751G.00/11–3054: Telegram
The Minister in Laos (Yost) to the Department of State
147. Repeated information Saigon 217, Phnom Penh unnumbered. I took up with Prime Minister1 today in brief preliminary fashion topics listed Legtel 128 (repeated Saigon 190, Phnom Penh 16),2 particularly reiterating US decision henceforth to furnish military and economic aid directly to Lao Government, requesting in this connection that Prime Minister furnish as soon as possible (1) proposed military budget for 1955, (2) his Government’s views re first priorities under economic aid program and technical assistance. Katay replied he is most eager to get down to cases on these matters and will endeavor furnish information shortly. He added he would also seek US assistance in expanded information program.
Concerning Pathet Lao and two northern provinces, Prime Minister said he is sending to Samneua during first days December informal commission composed of former comrades Pathet leaders in Lao Issarak movement. Objective of commission will be sound out Pathets re conclusion an accord by which they would demobilize and be reintegrated into national community, in exchange for assurance democratic rights and free participation in early elections. Katay denied newspaper reports he intended offer Pathet leaders place in Government before elections, but I had impression he is not completely firm on this point. He desires hold elections March or April both in order get them over quickly and because campaigning much easier during dry season.
Prime Minister is most optimistic that understanding with Pathets will be worked out easily. If it is, he will despatch second more formal commission to conclude agreement. Meanwhile Governor Phong Saly already in his province and Governor Samneua will be despatched if [Page 2322] ICC lifts objection they have so far maintained. On other hand, if Pathets refuse accord on reasonable terms, Katay states intention to send in military governors with troops to reestablish royal authority. He remarked only serious security problem is in two northern provinces as remainder of country is quiet.
He expressed desire discuss all these matters with me at length in two or three days after he has had time to settle into office. As previously reported, Katay shares in fullest degree widespread Lao illusion that Pathet leaders “not really Communists” or at least are “Laos first and Communists afterwards”. Fact that these have proven famous last words in several other countries has not yet shaken his conviction. Also disturbing is his apparent acceptance ICC veto on despatch Governor to Samneua.
While we should certainly oppose to full extent our influence any inclusion of Pathets in Government, I am not inclined object to projected negotiations per se since they seem best means, particularly in view total abdication ICC, of probing Communist intentions. Without sharing Lao illusions re Pathet leaders, I think there is fair prospect that (1) Communists will not consider it expedient from over-all viewpoint to recommence hostilities at this time, (2) Pathet rank and file may tend to dribble away. Under these circumstances acceptable settlement might possibly emerge, presumably after usual frustrating delays. If not Katay at least has the alternative in mind.
- The government of Katay D. Sasorith came to power on Nov. 24. The Legation transmitted an analysis of the political situation in Laos and the new government in despatch 42 from Vientiane of Dec. 14. (751J.02/12–1454)↩
- Telegram 128 from Vientiane, Nov. 21, in which Yost listed the topics he planned to discuss with the new Prime Minister, is not printed. (751J.00/H–2154)↩