Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

249. Memorandum From the Senior Member, National Security Council Special Staff (Smith), to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)¹

Washington, June 26, 1957.

1. The information which was given to the President on June 24 by Admiral Strauss and three ranking nuclear scientists, Drs. Lawrence, Mills and Teller, reopens the issue of nuclear testing, in my opinion, from both a technical and a moral point of view.²

2. The scientists, summarizing the knowledge gained primarily within the last 30 days, made two crucial statements:

a. …

b. An agreement to stop tests cannot be policed with certainty, a reversal of an earlier view which was necessitated by recent experiments with “the deep cavity technique” of using … thermonuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

3. The scientists raised the moral issue of the use of nuclear weapons in the following way:

a. If we know how to make … weapons, but fail to do so and to convert existing weapons into … ones, then the use of dirty weapons in war would be a “crime against humanity”.

d. If we live up to an agreement to stop our tests and the Soviets continue (secretly and illegally) testing and develop … bombs, we may face a situation in the future in which world opinion would inhibit us from using our … weapons, while the Soviet Union would not be restrained from using their … weapons. Technically, it is possible to add materials to … weapons which would result in radioactive fall-out.

c. In the long run it might be advantageous for us to know that all nuclear powers possess … weapons… .

4. Our present position on first phase of disarmament (June 11 policy statement³ ) states in paragraph 8 that, as part of a package deal, we will agree to refrain from nuclear tests for 12 months after the effective date of an arms agreement, upon the condition that the parties to the agreement cooperate in setting up an effective international arrangement to monitor tests. This position, in substance, has been made known to our allies, the Soviet representative and to the public in general.

5. The President told the scientists that our proposals for stopping tests are in the context of stopping war, that we have no thought of stopping tests without some kind of package deal. The President volunteered, at his next press conference if he were asked, to explain that we declined to join in unreservedly abandoning tests because our tests are projected to clean up weapons and thus protect civilians in the event of war.

6. The situation thus created is as follows:

a. The scientists wish to continue testing for 6 to 7 years.

b. The President, acknowledging the uninformed pressure of world opinion, is thinking in terms of halting testing in return for real control of nuclear weapons.

c. Mr. Stassen is in London offering a suspension of tests to the Russians in return for their taking limited steps toward future control of nuclear weapons.

7. Several alternatives, none of them easy, present themselves.

a. We could frankly explain the new situation, the advantages of clean bombs, continue our testing and let those who would criticize continue to do so.

b. We can continue our present position in London and take the risk that the conditions attached to our agreement to suspend tests will be unacceptable to the Russians—therefore no suspension would take effect. Additionally, we might inform Mr. Stassen of the new situation and instruct him to so conduct the negotiations that Soviet acceptance would be remote.

8. The over-all implications of what the scientists have told the President are very disturbing. Their judgment that no policing of nuclear tests can be relied upon must be accepted. The risks involved in illegal and undetected Soviet testing were considered by the scientists to be very serious. The scientists obviously would wish to continue testing for professional reasons. In addition, there may be an unconscious desire to reduce the horror of nuclear weapons which they are responsible in large part for creating. Any attempt to insure that only clean weapons were in the hands of the nuclear powers appears impossible in the light of the fact that it is a simple operation, apparently, to convert … weapons into … ones. Moral restraints which would bear on our use of weapons would certainly not apply to the Soviet Union if an advantage could be gained by them in using dirty weapons. As knowledge spreads …. In the talks leading up to a decision on our offer to suspend nuclear tests, few of these problems, as far as I know, were discussed.

Recommendation

Admiral Strauss should be given an opportunity to present the case against suspension of tests to the same group which made the decisions now embodied in the June 11 paper. Discussion of this crucial issue would be facilitated if the Chairman of the AEC were asked to prepare a short discussion paper of the reasons against a suspension of tests. Adequate staffing of this paper prior to a discussion in the presence of the President would result in information which is not now generally known to those officials dealing with disarmament.

Bromley

11:30 a.m.⁴

P.S. The President’s press conference statement (attached)⁵ have overtaken some of the above information. The policy issue remains.

BKS

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Tests. Top Secret.
2. See Supra.
3. Document 237.
4. The time and the following postscript have been added in handwriting.
5. The President’s press conference statement, June 26, is not attached to the source text, but is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 498–499.