Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.5/12–1454: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State

confidential

Saigon, December 14, 1954—5 p.m.

2261. Repeated information Paris 710, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. Pass Defense and CINCPAC. From Collins. Follows text of understanding signed by Ely and me 13 December 1954: (Enclosure A mentioned in paragraph 1 contains force structure cited part II, Embtel 1830.)¹

“Understanding on development and training of autonomous Viet-Nam armed forces.

I. Subject to approval by the Government of the United States of a program of direct aid to the State of Viet-Nam, the parties to this understanding are in accord that the initial Viet-Nam force structure to be attained by 1 July 1955 will be as shown in enclosure “A” hereto.

II. This force structure will be attained by reduction of the strength of the Viet-Nam armed forces, through selective discharge as far as possible of the least effective personnel, until the structure defined in enclosure “A” is achieved. Adjustments may be made in the rate of reduction in the light of the political and economic developments in Viet-Nam.

III. It is agreed in connection with the foregoing that full autonomy will have been granted by France to the armed forces of the State of Viet-Nam by not later than 1 July 1955. For the purposes of this minute “full autonomy” is understood to mean that all units of Viet-Nam armed forces will be commanded and staffed by Vietnamese personnel.

IV. The parties to this understanding consider that the United States can make a useful contribution to the development of effective Viet-Nam armed forces through the furnishing of instructors and advisers in the fields of organization and training. Recognizing that the actual direction of an effective program in these fields must be vested in a single authority, the parties agree that full responsibility for assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the organization and training of its armed forces will be assumed by the chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on 1 January 1955, under the overall authority of the commander-in-chief in Indochina.

V. The chief MAAG will in particular recognize this overall authority in all matters pertaining to the strategic direction of the French and Vietnamese armed forces and to the security of Viet-Nam against external aggression and internal subversion, in conformity with existing agreements.

VI. The parties agree that United States personnel will be assigned, together with French personnel, as advisers and instructors of the Vietnamese armed forces. All US and French advisory and training personnel assigned or detached to the Vietnamese armed forces will be under the direction of the chief MAAG. As the efficiency of the Vietnamese armed forces increases, the number of US and French advisers and trainers will be decreased.

VII. It is understood that the arrangements and agreements set forth herein are subject to the consent of the Government of Viet-Nam.”

Memorandum for record to accompany understanding initialed by Ely and me. Ely, apparently under strong prompting his political advisers, had proposed long and detailed protocol which I told him frankly I could not accept. I therefore proposed simple memo in which clarifications he desired, but which were not appropriate in text of understanding itself, could be made matter of record. He agreed. Text follows:

• “1) With reference to the force structure of the Viet-Nam armed forces specified in enclosure A, Generals Ely and Collins agreed that the size of such forces is the maximum that can be effectively maintained and trained within the limits imposed by US funds likely to be made available. They recognized that the forces of the size envisaged would be clearly insufficient in themselves to guarantee Viet-Nam against external aggression. However, they acknowledged the necessity of accepting the military risk inherent in the proposed levels of forces. They further recognized that under these conditions ultimate reliance must be placed on the Manila pact as a deterrent to a resumption of Viet Minh aggression.
• 2) With reference to the responsibility vested in the chief MAAG for assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the organization and training of its armed forces, Generals Ely and Collins agreed that the chief MAAG will designate the positions to be filled by US and French advisory and training personnel. They recognized that assignments should be made to insure the most effective distribution of advisory and training skills, irrespective of the nationality of the personnel concerned.
• 3) Generals Ely and Collins agreed that for the purpose of the understanding the term ‘internal subversion’ in paragraph five means subversive action of a military character within Viet-Nam taken by the Viet Minh.”²

Kidder

1. Dated Nov. 15, p. 2250.
2. In telegram 2457 to Saigon (also sent to Paris as 2249), Dec. 16. Collins was informed that State and Defense approved the understanding and the memorandum for the record. Collins was requested to so inform General Ely, and the Embassy in Paris was instructed to inform the Foreign Ministry. The telegram expressed the hope for rapid French approval. (751G.5/12–1454)