Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

455. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,December 13, 1955—8 p.m.

1136. Although decision place Gallilee affair before SC would seem indicate lack Arab intention retaliate, called on Fawzi tonight to urge restraint.GOE of course insist delicate position over this attack for obvious reasons. Took advantage this occasion use substance Department telegram 1245² as authorized by last sentence thereof which most helpful here as British and French protests on record very quickly and received headlines here yesterday morning.

Fawzi, who interrupted meeting of Council of Ministers to receive me, said Egypt was aware of her moral and formal responsibilities as well as the importance of restraint. He added that Egypt had advised Syria to take matter to SC as support this policy and had as well used moderate press. They had tried to keep press treatment such as to play down emotions but of course not belittle seriousness of attack.

Fawzi stated result to SC at this stage was only “lesser evil” than other possible alternatives as this route could in itself hold great dangers. He was very concerned as to what mischief the USSR might make of this opportunity and he feared others might play into Russia’s hands. He felt it of utmost importance that Israelis not be allowed to continue the issue by introducing as many other items as possible. He felt there might as well be an effort by others to raise whole question of Palestine. The SC could of course not conduct itself as if closing its eyes to broader problems but he hoped this particular incident could be kept to forefront as the matter of urgency (and for action) before Council.

Embassy fully concurs in Fawzi’s concern regarding dangers that may be encountered in SC considerations but highly gratified that this route chosen rather than military action. Believe what Fawzi fears most is some dramatic gesture by Russians as to lines of settlement, which would be impossible to obtain, but would practically preclude any Arab leaders from taking positions which might make settlement possible.³

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–1355. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:53 p.m., December 14. Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 683.84A/12–1255)
3. In telegram 1138 from Cairo, December 15,Byroade informed the Department that the “Last sentence Embtel 1136 should be interpreted to mean that Fawzi [fears] Russians might take line that would make it impossible for GOE to adhere to principles for settlement already given us by Egypt.” (Ibid., 684A.86/12–1555)