Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

711.56373/6–1254: Telegram

The Minister in Libya (Villard) to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Tripoli, June 12, 1954—4 p.m.

448. From Villard. My considered views as to situation which has now developed in base negotiations are as follows:

1. Government of Ben Halim, with support of King, is determined hold out for highest possible price in return for agreement, even though demands may take form of assistance for specific economic projects instead of increase in cash payments over and above $2 million. They will use question of jurisdiction as top bargaining card, which attitude of course tantamount to blackmail and showing little change from barbary pirate tradition.

2. Precedent set in negotiations with UK after we surrendered initiative in December 1952 will be followed to letter, as shown by pattern of discussions on text to date, demands for higher compensation, and removal of negotiations in final stage of opposite capital where chances judged better obtaining more money. Intention of Libyans all along has been to conclude negotiations in Washington, only surprise being present timing.²

3. French Minister, frustrated and desperate, has apparently recognized the inevitable and invited Libyans enter direct negotiations in Paris before expiration their temporary accord June 30. Libyans are taking full advantage this situation and playing United States and France off against each other.

4. What Libyans consider inadequate quid pro quo from “rich and generous United States”, will now be advertised to Arab world by inspired “public opinion” and press comment, as occurred in spring of 1952 when million dollars denounced as insufficient (see next following telegram).³ If understanding not reached on economic aid, campaign may be expected extend to threats terminate interim agreement as illegal document negotiated under duress before independence and carry case to United Nations and forum world public opinion.

5. With exception few outstanding points we have in any case carried negotiations as far as possible here. Since Libyans have consistently remained deaf my pleas not to expect United States underwrite their economy, there may be considerable virtue their proceeding Washington and hearing statement direct from horse’s mouth. Essence of problem will be what Wheelus field is worth to USAF, and how our treatment of Libya will react on rest of Arab world.

6. Department will recognize that virtually all of above has been forecast by Legation and that Libyan expectations, probably instigated by Pitt-Hardacre, have steadily risen over last 2 years despite Legation’s best efforts forestall such development. Absolute minimum which could be offered Prime Minister during Washington visit would in Legation’s opinion be 3 million MSA funds fiscal 55, grant of wheat request and some further guarantee of eonomic aid. It would of course be preferable if such additional assistance could have come through Legation channels, otherwise Libyans will undoubtedly attempt bypass any United States Minister in future to seek aid directly from Washington.

Villard

1. This telegram was repeated to London for CINCNELM, Paris for CINCEUR, Wiesbaden for CINCUSAFE, and Benghazi.
2. An exchange of telegrams took place between Tripoli and Washington during the first 2 weeks of June, regarding the visit of the Libyan Prime Minister to Washington to continue negotiations there. Telegram 409 to Tripoli, June 12, advised the Legation that in view of the King’s desire to have his Prime Minister come to Washington, the Department would receive the Libyan Delegation the second week of July. It informed the Minister he would be expected to preside over the meetings and conclude the negotiations in Libya later if necessary. In telegram 458 from Tripoli, June 14, the Minister informed the Department that the Libyans expected to meet high-level officials and that “it would seem futile for me to chair such meetings after two years fruitless negotiations here.” He further advised the Department that it was unlikely the Libyans would agree to resume negotiations later in Libya. He said the Department should be prepared for either a successful conclusion, an indefinite suspension, or the termination of the negotiations as a result of the Washington discussions. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56373.
3. Telegram 449 from Tripoli, June 12, reported on an article from a Benghazi newspaper the previous May. The article said the base negotiations had been suspended because of U.S. obstinacy on financial and judicial issues. (711.56373/6–1254)