Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

313. Memorandum of Discussion at the 347th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 5, 1957¹

Washington, December 5, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957 (NSC 5720, Part 3²)

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the next item on the agenda was a brief mention of the annual report by the Atomic Energy Commission on the status of its program as of June 30, 1957. He had suggested that Admiral Strauss cover certain topics in this annual report which the NSC Planning Board had found to be of particular interest.

Admiral Strauss stated that he would confine himself to the four topics to which Mr. Cutler had referred, and would conclude with material designed to up-date the report by adding significant developments which had occurred since June 30, 1957. Accordingly, Admiral Strauss read a report covering the following four subjects:

(1) The program for the development of “clean” weapons;

(2) The plans for “Operation Hardtack”, the weapons test scheduled for the spring of 1958 at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds;

(3) The aircraft nuclear propulsion program; and

(4) The program for nuclear propulsion of missiles (the so-called “Rover” program).

Thereafter, Admiral Strauss continued with comments dealing with significant developments in the atomic energy program from June 30, 1957, to the present. He displayed a chart entitled “Weapons in the Stockpile at the End of the Fiscal Year”.³ This chart revealed the extraordinary increases in weapons in the stockpile. Admiral Strauss added that the United States was well ahead of the USSR in both numbers and types of weapons. However, the Soviets have closed the gap between us in the design of weapons. There were perhaps only three or four weapon designs in the possession of the United States which still remained unknown to the Soviet Union.

Admiral Strauss then commented that there appeared to be a concerted effort to convince people that the program of the United States for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, particularly for electric power, was lagging behind. Admiral Strauss insisted that this was not the actuality. He recited a number of power plants which were being built in the United States by private industry, and he strongly supported the incentives for building power reactors provided by private resources.

The President commented that in the face of charges that the program was languishing, we should publicize the actual achievements. The President then reverted to Admiral Strauss’ earlier statements about “clean” weapons. Specifically, the President inquired as to what was the purpose of “clean” weapons of very high yield as opposed to “clean” weapons of low yield. The President believed that if the USSR used “dirty” weapons against the United States he would be inclined to use “dirty” weapons against the USSR, a statement which he qualified by saying that he meant “the big ones”.

Admiral Strauss replied that we had no intention of eliminating “dirty” weapons from the stockpile, but there were certain circumstances in which we would want to be able to make use of a “clean” weapon of high yield. For example, if the United States was preparing to land large forces in some foreign area, we would want to use “clean” weapons of high yield to prepare this area for such a U.S. landing, because if we used “dirty” high-yield weapons the area would be contaminated and could not be entered by our own forces. Moreover, if it came to a situation where we had to use many “dirty” weapons of high yield, the world-wide contamination would be so great that we in the United States would suffer along with our enemies.

. . . . . . .

With reference to Admiral Strauss’ earlier remarks on the program to develop a nuclear-propelled aircraft, the President inquired whether Admiral Strauss had not previously informed him that we could have a nuclear-propelled aircraft flying in two years. Admiral Strauss replied that this was indeed what he had said, but he had also pointed out that such an aircraft would hardly be anything more than a “flying platform”, rather than an effective airplane which could have a military use. He added that the AEC and the Department of Defense were preparing recommendations to be submitted shortly to the President with regard to the aircraft nuclear propulsion program. The President indicated his belief that the achievement of such an aircraft was just as important as the Sputnik.

The National Security Council:⁴

Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on the status of the Atomic Energy Program on June 30, 1957, based on Part 3 of NSC 5720.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

5. Peaceful Uses Of Atomic Energy (NSC 5507/2; NSC Action No. 1726; NSC 5725; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 4, 1957)⁵

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council, again in great detail, on the contents of NSC 5725. In so doing, he listed a number of changes proposed by Admiral Strauss, most of which were accepted by the Council and which were listed in the Record of Action. With respect to the crucial issue set forth in the split paragraph, 33, on measures to facilitate the construction and use of U.S. power reactors and nuclear technology abroad, Mr. Cutler noted Admiral Strauss’ view that a Council decision on this paragraph should be postponed and the matter referred for further study by the Atomic Energy Commission and reconsideration by the NSC Planning Board. Similarly, paragraphs 24 and 34 were suggested for such study and reconsideration.

With respect to subparagraph 41–f, reading as follows:

“f. Explore the feasibility of:

• “(1) Placing U.S. non-military atomic energy facilities under the inspection system of the IAEA, on the condition that the USSR and the United Kingdom would do likewise.
• “[(2) Offering as an alternative proposal, should the USSR be unwilling to join the United States in such a comprehensive approach, to place several U.S. non-military facilities under the Agency inspection system as a confidence-Breeding first step and in order to assure more extensive, world-wide experience in developing a safeguard system.]⁶

“Defense and AEC propose deletion.”,

Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the bracketed portion of subparagraph 41–F be deleted because it did not appear realistic to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to offer unilaterally U.S. non-military atomic facilities for inspection without definite assurance of some progress in international inspection systems. Mr. Cutler went on to point out, further, that the Atomic Energy Commission wished to delete the entire subparagraph, and he asked Admiral Strauss to explain why the AEC proposed such deletion.

Admiral Strauss explained that the objective of inspection was primarily to prevent the plutonium derived from civilian reactors from being used to make atomic weapons. However, if the United States intended to use such plutonium for weapons purposes, there appeared to Admiral Strauss to be no sense in proposing that we set up an inspection system. Governor Stassen indicated his general agreement with Admiral Strauss’ argument. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler suggested that the whole of subparagraph 41—F be deleted.

After dealing briefly with the Financial Appendix to NSC 5725, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council adopt NSC 5725 except for the three paragraphs—24, 33 and 34—which would be reconsidered by the NSC Planning Board and brought to the Council at its meeting of next week.⁷

In conclusion, Admiral Strauss complimented the Planning Board on the excellent job it had done in developing NSC 5725.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5725, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of an initial draft prepared under the direction of the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1726–b; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 4, 1957, and of the views of the Atomic Energy Commission as reported orally at the meeting by the Chairman, AEC.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5725, subject to the following:

(1) The addition, at the end of subparagraph 3–a, of the words, “unless accelerated by a breakthrough.”

(2) Substitution, in subparagraph 8–a, line 3, of “1966” for “1965”.

(3) Revision of the first sentence of paragraph 9 to read: “Since 1953, and especially since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it has been possible to increase cooperation in the non-weapons field between the United States and the United Kingdom.”

(4) Substitution, in subparagraph 11–b, lines 2 and 3, of the words “has just been launched” for “is scheduled to be launched late in 1957”.

(5) Revision of the second sentence of paragraph 21, following the words “conventional plants”, to read: “economically competitive nuclear power is not likely to be achieved in the united States at as early a date.”

(6) Revision of subparagraph 28–d, following the semicolon, to read: “recognizing that this achievement of this objective requires effective implementation of safeguards under bilateral agreements and under the IAEA, but that national nuclear weapons programs can be controlled only through safeguarded disarmament agreements.”

(7) Deletion of subparagraph 41–f and the footnote relating thereto.

(8) Deferral of action on paragraphs 24, 33 and 34 until the next Council meeting, to permit further study of those paragraphs by the Atomic Energy Commission and reconsideration by the NSC Planning Board.

Note: The action in b–(8) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate action by the Atomic Energy Commission.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on December 6.
2. NSC 5720, Part 3, “The Atomic Energy Program”, has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. Documentation on NSC 5720 is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
3. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
4. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1821, approved by the President on December 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)
5. For NSC 5507/2, see Document 14. NSC Action Nos. 1726, May 23, and 5725, November 22, are not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions, and Ibid., Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725 Series, respectively) The memorandum from the Executive Secretary to NSC, December 4, is not printed. (Ibid., Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5725)
6. Brackets in the source text.
7. Infra.
8. Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1824, approved by the President on December 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)