Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

220. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, June 4, 1957—noon.

6671. USDEL Disarmament No. 245. Subject: Report of Four Power Meeting, June 3, 1957.

1. Noble opened session and asked for suggestion on the method of proceeding in the work assigned. Stassen suggested this week be primarily engaged in thorough Western Four power consideration of new positions with minimum of subcommittee sessions. Suggested therefore no subcommittee meeting on Tuesday² and entire day be devoted to Four Power consultations; subcommittee meeting on Wednesday and then, since Moch must go to France for personal engagement on Thursday, and since Monday is British holiday Whit-sun, next subcommittee meeting be June 11th. Further, that the two subcommittee meetings this week be of generalized nature and not include discussion of new positions.

2. Moch said he did not wish to differ with this procedure but he did wish to advise his colleagues that putting the U.S. informal memorandum of May 31 into Zorin’s hands had caused considerable agitation in Paris. Pineau said if any allusion was made to U.S. paper at subcommittee meeting, Moch should leave meeting because U.S. paper would not be studied in Paris until new French Government had been formed.³Moch added he must be in France on personal engagement of long standing to lecture at French university on June 6th and that he could not say whether or not he would be able to speak on the new U.S. positions when subcommittee convenes on June 11 (after Whitsun holiday) because must await formation of new French Government.

3. Stassen said he had no intention of discussing the informal talking paper in subcommittee at any time—that it was a talking paper, and that if we reached point where it was desirable put in a text for discussion in subcommittee, it would be a different text. Referring to suggestion that Soviets would not respect character of U.S. memorandum as “talking paper”, Stassen said this could be the case, but if it were, it would mean that Soviets were not really interested in reaching agreement. If so, it would be well to find that out right away. Stassen suggested that on other hand, if Soviets were in fact interested in agreement, it was important they not misunderstand U.S. position. That was reason, after reading paper to Zorin, it had been handed over to him. Stassen stressed fact he had made it plain that paper was not to be regarded as containing firm proposals, that it was in generalized and carefully hedged language, and that consultations with other governments might lead to amendments or modifications. Stassen felt however, that in view of fact that consultations with NATO and with Adenauer⁴ were publicly known to have taken place, he felt it was important to acquaint Zorin with general nature of U.S. position if negotiations were not to break down.

4. Noble (U.K.) said that matter had caused astonishment within U.K. Govt, which thought that even talking papers should be discussed among Four Powers before treating with Soviets.

5. Moch said he did not fear discussions of paper in subcommittee nearly as much as possible public discussions in event of “an indiscretion in the press”. If matter became public, it would undoubtedly be raised in French Parliament in debate in connection with formation of new government. In that event, new govt would undoubtedly be obliged take position inconsistent with certain of ideas expressed in U.S. memorandum, with result that position of new government would no longer be flexible.

6. Stassen expressed regret regarding colleagues’ feelings in matter and stated he did not intend to hand any more informal talking papers to Zorin until colleagues agreed that he could do so. He hoped after his colleagues reflected they would recognize merit and necessity of this procedure and would approve of his further use of this method of work and exploration. He had not wished give talking paper of May 31 the increased status of having been cleared by Four Powers since process would take three to four weeks, with resultant suspension of negotiations, and this would undoubtedly give rise to complaints by Soviets that although they ready to move, Four Western Powers were not. Stassen emphasized that U.S. not committed by paper, that we could change any clause, and could move in any direction. He felt we were obliged indicate some general direction of movement rather than merely reject Soviet proposals.

7. Stassen suggested that no agreement would suit every government 100 percent. It would be necessary to look at agreement as package and then determine whether it would improve prospects of peace and reduce tensions. He did not think as Moch had suggested that any provisions of U.S. paper were contrary to NATO doctrine and that although it was perhaps too soon to know full NATO reaction, no objections had been expressed so far, following NAC consultations of May 29 of outlines of U.S. position.

8. Stassen said that U.S. does not intend permit Soviet delegation to treat U.S. paper as formal U.S. proposals until it had been fully cleared with other three Western subcommittee members. U.S. believes that formal proposals would take form of draft treaty language which would be worked through by five subcommittee delegations and then referred to governments.

9. Stassen said principal question was whether our governments were decided on reaching agreement on partial measures in disarmament and that in considering this, it was necessary have in mind 11 years of failure and that way toward agreement was not easy, either in procedure or substance.

10. Stassen raised question of whether matter of personal appearances before subcommittee of Indian and other representatives should be reconsidered. It was agreed among four that no change in our position was desirable.

11. Stassen raised question of whether successful results of subcommittee session should take form of draft treaty between the five, or of a report to general assembly which would envisage a separate treaty conference. Moch was of view that we should endeavor negotiate treaty among five and join it to report to General Assembly.

12. Meeting concluded with stassen suggestion of full day of Four Power consultations tomorrow being accepted by all.⁵Stassen said he would not expect any new decisions tomorrow on the new U.S. position, but would like to see full understanding achieved and accordingly would want talk about position in some detail in preparation for Four Power decision at an early date.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–457. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Ottawa, Bonn, Moscow, and Tokyo.
2. June 4.
3. Guy Mollet resigned as Prime Minister on May 21 and a new cabinet headed by Bourgès-Maunoury was formed on June 11.
4. For a summary of Stassen’s consultation with NATO, see Document 210. Regarding Adenauer’s visit to the United States, see Document 205.
5. Summaries of the Four-Power consultations held on June 4 were transmitted in telegrams 6705 from London, June 4, and 6713 from London, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–457 and 330.13/6–557, respectively)