Telegram 312, January 24, contained the French text of the single sentence declaration in English in paragraph 2 of telegram 311, supra. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/1–2455)
4. In telegram 314, January 25, the Department instructed the Embassy to bring the French translation in telegram 312 in line with the English version in telegram 311. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/1–2555)
5. According to telegram 526 from Phnom Penh, January 23, King Norodom Sihanouk announced on January 22 his decision to hold national elections on April 17 and a popular referendum on February 7. The referendum preceding the elections was to obtain public approval for Sihanouk’s 3-year program for maintenance and achievement of national independence and peace. As a consequence of this announcement, the Cabinet resigned and Sihanouk consulted political leaders to form a caretaker government for the period preceding the elections in April. (Ibid., 751H.00/1–2355)
6. In telegram 532, January 25, the Embassy in Phnom Penh expressed concern that the statement did not suggest enough mutuality of agreement with the Cambodians. As written, the MAAG Chief would unilaterally determine the date when instruction responsibilities were to be assumed by the United States. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/1–2555)
7. The final sentence of the first paragraph of telegram 532 reads as follows: “They [the Cambodians] might wish, for example, to ask that language be modified to read that this authority would be assumed at a date to be fixed by mutual agreement by Chief of MAAG and Cambodian Chief of Staff.”