Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–1454: Telegram

No. 153
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Rangoon, March 14, 1954—6 p.m.

890. Mytel 887.² Acting Foreign Minister Kyaw Nyein called me in this afternoon to give reply my representation of last night based on Deptel 796.³ He allowed me make copy of notes prepared for oral reply, substance of which follows:

Begin text. GUB do not doubt that US Government desire bring about maximum evacuation of foreign troops and that they been doing everything possible in implementing UN resolution and bringing about actual evacuation. Gratifying to note also that up till 11th March total number troops evacuated have exceeded 4500 including over 3600 combatants. Will therefore be ungrateful of Burmese if they forget that USA has rendered great help in matter. On other hand it sincerely hoped US Government would also appreciate difficulties facing Burmese people in affected areas since last four to five years and if through sense of obligation its people GUB and Burmese army have exceed in their sense of anxiety or cautiousness, it believed US Government would not consider such excessive caution unreasonable.

1. It regretted that deferment of transport of surrendered arms by plane to and from Kengtung taken as failure of GUB honor commitment for restoration of arms surrendered. GUB would be willing restore arms surrendered provided airlift will not in any way affect military operations in the area. In view operations now being conducted it felt that flight of foreign aircraft over area at this juncture is objectionable from military point of view. GUB would therefore repeat its proposal that airlift of arms from Kengtung be deferred till 31st March or as alternative airlift be conducted from Rangoon airport to which place GUB will undertake to despatch the arms from surrendered areas at earliest possible date.

2. Allegation of KMT forces that Burmese troops have occupied Mong Hai is totally untrue.

3. GUB have given ample time and opportunity for KMT troops evacuate. Negotiations have been protracted and tedious. KMT forces have been living on the land and committing atrocities for past four years. Despite promise after promise evacuate nothing done until approach 8th UNGA. Even that limited evacuation farcical in that no arms were surrendered. When GUB threatened military action we were asked hold our hands off not disturb flow of evacuation and chances for peaceful settlement. On other hand there has been lack of guarantee from other side that all troops would peacefully evacuate or would cease committing atrocities in areas affected. Yet concession after concession has been afforded these people. Meanwhile public opinion in Burma has become more violent and army poised for action had to be held back for long time. It has been repeatedly told us that some at least of KMT generals and followers would not leave. This being case, GUB has found it impossible accede to request of US to change present plan of cease-fire.

4. This paragraph, on question of evacuation from southern area, was so loosely worded as to be practically meaningless. Accordingly Kyaw Nyein said would again consult with his colleagues and give definite reply next day or so.

5. In regard evacuation of POWs and refugees it may be pointed out that it was Chinese Representative who insisted on release and deportation of suspected Chinese collaborators as condition precedent their general evacuation. Now they have changed stand with view to leave their fifth column in our country. However in appreciation good offices rendered by US, GUB would agree in principle though with reluctance to deliver Chinese POWs and refugees without including suspects and orderly arrangements to this effect will be made in consultation with joint committee. End text.

Comment:

1. If alternative use Rangoon airport acceptable, Kyaw Nyein said immediate arrangements would be made. Lower levels war office estimated about five days required transport arms Kengtung to Rangoon. No objection shipped by sea provided no Chinese Nationalist flag ship employed.

2. Kyaw Nyein stated GUB cannot understand why KMT forces have made this false allegation.

3. Burmese position apparently predicated on absence guarantee that any “bases” will be handed over peacefully. Kyaw Nyein said in consequence each point has to be taken by military action. Indicated military time schedule does not allow Mong Hsat be included in requested cease-fire extension, particularly because airfield located here. Discussed this paragraph at length, pointed out reasonableness joint committee and US request. Expressed disappointment GUB failure cooperate and stated GUB decision might have serious consequences on continuation and success evacuation. Kyaw Nyein replied Chinese have been given every opportunity evacuate but each concession by GUB followed by demand further concessions. I gained distinct impression GUB decision final and will not be changed.

4. Kyaw Nyein definitely stated no Burmese armed forces in Myawadi-Palu area and hence question of cease-fire or guarantee for safe passage does not arise. Indicated no difficulty anticipated should evacuation proceed now. Should Burmese forces subsequently be posted that area suitable arrangements with joint committee could be made.

5. Further discussion this paragraph indicated arrangements should be made between Pe Khin and joint committee.

I again pointed out weak position in which GUB will find itself when matter raised in UNGA where Burma’s lack of further cooperation will inevitably be pointed up. Kyaw Nyein said he understood this “but we shall raise our counter-arguments and give our side of story.”

Sebald

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.
2. In telegram 887, Mar. 14, Sebald reported that he talked to Kyaw Nyein the evening before as instructed. (690B.9321/3–1454)
3. Supra.