Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,October 14, 1955—8 p.m.

359. Rome for Ambassador Johnston. In course conversation yesterday evening on water plan, Ambassador Johnston took opportunity to inquire of Prime Minister Sharett latter’s view as to how problem Soviet arms to Egypt should be met.

Sharett said Nasser must go; that he was unreliable and troublemaker as indicated by his activities in the Sudan, in North Africa and in the Middle East; and that Nasser had returned from Bandung with a swelled head and inflated idea of his position and importance. He concluded that Nasser must be destroyed.

Sharett said there were the following four possible means of coping with Soviet arms aid program:

1. The US could deal directly with Soviet Union to force her to abandon her program. When Johnston pointed out that USG confrontation Soviets other cases, such as Berlin airlift, Korea and Western Europe had required presence US forces and inquired how that pattern could be followed in this area,Sharett replied this was problem USG would have to work out.

2. As second alternative, the Prime Minister said, although he did not necessarily agree, many people in Israel advocated a preventive war against Egypt. These people believed that Soviet arms should be destroyed, either en route or upon arrival, before they could be put into use by Egypt. (Embassy despatch 259 October 8).²Johnston replied that he believed such a course action would involve entire area in war and that it would not be solution to Israel’s problems.

3. US could give Israel arms equivalent to those received by Egypt.Johnston inquired whether, in view population and other limitations, Israel would not soon reach the saturation point in ability utilize additional equipment.

4. Fourth alternative was for US to conclude security guarantee treaty with Israel.Johnston pointed out Soviets might respond with similar guarantee to Egypt, thus laying basis general conflagration.

When Sharett inquired of Ambassador Johnston as to latter’s ideas solution Soviet arms problem,Johnston replied he held personal views this subject but, in view fact matter was outside his terms of reference, he did not feel justified in setting them forth to the Prime Minister.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–1455. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:25 a.m., October 15. Sent to Rome and repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Ankara.
2. The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported in despatch 259 that Cyrus Sulzberger of theNew York Times, in an off-the-record interview with Ben Gurion, had asked Ben Gurion what Israel’s response would be if the Egyptians did receive large-scale arms deliveries, including MIG fighter aircraft, from the Soviet Union.Ben Gurion’s reply was that “we would have to smash them.” (Ibid., 774.56/10–855)