Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

193. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

London, May 7, 1957.

Dear Chris: Thank you for your thoughtful letter of May 3rd² enclosing a copy of an evaluation of the Soviet disarmament proposals of April 26th drawn up in the Department.³

Your estimate in the Department runs along very much the same lines as the estimate developed here in the Delegation. It also checks quite well with the evaluation by the other Western Delegations, although the British are showing rather more reserve and we are not certain of the complete motivations for their position.

I am enclosing an interim memorandum of some of our further appraisal of the Soviet proposals. We are also developing the USDEL recommendations to the U.S. government. I wrote to the Secretary while he was at Paris with some suggestions for his consideration as to the procedure to be followed.⁴

I have asked Lawrence Weiler, a member of the Delegation who has been one of the State Department personnel on our Special White House Study Group to bring this letter to you, and copies of the memorandum to the Department. He will be available for staff level discussions in the Interdepartmental work. He is thoroughly familiar with all of the various bilateral and multilateral discussions in London.⁵

Sincerely,

Harold

[Enclosure]

INTERIM APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF APRIL 26, 1957 AND OF THE RELATED SITUATION

1. The key sentence in the Soviet paper is the following:

“The Soviet Government proposes that the governments of the States represented in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission should reach an agreement on partial disarmament measures”.

2. The primary Soviet concern for their own future security is that the spread of nuclear weapons, through their production by additional countries and/or through the transfer by the U.S. and the UK, and through the consequential delivery of nuclear weapons to China and some of the Eastern European force by the USSR, is likely to result, from either careless, irresponsible, or headstrong action, by some state other than the U.S. and the USSR, in the triggering of hostilities which would then involve the U.S. and the USSR in a nuclear war; and this would occur under circumstances in which the U.S. would have a posture that would result in the substantial destruction of the Soviet Union.

3. It is the Soviet estimate of the U.S. position that the U.S. is also concerned about the fourth country spread of nuclear weapons production, but that the U.S. does not put as much weight on the spread through nuclear weapons transfer, does not realize the countering pressures for Soviet delivery to Warsaw states and China, and that the U.S. does have some concern over a future potential of surprise attack upon the U.S.

4. The Soviet Union is prepared to reach an agreement for partial measures which would serve the mutual interest against fourth country spread of nuclear weapons production, which would decrease the other stated dangers to Soviet security, and which would reciprocally decrease the stated grounds for concern for U.S. security.

5. This is the basic reason for the extensive offer to open up Siberia, in delayed response to the original Eisenhower proposal at Geneva.

6. If these Soviet objectives can be served in some degree, all portions of the Soviet position in the April 26th paper are negotiable in some degree, but the Soviet will bargain hard to get the maximum advance on their security objectives and to pay as small a price as possible for U.S. and free world security objectives.

7. The Soviet is uncertain and uneasy about the effect which a partial agreement would have on their regime within the USSR and their relations with the Satellites.

8. The specific wording of the Soviet proposal need not be given undue attention if the objectives in paragraph two above are served, but the amount of movement that the Soviet will make on their total position is limited and the amount they will move on some of their points is quite narrow.

9. There will be almost as great difficulty in fitting together provisions for a partial agreement satisfactory to France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the UK, as there will be for the USSR.

Note: Important factual correction of Department memorandum, paragraph III (f). The Soviet proposal does include 28,000 square miles of Soviet territory in the European zone of aerial inspection.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5–757. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Delivered by hand ⅝ 12:25 pm.”
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 600.0012/5–357)
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. Supra.
5. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Would like to see Weiler if available. C.A.H.” No record of a meeting between Herter and Weiler has been found in Department of State files, but Weiler later confirmed to the editors that he met with Herter upon his return to Washington on this occasion.