252. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State1

Dear Foster: On 12 June 1957, Mr. Stassen called on Mr. Quarles2 and stated he felt it would be very helpful if we could place in his hands a U.S. proposed list of equipment to be deactivated concurrently with the first stage reduction of forces, as set forth in paragraph 11(b) of the U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament.3 He confirmed this request in his cable from London (7050) dated 18 June 1957.4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a list of armaments5 which they would propose be placed in storage in connection with a force level reduction to 2.5 million. This list, together with the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which I am in general agreement, are attached in the enclosure hereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious concern regarding a premature disclosure of the list. They recommend, and I agree, that the list should not be introduced into the Disarmament Sub-Committee until such time as progress in the negotiations of other crucial items warrants such action. In this connection, it is noted that Mr. Stassen [Page 646] reported on 26 June (London cable 72856) that the current discussion is directed toward the principle of such lists in a first step, and does not involve at this time any exchange of actual lists.

The list of equipment submitted herewith is tentative in nature and is designed for discussion and coordination with our principal allies. The Department of Defense would expect to be kept advised of the progress and results of such consultations, and be afforded an opportunity to revise the list, if this appears to be indicated, before it is introduced in the negotiations. Similarly, after the lists have been exchanged in the Sub-Committee the U.S. delegate should, of course, make no agreement as to the final lists to be adopted until they have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of the Western Four presenting their lists of equipment of the Soviets first (as Mr. Zorin has suggested) and of a simultaneous presentation of all lists in the Sub-Committee have been weighed. It is our view that the latter procedure should be followed. For this reason, there should be no disclosure to the Soviet delegate of the nature or content of the U.S. list of equipment until the formal and simultaneous exchange takes place.

Because of their concern regarding the consequences, both at home and abroad, of a premature disclosure of the list of equipment they have submitted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that it not be forwarded to Mr. Stassen for discussion with our allies until such time as we deem it appropriate. I would suggest, therefore, that we consult and arrive at a mutual determination as to the propitious time to take this action.7

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson
[Page 647]

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)8

SUBJECT

  • Disarmament Planning (U)
1.
In response to a memorandum dated 20 June 1957, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject as above,9 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a tentative list of armaments which could be placed in storage in connection with a force level reduction to 2.5 million as set forth in paragraph 11 b of the U.S. Position on First Phase of Disarmament.
2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff question the advisability of introducing any list of armaments into the current disarmament negotiations at the present time. There are many critical unresolved issues still before the conference. The matter of determining specific quantities of designated armaments to be deposited in internationally supervised storage depots should be among the last issues to be introduced in the present disarmament negotiations, and such introduction should be dependent upon previous agreement upon other crucial items in the U.S. Position on First Phase of Disarmament approved by the President on 12 June 1957. In any event, the initial list of armaments proposed by the United States should be presented first to the western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee for thorough discussion and coordination of lists. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considerable misgivings with respect to the effect of a premature disclosure of such a U.S. list. During the process of coordination of armaments lists with our Allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect to be kept fully informed of the Status of Allied consultations. Until the results of these consultations have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no U.S. list should be discussed with or given to the Soviets either on a formal or informal basis.
3.
After determination to exchange a list of armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge strongly that the list by the United States be presented to the Soviet Delegate only with a simultaneous presentation by the Soviet Delegate to the United States Delegate of a similar list. The U.S. Delegate should make it clear that the list proposed by the United States is being submitted only for the purpose of negotiating [Page 648] a mutually agreed list to be incorporated in any agreement. The Department of Defense should ask the Department of State to emphasize to the U.S. Delegate that any mutually agreed list should be provisional in nature, pending review by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4.
The numbers of armaments in the tentative list prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff bear only a general relation to a reduction in manpower from 2.8 million to 2.5 million. In order to provide a list indicative of a general order of magnitude, the reduction of approximately 300,000 men from the Services was apportioned in direct relation to each Service’s present strength. This theoretical apportionment of the overall personnel reduction and the resultant list should be recognized as being only a rough approximation and must not be constructed as a final solution to the problem. Any list of arnaments actually to be placed in storage would, of necessity, be based upon the actual force structure existing at that time and would have to reflect appropriate consideration of specific agreements reached and of the list provided by the USSR. In addition, a meaningful list of armaments to be stored can be reasonably determined only when the timing of such action can be predicted with considerable certainty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in finalizing such a list, would retain those armaments required to insure the maximum offensive and defensive capabilities of those forces allowed under the terms of any agreement reached, and would expect the USSR to do the same.
5.
For the foregoing reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urge that the provisional list of armaments provided herewith not be forwarded to Mr. Stassen until such time as determined propitious by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
6.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe Mr. Stassen’s query, concerning the dosing of U.S. bases in the European area, refers to a proposal to close four fighter bases in England. This action has been held in abeyance at the request of SACEUR, pending completion of his dispersal requirements. If action of this kind is planned later, Mr. Stassen could be advised by the Secretary of Defense.
7.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing form the basis of your reply to the Secretary of State.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford10
Chairman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7–157. Top Secret.
  2. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
  3. Document 237.
  4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–1857)
  5. This list, an appendix attached to the enclosure, is not printed.
  6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–2657)
  7. In a letter to Stassen, July 3, Dulles attached the enclosure (including the list of armaments) printed below and asked for Stassen’s comments on it as to timing and tactics. Dulles said it should not be discussed with U.S. allies and in fact should not become known that he had such a paper. (Ibid., 600.0012/7–157)
  8. Top Secret.
  9. Quarles’ memorandum on disarmament planning, June 20, has not been found in Department of State files.
  10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.