772.00/4–552: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
5923. Under Secy called in Amb Bonnet today and informed him as fols re Tunisian case:
“After most careful and exhaustive consideration the Secy of State [Page 722] decided, as you are aware, to abstain on question inscription Tunisian case in SC. He took this decision, rather than one to vote for inscription, only because we believe this course of action shld be conducive to creating more auspicious climate than otherwise for talks between Fr Govt and Tunisian auths looking towards Protectorate’s internal autonomy. Fr Govt must realize that our decision not to vote for inscription will have unfavorable repercussions not only in various other parts of world, but also in our own press and among Congressional circles.
Other nations may likewise abstain on issue but it is clear to us as it must be to you that number other govts may look to us on quest. Without our action Tunisian case wld have been inscribed SC agenda so onus falls on us. Accordingly we feel we have right talk frankly with you this subj.
You will therefore see from our willingness to face the attacks which will be leveled against us, great importance which we attach to this quest. We have been willing fol this course only because we have full confidence France will make good opportunity thus created to take rapid strides towards Tunisian settlement which will be satisfactory to two parties concerned. If progress is not soon evident, we do not see how we can pursue our present course.
Specifically, it is of course apparent that creation representative Tunisian cabinet is prerequisite any effective negots. Therefore, we trust that there will be developments in this field in next day or two. Estab of Tunisian Govt that wld justify charge which has been made in some quarters to effect France ‘wld be sitting on both sides of Conference table’ wld obviously not permit real solution problem. In this connection US Govt ventures to hope that Fr Govt will give due weight to importance of representative Tunisian Govt and therefore will facilitate formation such cabinet.
Furthermore, we earnestly hope provisions an acceptable Fr reform program, will be put into effect just as rapidly as possible.
Finally, we believe tension wld be relieved and negots facilitated if extraordinary measures which were taken on occasion arrest former PriMin and his associates were lifted promptly, and that former mins and others detained purely for polit reasons were released. Our Emb Paris has informed us Fr Govt has already recommended ResGen Tunis liberalization these extraordinary measures. We consider this wise move and hope it will be carried out. We desire help Fr on this problem but must state frankly measures taken by Fr such as arrests PriMin and others have made it most difficult be of assistance. In this connection we also note suspension Apr 3 of Moroccan nationalist daily newspaper in Rabat, and fear measures this sort are conducive creating atmosphere which we are sure both France and ourselves wish avoid.
In conclusion we must stress that while we believe decision which we reached abstain Tunisian quest SC is correct one in immediate present, it is necessarily of temporary nature and can be confirmed only when Franco-Tunisian talks will have succeeded putting into effect an acceptable reform program. Shld developments Protectorate progress unsatisfactorily we wld very likely be forced to vote to inscribe item shld it be raised again. Finally, we believe that time is running short and we note initial mtg Tunis scheduled for Apr 24. [Page 723] We wld wish see mtg even before Apr 24 if possible in light SC situation. We express fervent hope that substantive discussions will be scheduled leading to implementation reform program Tunisia earliest possible date.”
- This telegram was drafted by McBride and Knight (WE) and cleared with the offices of Hickerson (UNA), Berry (NEA), Perkins (EUR), Byington (WE), and Bruce (U) in draft. It was repeated to London, Jidda, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Tangier, Tripoli, Addis Ababa, Monrovia, and Rabat.↩