92. Memorandum From Matthew Looram of the Office of Western European Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Office (Torbert)1
SUBJECT
- Algeria
The following are a few thoughts gained from my recent trip to Algiers and Paris:
Paradoxically, the problem for France today is how to extricate herself from Algeria; for Algeria, the long-term problem is how to maintain French interest in the area. It is no longer a question of how France can permanently keep Algeria a part of the Metropole—it cannot be done. The eventual formation of an Algerian state in some form or another is inevitable. The task, therefore, confronting France today is to devise a means of liquidating and transforming her present relationship with Algeria without provoking an internal French crisis. With regard to Algeria, there is no evidence that it is yet ready for complete independence, and French financial assistance will be desperately required for a long time to come. In the long run, the greatest danger for Algeria is the possibility that, in the process of extricating herself from Algeria, France will become so disillusioned as to be unwilling to contribute further to the economic development of North Africa in general and Algeria in particular. If this should occur, a very costly and onerous responsibility would fall upon us.
As the Algiers Consulate General has often reported, the final decision on Algeria will be made in Paris, not Algiers, and probably as a result of factors, financial and other, extraneous to Algeria. The present situation in Algeria, although a temporary phase, can continue indefinitely. As long as the French are willing to station 400,000 troops in Algeria, they can probably hold on. In fact, the French military have had very considerable success in their pacification program in certain areas. At the moment the rebellion is in the doldrums—presumably preparing for greater activity at the occasion of the U.N. debate. It seems probable, however, that the military potential of the rebel forces remains intact, if not improving.
The military, psychological and economic effort now being made by the French in Algeria is nothing short of stupendous—roads, [Page 283] housing and public works of every nature are currently being undertaken on a large scale. The military have restored contacts with the Moslem population in many areas, and the S.A.S. officers are doing a magnificent job.2 However, the contacts are with rural elements and not the urban population. Moreover, irrespective of the efforts of the French military, the Moslem and French communities of Algeria are farther apart than ever. The successes obtained by the military can only be temporary and would be obliterated overnight by their departure.
In the political realm the French effort to date has been very limited indeed, and what has and is being done is probably all the traffic will bear for the time being. There is no basis, however, for believing that the loi-cadre, at least in its present form, will have any bearing on the course of the rebellion or will contribute to a solution of the Algerian problem. Basically a retreat from the Mollet program, it is unlikely that the loi-cadre will have a significant effect on the Moslem population and it is doubtful that it could ever fully be implemented. The fallacy of the loi-cadre, which I cannot help but feel is mere window-dressing for the benefit of the U.N. in general and the U.S. in particular, is that it inherently presupposes the suppression of the rebellion and the obliteration of the FLN as a military and political force in Algeria. The only possible utility of the loi-cadre—and this may be highly significant—is that it may be a necessary exercise for the French to go through before they are psychologically prepared for the important concessions that will be inevitable.
The continuation of the conflict and its present impasse with the resultant widening gulf between the two communities will probably make the final settlement more difficult, less satisfactory from the point of view of the French, and strengthen the hand of the Moslem extremist and anti-Western elements. It seems probable that in the last analysis the French will have to negotiate with the FLN. The only possible advantage to be gained for the French from the continuation of the pacification program is that if it continues to have some measure of success, the Moslem population might be more disposed to sue for peace and therefore pressure the FLN to accept a compromise settlement. There is, also, the possibility of some other native element emerging as a result of the current stalemate which would have an influence, if not directly on the settlement, at least on the future course of Algerian affairs. Similarly, the prolongation of the impasse would presumably induce the French to accept a compromise settlement. None of these, however, must necessarily follow.
[Page 284]Finally, one cannot reject out of hand the possibility, however remote, that by increased military effort the French might conceivably succeed in quashing the rebellion. However, even if the French should obtain such a miraculous success, which seems highly unlikely, their efforts in creating a new Moslem elite as an alternative to the FLN leadership would be inevitably rewarded by eventual demands from this very same elite much similar to those demands now being made by the FLN.