790.5/11–1452
Report of the Five-Power Military Conference on South East Asia1
[Here follow a summary of contents, a list of representatives (39) at the Conference, a distribution list, and sections of the report titled “Terms of Reference”, “Actions Limited to the Area of Aggression Including the Contiguous Areas of China”, and “General Operations Against China”.]
Conclusions
General Principle
29. The retention of Southeast Asia within the Allied sphere is considered vital. A resolute defence of the area of aggression is an essential condition of any action to defeat a Chinese Communist aggression. As the present major communist threat is against northern Indo-China, Tonkin is therefore of essential present interest.
Allied Capabilities—Action Limited to the Areas of Aggression
30. Except in the case of Formosa, the forces at present available in each of the possible areas of aggression will not suffice to halt aggression in those respective areas.
31. Local naval blockade of the areas of aggression would not affect the Chinese offensive capability and might lead to pressure on Hong Kong. The effects of local air action in combination with other local naval support is considered separately in the case of each area of aggression.
32. Tonkin. Reinforcements restricted to air and naval support only, within conceivable capabilities, would not ensure the retention of Tonkin in the event of a Chinese mass attack. To halt such an attack, timely land reinforcements, amounting to two to four divisions, would be necessary in addition to air and naval support.
33. Hong Kong. The Chinese Communists are capable of mounting a mass attack on Hong Kong with only three or four days warning. Successful defence of Hong Kong would require timely reinforcement [Page 231] by forces estimated by the United Kingdom at two divisions and naval and air support from carriers and from bases outside the colony. The United Kingdom points out that the bulk of the additional land reinforcements and defensive fighters would have to be located in Hong Kong prior to the commencement of Chinese attack.
34. Burma. Chinese forces are believed to be in the immediate vicinity of the border on the Burma Road adequate in strength to launch an attack with little previous warning. The Burmese defence forces might impose a slight delay on the Chinese advance but the effect of this can be discounted. No form of Allied air or naval support in Burma could cause the Chinese to cease an act of aggression against Burma.
35. Macao. The threat to Macao is substantially the same as that for Hong Kong. The colony is so small that no effective Allied action could be taken in time to prevent its fall in a matter of hours.
36. Formosa. The capability exists for a successful defence of Formosa.
Allied Capabilities—General Action Against China
37. Sea Blockade. There is a divergence of views as to the Allied capability of maintaining a full and effective sea blockade with the ships and aircraft now in the theatre, even if they could be spared from their current tasks for this purpose. It is the view of the United States delegation that this capability does exist. This blockade would have no immediate physical effect on a Chinese Communist aggression. It would undoubtedly affect China’s economic and industrial capabilities and consequently, in the long term, its war potential. It is likely to lead to pressure on Hong Kong and possibly to clashes with Russian warships. Air and surface ship attacks on ports and coastal shipping might be employed to augment the direct effects of blockade.
38. Air Action. The Allies have a capability to undertake general air action against China as a whole, particularly in regard to lines of communication but also including industrial targets as well, which would reduce China’s ability to make war.
- a.
- The United Kingdom estimate of the bomber force which these tasks would require for effective implementation far exceeds the total number of light and medium bombers shown in the force tables appended to this paper.
- b.
- The United States position is that the Allies do have the capability of effectively accomplishing any one or all of these air actions, the degree of effectiveness being dependent upon the timeliness and number of aircraft available.
39. It is the opinion of the United States and Australian delegations that Chinese Nationalist forces in Formosa, if made available, represent an important capability for offensive operations against the Chinese Communists. This capability, at present limited, could be progressively developed.
Over-all Conclusions
40. Air, ground and naval action limited only to the areas of aggression and contiguous areas of China offers little prospect of causing Communist China to cease its aggression.
41. The imposition of a total sea blockade, in conjunction with the actions limited to the areas of aggression and contiguous areas of Communist China, might have a significant cumulative effect. This course of action offers little assurance of forcing the Chinese Communists to cease aggression.
42. A combination of all coercive measures including the defense of the areas of aggression, interdiction of the lines of communication, a full sea blockade and air attacks on all suitable targets of military significance in China, insofar as they are within the Allied capabilities, plus such reinforcements in time and scale as may be practicable in the immediate area, offers the best prospect of causing Communist China to cease an aggression.
Conditions to an Effective Military Action
43. Any action taken against Communist China should be swift and effective and so conducted as to show the Chinese Communists the determination of the Allies to cause them to cease aggression.
44. If action is to be prompt, the several participating nations obviously must have plans ready which have been fully coordinated in respect to action to counter the enemy at the actual scene of aggression and in areas immediately contiguous thereto. This coordination, which includes the full exchange of pertinent current intelligence, agreed communication procedures and other information essential to most effective cooperation, may require the setting up of a staff agency so that contacts are maintained and necessary studies continued. The respective Commanders in Chief in the areas concerned should be charged with the earliest implementation of such action as may be appropriate in this regard. The United States delegation is of the opinion that insofar as United States participation is concerned, the United States Commander in Chief in the area now has the machinery for carrying out his part of the coordination necessary.
The Australian delegation, whilst accepting the necessity for coordination, did not express a view upon the machinery which may be required.
[Here follow Appendixes A–K, none printed.]
The Conference met in Washington at the Pentagon, Oct. 6–17, 1952. A covering note to the report reads: “In accordance with instructions, the Military Representatives of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Washington on Monday, October 6th, 1952, to consider the defence of Southeast Asia in the event of Chinese aggression.” The note is signed by the heads of the delegations, as follows: Air Vice Marshal A.L. Walters for Australia; General Ely for France; Air Commodore James L. Findlay, Air Attaché at the Embassy in Washington, for New Zealand; Air Chief Marshal Elliot for the United Kingdom; and Maj. Gen. J. Sladen Bradley, Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff, for the United States.
The report is filed as enclosure “A” to the memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Nov. 14, p. 239.
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