Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

254. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, July 2, 1957—noon.

36. Eyes only for the Secretary from Stassen. Please deliver to the Secretary personally 9 a.m., July 2nd.

1. Acknowledging your Deptel 04 of July 1st.² Will look forward to receiving memorandum of conference, and in the meantime on a basis of surmise from the public statements which I have seen, I send this immediate comment for your consideration and, if you so decide, for the information of the President and others.

2. It would appear that perhaps some parts of the inseparable facts have not been explained in full to the President and to the Senators.

3. It has always been contemplated in our US studies and recommendations that nuclear research would go on and that the testing of nuclear reactions which would have a non-military and peaceful use, … would go on under international agreement and observation.

4. …

5. For example, the Anglo-French plan of March 19, 1956³ which was presented after extensive US work in reorienting Anglo-French thinking to the facts of modern developments has under the third stage of disarmament, paragraph 1, the following. Para “prohibition, under control, of nuclear test explosions for military uses; nuclear explosions directed towards the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses may take place under controls, subject to the approval of an international scientific committee. Simultaneously, prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons.”

6. The US delegation could not under the then US policy join in the Anglo-French document because of a number of sections which were not in line with US policy. But the USDEL since I have been its chairman has never made any contrary comment to the sense above quoted paragraph.

7. On the other hand, from a standpoint of arresting world public opinion and turning it toward US leadership, it is important that the temporary suspension for 10⁴ months which I have now advanced within the authority of paragraph 8 of the June 11th paper reflecting the May 25 decisions should be at this moment in the negotiations a focal point for attention without introducing confusing or retracting psychology. As you are aware, I have always opposed within the US Government establishing this first suspension on any long period such as two years. It has always been my view that the US needs complete bargaining power during the first year to shape the second step in keeping with our own national security and in the light of the most up-to-date scientific, military and political information then available. This complete power of US decision as to where to go beyond the first year, even after a treaty is ratified, I have always maintained in the negotiations.

8. You and the President should also know if you are not now aware of it that there is also US research going on and testing regarding methods to make bombs more poisonous, more radioactive, more dirty, as well as to make them clean. This research in greater radioactivity, in my view, should stop if a first step agreement is reached. Furthermore, to the best of my information, the Department of Defense has been resisting the refabrication of dirty bombs now in the locker which could be made more clean under research proved out more than a year ago.

9. In all Western governments who have recently begun to consider this matter in seriousness, there is now a growing appreciation of the value of safeguards against surprise attack, against incidents getting out of hand, and against the wide spreading of nuclear weapons into multiple and less responsible hands. See Paris Polto 25 on NATO council session.⁵ These values must always be kept in the equation of decision on a first step, as you have often and ably pointed out personally.

10. It would be my further view that a 30 minute presentation by you to the American people would be very desirable. It would carry great weight. It would clarify much of the confused thinking. It would show that the US is seeking an agreement which will serve our sound national interest, and is doing so on the only basis that is ever feasible in this type of international negotiation, and that is to find the ground where our national interest coincides with the national interest of other nations involved. Such a presentation by you would be helpful within the next few days at your discretion.

11. When I receive the memorandum of the conference I will comment further,⁶ but trust you do not mind this immediate and preliminary response.

12. In response to your inquiry regarding the Senators, I believe the value of their spending a few days here at an early date is that they would give their own concentrated attention to this subject, and it is so complex that it requires concentrated, sequential study to thoroughly understand the US national interest. It would also reveal to them that we are not soft in firm persistent negotiations with the Soviet Union and the other Western States. They could then follow the Washington end of the cables and consult in the future decisions in Washington more intelligently and with a greater sense of participation.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/7–257. Top Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 595–598.
4. The number “1.6” has been deleted and the number “10” has been handwritten on the source text.
5. Dated June 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–2957)
6. No further comment by Stassen on the memorandum of the scientists’ conference with the President has been found in Department of State files.