Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

298. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen)¹

Washington, September 27, 1957.

I have studied your informal memorandum of September 23, 1957,² with reference to “disarmament” and have the following comments:

(A) I do not believe that we should now alter, or consider substantial departure from, the Four Power Proposals of August 29, 1957, approved also by NATO. These proposals, made less than a month ago, after months of the most thorough and difficult negotiation within and between the NATO countries, have been hailed by President Eisenhower and myself as historic proposals of great significance. The Soviets have called them a “sham”. If now we basically and precipitously alter them, that in itself will certainly be judged in the eyes of world opinion as substantiating the Soviet characterization of them and we shall be put in a humiliating public position.

I believe that these proposals are in fact sound and of immense significance, and I believe that the United States should defend and support them. That is the position which I publicly took in my opening address at the United Nations General Assembly.³

(B) With respect to the substance of your proposals, a great deal could be said. However, it is perhaps sufficient to say this:

(1) It seems to me that the proposals would give the Soviet Union immediate and immense political successes without any corresponding gain for ourselves, e.g.:

(a) It would bring about a total suspension of testing without any agreement for “cut-off” or inspection against surprise attack;

(b) It would be a major step toward the neutralization and demilitarization of Germany and the freezing of the present partition of Germany;

(c) By adopting the procedure of bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, we would give what has, since 1945, been the great Soviet goal of dealing directly with us to the exclusion of our allies. This procedure would almost surely trouble, if not break, our NATO alliance. It was your bilateral talk in London that precipitated the grave crisis with the UK and Germany last June.

(2) France almost surely would not accept a suspension of testing without a cessation of production and some efforts at least to limit Soviet conventional power. France would feel that it would be placed in a position of permanent inferiority with no compensations. No French Government, we believe, can accept this. It was difficult enough to get the French to accept our present proposals.

(3) We can, I think, be certain that Adenauer would not accept the proposal of what you refer to as “a reasonable initial European-Russian inspection zone”. I assume you refer to a zone substantially more restricted than the “5–35” zone which the Germans have already indicated they would accept as a fall-back position if the Soviets reject the all-Europe zone. Of course the Soviets have not responded to our invitation to propose such a small European zone if they did not want the all-European zone.

(4) We doubt very much that it is practical or desirable to propose the opening up to inspection of the western half of the United States as against Eastern Siberia and adopting in this respect the criterion of equality of square miles as the test which you feel the Russians will demand that we accept.

(5) The suggestions which you make insofar as they relate to nuclear testing, etc., seem contrary to what the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the AEC believe to be compatible with the essential security needs of the United States. But I shall, if you agree, get their specific comments.⁴

(C) The total impact of your proposals seems to me to reinforce the fear held by many both here and abroad that you feel that some agreement between the United States and the Russians is so sought by world public opinion that we should if necessary make such an agreement on Russia’s terms. But world public opinion, now largely emotional, should not be our guide. We should try to guide it. The past record suggests that wars are not avoided, and safety not gained, by imprudent disarmament measures.

(D) Our position should never be inflexible and, as I think you know, we and the UK are now searching for some acceptable and significant formula for the limitation of testing. I suppose that, with the passing of time, the need for testing at anything like the present rate and dimensions would diminish, at least as far as the United States is concerned. There may be changes in the point of view of the French and German Governments. These, and other relevant factors, ought constantly to be taken into account. Certainly, my mind is not closed to the consideration of changes which in themselves have validity. But at the moment it seems to me that all of the considerations which led to our August 29th proposals are valid. The only new event to which you refer is the German elections, and I suspect that Adenauer’s great victory will tend to reinforce him in his views rather than alter those views. With this possible exception, the reasons you give for change of our August 29th position are merely that these changes would make our position more acceptable to the Russians. This seems to me not to be an adequate reason.

John Foster Dulles⁵

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks. Secret.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9–2357)
3. Regarding Dulles’ speech, see Document 295.
4. Strauss’ views on Stassen’s informal memorandum of September 23 are contained in his memorandum to Dulles, September 28. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks) Strauss’ memorandum was attached to a note from Dulles to Eisenhower, September 29. (Ibid.) For the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Document 300 and its enclosure.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.