Office of the Historian

751G.5/1–252

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret
Washington, January 2, 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to Department of State draft position paper TCT D–5/3b, dated 26 December 1951, entitled “Indochina”.1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this paper and concur generally in it. However, they feel that the paper does not adequately [Page 4] cover possible courses of action in the event of Chinese Communist intervention in the hostilities of Indochina, and accordingly recommend certain additions for this purpose, as well as changes to define more closely possible US command relationship and commitments in that area. A copy of these comments and recommendations is inclosed herewith. These comments and recommendations have my concurrence.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret
Washington, December 28, 1951.

Subject:

  • Indochina (TCT D–5/3b), dated 26 December 1951.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Department of State draft negotiating paper entitled “Indochina” (TCT D–5/3b, dated 26 December 1951) prepared by the Department of State for use in the forthcoming Washington Talks between the President and Prime Minister Churchill in the event the subject is raised by the latter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur generally with the subject paper but feel that it does not adequately cover possible courses of action in the event of Chinese Communist intervention in the hostilities in Indochina. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic draft negotiating paper be modified to reflect the substance of the following changes:

a.
Insert a new paragraph as follows after the fourth paragraph under the heading Position to be presented:

“In the event of active Chinese Communist participation in the conflict in Indochina, either openly or under the fiction of ‘Volunteer forces’, the United States, in its security interests, might consider taking military action, short of the actual employment of ground forces, in Indochina, if it became apparent that such action was necessary to prevent the fall of that country to communism. Further, in such an eventuality, the United States considers that the United Nations should take appropriate action. If the Chinese Communist Government intervened in Indochina overtly, it is possible that action by United States/United Nations forces to include the following might be necessary: (a) a blockade of the China coast by air and naval forces with concurrent military action against selected targets held by Communist China, all without commitment of United States ground forces in China or Indochina; and (b) eventually, [Page 5] the possible participation of Chinese Nationalist forces in the action. Further, if the Chinese Communists intervened in Indochina under the fiction of ‘Volunteer forces’, it would be highly desirable for political action to be taken which would expose this fiction, thus removing insofar as practicable current objections of friendly member nations of the United Nations to such a course of action as envisioned above.”2

b.
In the interest of accuracy, change the first two sentences of the final paragraph under the heading Position to be presented to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“In our present thinking we do not envisage a command setup in Southeast Asia through the organization of a combined chiefs of staff, and we would not be prepared to discuss a also oppose any project for the United States to be a party to a combined command structure during the military conversations which I have mentioned. I should point out, however in any event, that we won’t be in a position under the present circumstances to commit any forces in the forsecable future to the Southeast Asia area.”3

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Not printed. (CFM files, lot M 88) TCT D–5/3b was prepared by the Steering Group for the Truman–Churchill talks.↩
  2. With the exception of the third sentence, which was omitted, this suggested paragraph was incorporated in TCT D–5/3c, Jan. 2, not printed, a revision of TCT D–5/3b. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 99)↩

  3. On Jan. 2, at a meeting with Department of State representatives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they would have no objection to the insertion of the word “ground” before the word “forces”. (Note by the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan. 4; JCS files, 092 Asia (6–25–48)) As it appeared in TCT D–5/3c, the paragraph reads as follows:

    “In our present thinking we do not envisage a command set-up in Southeast Asia through the organization of a combined chiefs of staff, and we would also oppose any project for the United States to be a party to a combined command structure. I should point out, in any event, that we won’t be in a position under the present circumstances to commit ground forces to the Southeast Asia area. Frankly, my advisors and I feel that the military and economic aid program now under way represents the best contribution we could make toward stabilizing conditions in the area.”

    TCT D–5/3c was marked to indicate that all positions in it were to be presented to Churchill only if the subject were raised by him.

    ↩