117. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1
1964. Ref Embtel 1839.2 In view snowballing anti-nuclear test publicity, Embassy–USIS believe in addition to cooperative measures proposed para 7 reftel3 urgent consideration be given to problem of compensation to fishermen for direct and legitimate losses resulting from tests. It now appears inevitable that test series will create in Japan serious political and propaganda problems even without repetition of “Fukuryu Maru” incident.4 Recognizing compensation involves difficult legal aspects, Embassy considers that problem should be dealt with on political level and divorced from question of legal liability as was case with Bikini payment. Political settlement without prejudice to principle of legal liability appears best means for heading off revival of Japanese bitterness and hysteria characteristic of Bikini incident and serious difficulties in our relations with Japanese Government. Risk thereof is sufficiently grave in our opinion to merit serious consideration of following:
Compensation problem appears involve two aspects which can be handled separately: (1) Losses resulting from inability to fish in restricted area and from need to navigate around area in order reach other areas; and (2) losses resulting from contamination of fishing grounds and catch. Former category of losses can be roughly determined in advance of tests and dealt with full even before tests begin. Embassy–USIS aware of difficulties in committing US Government to pay such claims on case-by-case basis. Not only would this appear establish legal liability but would involve handling demands likely to be unreasonable and exorbitant. Furthermore, possibility exists that fishing industry would take opportunity squeeze as much as possible and come up with claims for alleged damages which we not prepared [Page 344] to honor. Rather than deal with such claims on case-by-case basis, Embassy suggests that US announce its recognition of inconvenience caused to fishermen from tests and its willingness turn over to Japanese Government on ex gratia basis lump sum to assist Government in compensating fishermen for added expenses due to detours. Do not believe this would involve large sum and sum could be determined through checking fishing in area during previous years. This method of compensation would go far meet legitimate complaints of Japanese fishing interests and demonstrate to public US concern and humanitarian attitude in contrast to Soviet callousness. At same time, we would avoid legal liability and involvement in processing claims.
Losses resulting from contamination involve even more sensitive political problem. Probably needless to point out that should unforeseen incident occur as result of tests (e.g. contamination of fish or injury to fishing craft) reaction here would be immediate and explosive and our efforts to counteract after the fact would very likely be almost completely unsuccessful. Scientific and technical arguments would be of little avail and the tremendous propaganda organization available to the anti-test groups here (backed by outraged public opinion) would be relentless. A scientific survey group composed of both US and Japanese scientists (who have during the past two years established closer relationships) established in advance to deal with this subject could be most useful in meeting situation. It would have respect of Japanese people, could calm their fears about minor radioactivity which sensation seekers are bound to find. Joint scientific survey could determine in advance radiation standards and after test study fishing grounds as well as check fish coming into Japan. In establishing joint survey, we could state in advance that some compensation might be required despite maximum precautions taken by both Governments. If survey determined real damages resulted from tests, we would be prepared compensate quickly—again on ex gratia basis—using findings of survey to determine amount of lump sum payment.
From viewpoint of meeting political and propaganda problem in Japan, most preferable action would be statement in advance of tests setting forth: (1) 1956 tests will be on substantially smaller scale than those of 1954 and US Government and scientific authorities taking maximum precautions avoid injury to fishing and shipping and restrict navigation near test area; (2) US recognizes certain Japanese fishing boats will inevitably be forced to detour from test area and therefore US is providing sum to Japanese Government to assist in meeting added expenses; and (3) US invites Japanese to participate in scientific survey to check contamination of fish or fishing grounds and will be guided by findings of survey in considering further ex gratia compensation.
[Page 345]If decision made to provide some form of compensation on grounds of political desirability, suggest statement be issued simultaneous with announcement of restricted area (Deptel 1796)5 and safety precautions to be taken in order meet leftist propaganda and be of maximum positive usefulness in calming public opinion and government pressure on US.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/2–2256. Secret; Priority.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 711.5611/2–956)↩
Paragraph 7 of telegram 1839, February 9, reads:
“7. Several forms of cooperation with Japanese might be considered: (a) Give ample notice of prohibited areas, timing of tests, etc., to assure fishing fleets warned prior departure from port; (b) invite observers if any foreigners are to be present at tests; (c) arrange periodic consultations on safety precautions and radiation standards; (d) conduct joint scientific survey after tests to determine whether normal fishing grounds contaminated; and (e) encourage Japanese to work out orderly procedures for application of these standards in order to avoid panic over irradiated fish.”
↩- For documentation on the repercussions of the incident involving the Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon), a Japanese fishing vessel exposed to radiation following a U.S. H-bomb test in the Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1622 ff. Also see the memorandum of the telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and Strauss, March 29, 1954, ibid., vol. II, Part 2, p. 1379.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/2–2156)↩