125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

5346. For US Del Disarmament. Following Recommendations in position paper on Restrictions on Nuclear Weapons Tests2 approved by agencies concerned:

1.
U.S. should state that if agreement to limit effectively nuclear weapons under proper safeguards is satisfactorily implemented as part of a comprehensive plan for regulation and control of armaments, including satisfactory operation of aerial and ground inspection, United States would be prepared to agree to restrictions on testing of such weapons. U.S. should make no commitment now as to nature or phasing of restrictions on testing of nuclear weapons within such a comprehensive plan.
2.
If USSR should propose cessation or limitation of tests of nuclear weapons, as a partial measure of disarmament, U.S. should relate such a proposal to a safeguarded disarmament system including adequate inspection. U.S. should oppose implementation of restrictions on nuclear weapons tests as an isolated step. By itself such a step would not limit production of nuclear weapons and would not reduce [Page 361] danger of surprise attack. However United States should indicate its interest in considering any such proposal by USSR within larger context and should refer to Indian proposal in this connection.
3.
United States should point out need, in absence of such a comprehensive disarmament system, of taking measures essential to maintenance of its national defense and security of free world. Continued testing of nuclear weapons is one of these essential measures.
4.
United States should emphasize that none of extensive data collected from all tests shows that radioactivity is being concentrated in dangerous amounts anywhere in world outside testing area. U.S. should cite its initiative in establishment of UN Scientific Committee3 which will assist in compilation and dissemination of information on effects of radiation on man and his environment.
5.
U.S. should seek a common Western position on this issue along above lines. To this end it should attempt dissuade France and UK from pressing for separate restrictions on nuclear weapons tests.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3–1656. Secret. Drafted by Baker and approved by Bond. Repeated to Paris.
  2. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
  3. See Document 84.