Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

746G.00/12–3052: Telegram

No. 64
The Consul General at Hong Kong (Harrington) to the Department of State

confidential

Hong Kong, December 30, 1952—1 p.m.

1649. Pouched to all China periphery and Weeka posts.¹ View fact that official ChiCom line now indicates that 1953 will usher in new “period of large-scale planned construction”, ConGen submits following comments on domestic political situation as of end 1952 after 3 years Commie domination of mainland. Observations on international aspects ChiCom power situation, including military-strategic implications, will be forwarded later.

Developments during period 1949–1952 might be characterized as “cheap” period of ChiCom revolution, that is, period in which regime has concentrated on implementation of policies not requiring large amounts of money. These programs include such things as:

(1) Agrarian reform and organization of peasantry (aimed at demolition traditional social-economic structure in rural China with political aim of preparing way for gradually increasing collectivization).

(2) Physical liquidation of “counter-revolutionaries” in 1951 with accompanying terrorization.

(3) Intensive organization and indoctrination of significant groups of population, especially youth.

(4) Fund-raising campaigns to squeeze money from all segments population for state purposes.

(5) Expropriation western interests and institutions, accompanied by pressure to force remaining non-Soviet foreign residents to leave mainland.

(6) Large-scale flood control and irrigation projects, road construction, physical clean-up in cities.

(7) Five-anti campaign timed at economic milking of bourgeois.

(8) Three-anti campaign aimed at cleaning up ChiCom party and govt.

(9) Revamping of educational facilities aimed at extension of “peoples universities” and technical training schools and accompanied by intensive “ideological remoulding” of intellectuals, especially those with “bourgeois” western connections, to Marxist-Leninist viewpoint.

(10) Establishment of extensive fabric of “Massorst” [“Massorgs”?] to control and mobilize various segments of population.

(11) Widespread and reasonably effective (at least with certain significant groups) anti-US and pro-USSR propaganda campaign.

(12) Projection of state into dominant role in all sectors of economy, accompanied by organization of efficient tax collection machinery and currency stabilization.

(13) “Emancipation” of women, often to dismay of their unsuspecting spouses, which has resulted in considerable feminine energy accruing to regime.

(14) Regimentation of industrial labor and improvement of centralized control over urban labor market.

(15) Direct attempts to organize, control, and indoctrinate minority ethnic and religious groups such as Mongols, Tibetans, Moslems, and others with view using them for Commie ends rather than merely ignoring or flatly suppressing them as previous Han Chinese-dominated political regimes in modern periods are [have] usually done. Foregoing list, while incomplete and not intended be analytical, suggests nature of domestic tasks which ChiComs have, generally speaking, been able to carry out during 1949–1952 period.

Given reasonably effective military and political control, above project, without exception, requires primarily determination, indoctrinated and energetic cadres, organizational ability, and mobilized manpower, all of which ChiComs have in fact had in some abundance during this period. Fact that ChiComs, led by working, driving elite formed through years training and indoctrination, have been able to accomplish so much in attaining initial targets is unquestionably sobering political fact. Further, tempo of implementation of full-scale Commie revolution turning sprawling agrarian country like China into increasingly centralized, tightly controlled, and militarized police state in image of Soviet Union has surprised many observers of chinese political scene.

This extremely rapid domestic consolidation, which has involved direct extension of Chinese military and political power to farthest reaches of country including Sinkiang and Tibet [and has] brought entire mainland of China under complete domination of single unified regime for first time since 1911, has been aided by several factors.

(1) Of major importance is tough, indoctrinated and indigenous ChiCom leadership mentioned above which has survived to end 1952 with no notable purges and with no firm evidence of significant divisive splits which Mao Tse-tung unable control. Other important factors in domestic consolidation have been:

(2) Maintenance of disciplined and reliable army.

(3) Great attention to and ability in organization and planning.

(4) Effective propaganda which is product of well organized propaganda machine operating on scale unequalled in Asia since defeat of Japan. Degree importance ChiComs attach to matters organization and propaganda is indicated by fact that most important organs at all levels ChiCom party apparatus, from central comite at top to lowest comites and party branches, are those devoted to organization and propaganda.

(5) Outbreak Korean war in 1950 and subsequent ChiCom intervention permitted Commies to weld their nationwide controls on country much faster than might have been anticipated. It may also be suggested that domestic consolidation 1949–1952 has been aided by:

(6) Normal poverty of large elements Chinese population (which poverty tended make them less resistant to Commies since they cld assume that things cld not be much worse in any case); and

(7) Opportunism of certain wavering or disinterested groups (which, seeing ChiComs on winning side, rapidly climbed on bandwagon, both before and immediately after Commie takeover). Very factors listed above, however, have possibly tended to make some observers over-rate strength and potentialities of Commies. While changes have unquestionably taken place rapidly during past 3 years, Peiping regime has nevertheless inherited all the manifold problems involved in political unification and economic modernization and development of China and is still very long way from solving many of these basic problems.

It is apparent, moreover, that Peiping regime is now contemplating move into new period which must be defined as “expensive” phase of revolution in China, with stated aims of industrialization and ultimate socialism. Decisions on government organization taken by top-level Central Peoples Government Council in Aug and Nov 1952 indicated that regime feels that period economic rehabilitation and political consolidation virtually completed and that it is now looking forward to concentration on “planned economic construction” on nationwide scale and gradual expansion of existing industrial plant. Effective action during this new phase, in contrast to past “cheap” phase, will require substantial amounts of capital goods especially machinery, trained technical personnel, and foreign exchange. Given basic natural resources of China and limited possibility international capital accumulation, it is dubious how far country like China can pull itself up by its own boot straps in near future. Re politics of industrialization in Commie China, ConGen would suggest that, in terms of population in relation to basic resources, Peiping regime is operating on much slimmer base than Soviet Union was during period when Russians were expanding industrial plant and does not have amounts of capital and trained manpower which Japs employed in industrialization Manchuria after 1931.

Further, ChiComs are forced to attempt project with Korean war unsettled and with general international climate, both in west and in east of Asia, uneasy and increasingly hostile to them. Interest of Soviet Union in any such industrialization would appear to be limited by Soviet desire to keep ChiComs politically dependent as long as possible. Truly independent ChiCom industrialization, should this in fact ever be possible, would tend to limit Peiping’s dependence on Moscow and might ultimately exacerbate Sino-Sov relations. On other hand, failure of ChiComs during coming period to produce results which are clearly significant to ChiCom party itself might result in dissatisfaction and disillusion later.

Since early 1949, and especially during past year, ChiCom leadership has talked steadily about shifting center of focus of revolution in China from countryside to city and to industrial proletariat. This verbal preoccupation with proletariat, which is at present in China somewhat dubious basis for viable political system, is possibly prompted by ChiCom impatience with “old China”, backward and agrarian, and search for “new China” with real industrial and military power on modern basis. While this ultimate vision of industrialized proletarianized modern China is relevant, ConGen wld nevertheless suggest that peasant component in ChiCom power situation is still predominant as of end 1952. Despite certain amount recruitment elements of working class background, ChiCom party and army are both still dominantly peasant, and grain tax is still major factor is [in] national economy. It must be noted that intricate and often specious ChiCom jargon and theory may have little connection with political realities in China. Recent frenetic argumentation of ChiCom theories is to Pao Pravda [apparent omission?] proletariat [which] has historically been basic force in development Communism in China is clearly irrelevant and has little connection with serious analysis Chinese political behavior. There are considerable grounds for believing that Mao Tse-tung himself is essentially a political realist much less concerned with theory of evolution than with practical results. What has emerged on mainland is a political and military clique with firm underlying Commie motivation intent on forging a totalitarian power mechanism and manipulating individuals, groups, and circumstances to that end. Unfortunately, attempt to make general estimate of attitudes mainland Chinese toward Peiping regime this time is both presumptuous and often misleading. Continuing humorless Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, long hours work, increasing police interference with personal life, and knowledge that regime is quite prepared to use violence and fear as political weapons would not be expected to lead to excessive general enthusiasm. Yet present mainland situation must be studied against historical background and with full comprehension of manner which ChiCom leadership has made full use of reemergence vigorous Chinese power in Asia in its propaganda. Realistic estimate of domestic political situation Commie China at end 1952 thus must take account fact that certain segments of the population (and this group may be counted in millions) may still be finding energetic and purposive devotion to Commie revolution cause therapeutic after years of disruption and confusion in China.

Harrington

1. Weeka posts were presumably those which regularly received the Weeka telegrams (weekly, interagency, summary analyses) on the People’s Republic of China. These telegrams, prepared in Hong Kong, are in file 793.00(W).