Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.5/1–1054: Telegram

No. 142
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret

Rangoon, January 10, 1954—noon.

667. Mytel 655.¹ We believe termination BSM logically follows Burmese desire disentangle itself from arrangement considered derogatory its sovereignty, and that GUB action is indicative its growing confidence handle own affairs. (Burmese, however, desire employ foreign military “technicians” who would be under GUB policy direction.) On other hand, British Embassy has informed us negotiations for arms procurement agreement continue, but that abolition of BSM makes it unlikely Burmese “would obtain same priority as before.”

I have not changed views set forth my telegrams 658, October 22, 1952 and 287 September 28, ’53, and if anything believe more essential now that Burmese armed forces be strengthened as matter priority and that equipment for modest Burmese planned expansion of forces be furnished either by UK or US, or both. Failing early action, we incur increasing risk that Burmese might turn toward Communist bloc for supplies if sufficiently frustrated by procurement problems. Also unfortunate would be possibility that Burmese might turn to Yugoslavia and establish relationship which would tend strengthen Burma’s Marxist bias. Third foreseeable result might be procurement of an arms assortment from variety of sources, which, coupled with War Office’s intention obtain technicians from sources of supply, could be expected result in cross purposes among suppliers, and practically insurmountable linguistic, technical and mechanical difficulties. On positive side, it also follows, I believe, that Burmese forces with UK or US equipment would necessarily in foreseeable future be dependent upon free world for ammunition and parts, thus forestalling their turning toward other sources of supply. Finally, by meeting Burmese armament needs, as minimum on reimbursable basis, I believe Burmese pro-western orientation would be encouraged and strengthened. Conversely, deterioration of Burmese official friendliness toward US consequent upon delays already encountered should make it self-evident that something must be done if this trend is to be retarded or reversed.

Problem of Indian adverse reaction toward contemplated US arms aid to Pakistan would also appear relevant in connection with Burma’s needs. I should think public knowledge that UK and US are filling Burma’s arms requirements might well tend place US–Pakistan agreement in its proper perspective, at least among Indian leaders. It also appears not improbable that generous policy of arms supply to Burma at this time could well result in driving wedge, however slight, into neutral bloc presently under Nehru’s influence and apparent leadership. We consider it probable that Burma, in its eagerness obtain arms, would to some extent be willing run risk of compromising its standing with neutral bloc members. (I do not mean suggest however that Burma would in consequence arms procurement from UK and US join western bloc or be willing stand up and be counted. But such supply would act as spur in right direction. In fact, this would appear to be proper moment for an assessment of our attitude toward Asian neutrals. Upon expiry of British defense agreement, Burma may offer opportunity of creating an example of willing and straightforward cooperation between the United States as leading free nation, and Burma, whose government gives unquestioned promise of continuity and whose internal attitude toward communism is beyond question.

Based upon above considerations and in light expiration BSM, Department might wish renew its conversations with UK, in endeavor obtain more speedy action in meeting Burma’s needs. Department is of course aware that 14 months have elapsed since General Ne Win had conversations in Washington on this subject.

I am unable place much faith in British attitude toward Burma’s present situation and feel that British policy makers are deluding themselves (as they have done during past year regarding continuation BSM) by continuing effort maintain British influence through arms monopoly in Burma. Unless British policy is radically changed to effect speedy strengthening Burmese forces by supply conventional arms and equipment desired by GUB planned continuing basis, it appears inevitable that US must step into breach if Burmese leaders are to be dissuaded from casting about for help from other sources, and if premise that Burma should be strong is accepted.

Above considerations would appear dictate desirability for immediately renewed US sympathetic approach toward Burma in arms procurement problem. As ultimate course of action, if it were feasible in light US budgetary and existing world-wide commitments, would be special legislation under which US could offer an outright gift of selected arms and equipment (selected from lists attached Embassy despatch 66, August 28, 1953²), to Burma in amount $10 million without requiring any political commitments. (This would be similar to precedent already established by gift ten Coast Guard cutters under then existing legislation.) Alternatively, it might be possible without new legislation, offer Burma selected items at extremely liberal prices, perhaps on extended payment terms. Latter course would preserve Burma’s amour propre and negate Communist charge of direct interference in Burmese affairs, but would largely accomplish desired objectives.

In summary, I strongly recommend and urge Department formulate policy decision for early implementation in the premises.³ I hope however, that this recommendation will not delay limited procurement plans already nearing completion; service attachés concur.

Department may wish pass Defense, London and New Delhi for info.⁴

Sebald

1. Telegram 655, Jan. 6, reported that the functions of the British Services Mission were terminated as of Jan. 4. (790B.5/1–654) Some of the Mission’s operations continued, however, under an interim agreement until Apr. 4, according to telegram 3050 from London, Jan. 18. (790B.5/1–1854)
2. Not printed.
3. The Department replied on Jan. 21: “Your constructive suggestions for renewed US approach toward Burma under study. Overall policy considerations likely preclude effort seek special legislation for outright gift.” (Telegram 647; 790B.5/1–1054)
4. A copy was pouched to London.