13. Memorandum From Francis H.
Russell to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1
Washington, February 2,
1955.
SUBJECT
- Discussions with Shuckburgh
Attached is the final summary of points of agreement reached on an ad
referendum basis in the discussions with Mr. Shuckburgh during the past ten days. I
would like to obtain your comments and to discuss projected next steps
with you when you have a few minutes.2
It is presently planned to resume the discussions in London around the
last week in February.
[Page 35]
[Attachment]
POINTS OF AGREEMENT IN DISCUSSION ON ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT
I. General
- 1.
- The present is as favorable a time as is likely to arise in
the foreseeable future for an attempt to achieve a settlement of
the dispute between the Arab states and Israel.
- 2.
- An attempt at a general settlement will allow us to present a
balanced set of proposals which might permit us to dispose of
some problems, such as boundaries which are resistant to
solution in isolation.
- 3.
- An effort to reach a general settlement should therefore be
made soon; but this should not interfere with attempts being
made to solve the problems of Jordan Valley development.
- 4.
- The method which offers the best chance of success and
involves the least risk is that the United States and United
Kingdom Governments should work out the general terms of a
reasonable settlement and then by separate discussion with the
parties concerned, and if possible through direct talks between
them, attempt to get them to agree to the settlement or to an
agreed variation of it.
II. Method and Timing of the
Approach to the Parties
- 1.
- The first approach should be made to Nasser by Sir Anthony Eden on his way through
Cairo. It would be left to Eden’s discretion to determine how fully he
would develop the subject. If Nasser’s reaction warrants, he could give him a
general idea of U.S.–U.K. thinking, but not reveal the existence
of a plan. Eden would
endeavor to ascertain what steps Nasser is willing to take, what role he is
willing to play with respect to the other Arab states and how
Nasser believes the
U.S. and U.K. should approach the other Arab states. Eden would emphasize the
confidential nature of his discussions.
- 2.
- The exact nature of the next step would depend upon the
results achieved under 1. It will probably be necessary to
follow up the Eden–Nasser conversations by developing further the
substance of the proposals. If Nasser indicates a desire to proceed
immediately, an officer could be sent from the State Department
for this purpose. Otherwise the discussions could be carried on
by Ambassador Byroade. In
view of Mr. Eden’s first
approach Ambassador Byroade could raise the matter shortly after his
arrival. (Should the Johnston discussions still be in progress at the
time of Mr. Eden’s
arrival in Cairo, the extent of his discussions with Nasser would have to take
into account the possible effects on the Johnston Mission.)
- 3.
- The U.K. would outline our intentions to Jordan. This approach
is necessary prior to discussions with Israel because of the
special treaty relationship between the U.K. and Jordan.
- 4.
- Indication of the intentions of the U.K. and the U.S. would be
given to France and Turkey simultaneously with the approach to
Jordan and before the approach to Israel.
- 5.
- As soon as possible after stage 4 above, the nature of a
general settlement would be discussed in detail with Israel. We
would indicate that Nasser was prepared to consider a settlement and
that we have drawn up as a basis for discussion a set of ideas
which we consider offers prospect of progress toward a
settlement. We would state that if Israel is ready to pursue
discussions on this basis, we were prepared to continue our
efforts. If it should be necessary, we would make clear to
Israel the effects of a refusal on her part to cooperate,
mentioning particularly that under such circumstances we would
be unable to extend the security guarantee she has requested,
and that she would have to bear the onus for failure of our
efforts to progress toward peace.
- 6.
The approach to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq would be determined
in the light of the discussions with Egypt.
. . . . . . .
- 8.
- It is essential that we retain the utmost flexibility and
endeavor to maintain secrecy. We must always be ready to exploit
quickly any unexpected opportunity for progress. Each step
should be taken cautiously; and in the early stage of the
negotiations we should avoid actions which might commit us more
deeply than necessary to formal support for a rigid plan.
III. Inducements and Psychological
Factors
- 1.
- The terms of the settlement itself will contain inducements to
the parties, but these will probably be insufficient to overcome
the Arabs’ resistance to any settlement and Israel’s reluctance
to make the concessions required of her. Outside inducements
will therefore be necessary: e.g., military and economic aid,
and security guarantee.
- 2.
- Since no Arab state is likely to participate in a settlement
unless it knows that Egypt is sympathetic, Egyptian cooperation
is of first importance in any attempt at a settlement. We shall
therefore need to offer inducements to Egypt. The following are
the main possibilities:—
- a.
- The flattery implied in the fact that we have chosen
to consult Nasser first and cannot get on without
him.
- b.
- The suggestion that if Egypt will take the lead in
solving this problem it will eventually strengthen her
position in the Middle East
[Page 37]
and enable her to play a more
important role in cooperation with the West. The
solution of the Palestine problem will eliminate a major
impediment to such cooperation.
- c.
- Military assistance, the extent and conditions of
which will in any case depend on the state of the
relations between Israel and the Arab states.
- d.
- The prospect of support for Colonel Nasser’s plans for
the future of Egypt.
- e.
- Specific offers of economic aid, for example, on the
High Aswan Dam project.
- f.
- The offer of a security guarantee.
- 3.
- Inducements to Israel include:—
- a.
- A security guarantee.
- b.
- Elimination of factors creating tension between Israel
and her neighbors.
- c.
- Removal of Suez Canal restrictions. Termination of the
secondary boycott.
- d.
Continued U.S.–U.K. interest in Israel’s economic
future.
. . . . . . .
- f.
- Military assistance.
- g.
- Brighter prospects for Israel’s association in area
defense arrangements.
IV. Elements of
Settlement
- A.
- Territorial Adjustments.
- 1.
- Israel must make concessions. The Arabs will not
reconcile themselves to her present boundaries. But we
cannot expect large transfers of territory: the
concessions will be partly symbolic and partly designed
to produce a frontier which could last with a minimum of
friction.
- 2.
- We cannot make final recommendations on the North
Jordan Valley and Lake Tiberias area until the results
of Mr. Johnston’s
mission are clear. . . .
- 3.
- The No Man’s Land areas between Israel and Jordan
should be divided. The aim should be that most of the
territory should go to Jordan but the question of
awarding the tip of the Latrun salient to Israel to
permit the restoration of the old Tel Aviv-Jerusalem
road should be studied further.
- 4.
On the Israel-Jordan frontier, Israel would be
asked to agree to adjustments based on the principle
of reuniting farm lands with Arab agricultural
villages. Further study must be given to the
possible magnitude of such adjustments and their
strategic and economic effect before the United
States and United Kingdom can make firm
recommendations.
[Page 38]
. . . . . . .
- 6.
- In the discussions with Egypt, the Egyptians should be
asked to comment on disposition of the Gaza Strip. . .
.
- 7.
- In the southern Negev Israel would be asked to
relinquish a small triangle of territory north of Elath.
This triangle would have its base on the Israel-Egyptian
frontier and its apex on the Israel-Jordan frontier so
as to provide over-land communications between Egypt and
Jordan. The triangle would be located at a point where
the Israel road to Elath from Beersheba and Sodom runs
close to the Jordan frontier. At the junction of the
Israel north-south road and the Arab east-west road
there might have to be some form of international
supervision and control.
- 8.
- Terms of reference for the study group on this matter
are attached.3
- B.
- Refugees
- 1.
Israel would offer to readmit those refugees who
wish to return up to a certain figure, say 75,000.
This figure might run up to 150,000 if the Gaza
Strip were ceded to Israel (see IV, A. 6. above). It
would be understood that refugees returning to
Israel, would come as Israel citizens.
a. The Israel Government would donate land and UNRWA would finance the
development of that land to permit the
rehabilitation in Israel of those refugees choosing
to return there.
- 2.
- Israel would undertake to pay compensation for Arab
refugee real property and establish a fund for the
purpose. Some kind of trustee organization would be set
up to handle the payment of compensation.
- 3.
- Israel would borrow money from the Western Powers to
help pay the compensation. It is however desirable that
some part of the money should come directly from Israel
herself: and German reparations and contributions from
World Jewry might be used to this end.
- 4.
- In the payment of compensation individual claims would
be scaled down.Persons receiving more than a fixed
amount would thereby relinquish all claims on UNRWA for relief and
rehabilitation. Some arrangement would be needed to
ensure that large sums paid to individuals were invested
in the area and used to promote employment for the
refugees. In general compensation should be so
[Page 39]
applied that it
would make as many refugees as possible independent of
UNRWA
assistance.
- 5.
- Of the refugees who remained a charge to UNRWA after the payment
of compensation, it is hoped that 100–150,000 could be
settled in the Jordan Valley when the development scheme
was completed, and 50–75,000 on the Sinai project. Those
refugees in Syria and Lebanon who did not return to
Israel would stay in their host countries which would
gradually integrate them into their societies, possibly
with the help of lump sum payments by UNRWA.
- 6.
- In Jordan, and possibly Gaza,UNRWA would have to continue relief until
the further economic development of the area or
resettlement schemes create opportunities for the
remaining refugees.UNRWA relief would be made less attractive
as these opportunities became more promising.
- 7.
- Terms of reference for the safety group on this matter
are attached.4
- C.
- Jerusalem
- 1.
- The U.S. and U.K. would inform the parties that they
were prepared to sponsor a U.N. resolution on the lines
of the Swedish proposal of 1950 on the supervision of
and access to the Holy Places; . . . .
- 2.
- Israel would be informed that following agreement upon
a settlement and pending the adoption of such a
resolution, the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors would start to
call at the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem, . . .
.
- 3.
- The aim should be to eliminate the No Man’s Land in
Jerusalem by agreement between Israel and Jordan.
Government House would become the seat of the
international authority charged with the supervision of
the Holy Places and possibly other U.N. agencies.
- 4.
- Jerusalem to be demilitarized along the lines of plans
which have been discussed by the Consuls-General of
Britain, France and the U.S.A.5
- D.
- Communications Arrangements
[Page 40]
- 1.
- Israel to offer Jordan free port facilities at Haifa
and free access to the port.
- 2.
- Mutual overflight rights for civil aircraft of the
parties.
- 3.
- Israel to permit the restoration or construction of
telecommunications between the Arab states across her
territory.
- 4.
- Israel to accord to Egypt or Jordan the right to
construct a road across the Southern Negeb and to allow
free transit without inspection in peace-time (but see A
above).
- 5.
- Some mixed or U.N. authority to be established to hear
complaints on the infringement of communications
rights.
- E.
- The Boycott
- 1.
- The Arab states would:
- a.
- remove restrictions on transiting the Suez
Canal, including those on Israel vessels,
- b.
- cease the “secondary boycott”, defined as
attempts to prevent trade between Israel and
non-Arab countries, including termination of all
pressure on non-Arab firms trading with
Israel,
- c.
- abolish the Arab League Boycott offices and
all legislation rising therefrom.
- 2.
- The Arab states would not be pressed to engage in
direct trade with Israel.
V. The Form in Which a Settlement
Might Be Embodied, and the Guarantees to the Parties
- A.
- Instruments of Settlement
- 1.
- Permanent frontiers should be established by
re-negotiation of the Armistice Agreements in accordance
with the provision in the Agreements for modification by
consent of both parties. The UNTSO should continue to supervise the
boundaries as long as necessary. The new frontiers
should be noted in any guarantee decided upon.
- 2.
- The whole settlement need not be covered in a single
document. Different means should be used for the
different components, possibly as follows:
- a.
- Territorial. The
territorial settlement to be embodied in a
revision of the Armistice Agreements (see
above).
- b.
- Jordan Waters. A
separate agreement would be made between the
parties on the development of the Jordan Valley
and the operation of the unified scheme.
- c.
- Refugees. A settlement
providing for repatriation and compensation could
be contained in a letter from the Israel
Government to the Secretary-General of the U.N.,
referring to the 1948 resolution6 and
giving details of Israel’s intention to carry it
out.
- d.
- Jerusalem. Arrangements
for Jerusalem and the Holy Places would be the
subject of a U.N. resolution.
- e.
- Communications. Free
ports and transit arrangements would be the
subject of direct agreements between the
parties.
- f.
- The Blockade. The Arab
states would dissolve the Arab League Boycott
Committees and give informal assurances that they
intended to put an end to their secondary
boycott.
- g.
- While treaties of peace between Israel and the
Arab states remain our ultimate objective, the
state of Arab public opinion does not make it
feasible to insist upon such treaties as an
immediate objective. We should endeavor to bring
about to the maximum extent possible permanent
arrangements which would provide the substance, as
distinguished from the form, of peace. It should
be our objective to obtain the termination of the
state of belligerency between the countries both
to remove the basis for the Suez Canal blockade
and the secondary boycott and to justify to the
U.S. and U.K. public and law makers the security
guarantees and substantial financial contributions
required. The termination of belligerency could be
provided for in the revision of the Armistice
Agreements (see a above) and would involve the
revocation of any Arab legislation based on the
existence of a state of belligerency.
- B.
- Security Guarantees
- 1.
- It will be necessary for the United States and
United Kingdom and possibly Turkey and France, to
guarantee the frontiers to be established between
Israel and the Arab states against alteration by
force. (See attached draft treaty which will
require further legal study.)7
- 2.
- The Guarantee would not cover other aspects of
the settlement. Nor would it come into operation
in the case of frontier incidents not involving
the occupation of territory. Such incidents,
however, if sufficiently serious would bring into
operation the commitment of the parties to consult
together. The guarantors might inform the Arab
states and Israel that they are prepared to
discuss the means of implementing the
guarantee.
- 3.
- The participating powers might offer one
treaty to Israel embodying the guarantee and a
separate similar treaty to each Arab state. Should
the Arab states be unwilling to sign treaties with
the Western Powers, a unilateral guarantee might
be extended to them and the offer of a treaty left
open. Should the Arab states refuse to accept a
settlement involving a treaty between Israel and
the Western Powers, other means of guaranteeing
Israel’s security would be considered.
- 4.
- Any guarantee of the division of Jordan waters
required would be considered separately in
connection with the Jordan waters
agreements.
VI. The Roles of France, Turkey
and the United Nations
- 1.
- France should not be included in the planning or initial
approach to the parties but should be informed of the proposals
at the time of the approach to Jordan. (See II, 4, above.)
France should be included in the arrangements for the final
settlement and should participate in the guarantees, unless the
Arab states or Israel reject her participation.
- 2.
- Turkey would not be included in the planning or in the initial
approach to the two sides but may be informed at the same time
as the French. It would be desirable for Turkey to participate
in the guarantee envisaged unless this is resisted by the
parties.
- 3.
- The U.N. would be involved in the machinery of a settlement,
for example in supervision of frontiers and Holy Places. The
U.N. should therefore take note of the settlement at some stage,
perhaps by accepting a P.C.C. report on it. But the U.S. and
U.K. guarantees would have to provide for their execution
independently of U.N. action.
VII. Cost of the
Operation
- A.
- As inducements to a resolution of the Arab-Israel problem, it
is anticipated that it would be necessary for the United States
and the United Kingdom to provide assistance in addition to
present and already projected commitments (development
assistance,UNRWA relief
and rehabilitation, and the unified development of the Jordan
Valley). Such new assistance might include:
- 1.
- U.S.–U.K. participation in the financing of
compensation by Israel to certain of the Palestine
refugees.
- 2.
- Economic inducements such as substantial grant aid for
the High Aswan Dam, accelerated release of sterling
balances by the U.K., etc.
- 3.
- Military aid to the cooperating countries.
