Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

218. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 3, 1957¹

Washington, June 3, 1957

SUBJECT:

• Stassen Memorandum Given to Zorin

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Alphand, French Ambassador
• M. Lucet, French Minister
• M. Vimont, French Minister²
• Mr. Wilcox—IO
• Mr. Beam—EUR

Ambassador Alphand said he had been instructed to register his government’s protest with the Secretary over Stassen’s submission to Zorin of the US “informal memorandum.” He requested an interview with the Secretary on his return³ but in the meantime wished to acquaint Mr. Wilcox with his government’s feelings in the matter. He recalled Stassen had met with both the French and the British before returning to London and had most solemnly assured them that nothing would be presented to the Russians without full Western consultation. Stassen had further asserted that the May 27 Subcommittee meeting would be purely pro forma and that some time would elapse before the US would have anything to give to the Soviets.⁴

The Ambassador contended that Stassen had now presented to Zorin a plan with some new ideas about which the French had known nothing. This was a dangerous way to act. The French did not object to bilateral talks between the US and USSR, following full consultation with the other Western governments. In the Stassen memorandum the French, however, objected to the concept of an “atomic club” excluding certain powers, and to the aerial inspection of Europe, to which neither the French nor German governments agreed. As another new item Alphand also referred to zones where atomic installations would be prohibited. He said Stassen’s discussion of controls was vague and in fact amounted to no controls at all.

The following were additional points in the memorandum which Alphand said his government objected to: Paragraph 23; Paragraph 11, which was vague in its definition of aggression; Paragraph 25, which would place the onus for a breakdown in disarmament on any power objecting to this particular concept.

Alphand stressed that there was no such thing as a personal approach to the Soviets who would exploit any statement or document as having official meaning. Stassen had said nothing to Moch about his intentions. The French government took the matter so seriously that it had considered instructing Moch not to attend further meetings of the Subcommittee; while he might now attend, he would remain completely silent.

Alphand said it was most important that the press should learn nothing about the memorandum but he feared it might leak soon since Mr. Reston⁵ had called him about a Stassen plan. He urgently requested that every step be taken to prevent a leak and that Stassen hold no further meetings with Zorin until full coordination had been arranged.

Mr. Wilcox said he did recall Stassen’s meeting with the French and the British and the French concern over the Subcommittee meeting set for May 27. Mr. Pineau had made the same representations to our Chargé in Paris.⁶ According to report from London, Stassen had given the same memorandum to the French, British and the Canadians.⁷ Mr. Wilcox was distressed that the French government should feel this way about last weekend’s events. He believed there must have been a misunderstanding and promised Alphand we would look into it. In the meantime we would inform Stassen of the French request to avoid leaks and to refrain from another bilateral talk with Zorin without further consultation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6–357. Secret. Drafted by Beam.
2. Jacques P. Vimont.
3. A memorandum of conversation among Alphand, Lucet, Dulles, and Elbrick, June 5, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6–557.

4. A memorandum of conversation among Stassen, Alphand, and others, May 24, reads in part:

   “Mr. Stassen said that he had fully in mind the essentiality of prior Western consultations, to which he is committed, and expected that the Subcommittee meetings, until the Western position is developed, would be pro forma and few and short.” (Ibid., 330.13/5–2457)

   A memorandum of conversation among Stassen, Coulson, and others, May 24, noted that Stassen “recognized the importance of consultations with other NATO members before tabling revised proposal in the Subcommittee.” (Ibid.)

5. James B. Reston, chief Washington correspondent, The New York Times.
6. Reference is to telegram 6149 from Paris, June 1; see footnote 5, Document 216.
7. No report from London of this action has been found, but it is confirmed in Walmsley’s memorandum to Secretary Dulles, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3–357)