Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 155: Telegram

No. 31
The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Baghdad, May 17, 1953—11 a.m.

1373. Section one of two. For the President from Secretary.

Have now completed visit to Israel and four surrounding Arab countries, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Impressions follow:

1. Bitterness toward West, including United States such that while Arab good will may still be restored, time is short before loss becomes irretrievable. Mind general Arab feeling of hope in you as individual and head of new administration, but basic skepticism as to whether any United States administration can follow policies now approved by Zionists. Remaining hope will quickly dissolve unless our acts seem here to show capacity to influence British and Israeli policies, which now tend to converge in what is looked upon as new phase of aggression against Arabs. Have vigorously and consistently emphasized need for time and have stressed danger which would flow from open split of West Powers, and believe some impression made, but period within which we should get going must be measured in weeks, not months.

2. United Kingdom-Egypt problem² most dangerous and if unsolved situation will find Arab world in open and united hostility to West and in some cases receptive to Soviet aid. The recent statement by Churchill linking Israel to the Suez question³ leads to the feeling here that he is prepared to stand by force if necessary in Egypt, make military arrangements with Israel, and thus to abandon any British position in Arab states except as held by force. It is hard to believe this is correct appraisal of United Kingdom policy, but if it should be accepted here, any hope of extending United States influence over the Near East and building at least a minimum of strength here would have to be renounced unless we would publicly disagree with Britain and thus allow accomplishment of one of primary aims of Soviet Russia.

3. As previously reported, Naguib and Revolutionary Committee agreed try to postpone guerrilla type hostilities against British until we could return and perhaps moderate the British position. We have urged other Arab state leaders to urge moderation on Naguib and believe some may have done so. However, we should be prepared to get quick results on return. Suggest State and Defense consider our suggested formula cabled from American Embassy Cairo⁴ and also our conclusion that Middle East Defense Organization in original form is impracticable. Question of approach to British in this matter should be thought about in framework of other issues. As to this I look forward to talk with you on return.

4. Convinced after talks with Arab leaders and Americans here that formal Arab-Israel peace settlement not yet possible. Indeed, Ben-Gurion himself talked in terms of de facto peace and end of economic hostilities, rather than in terms of formal over-all peace settlement. He also favored United States adopt policies which would win Arab favor and thus permit US exert helpful influence in entire area. Our feeling is we may have to move step by step upon segments of problem that will reduce tension to where it would be politically possible for Arab leaders to agree to formal peace settlement. Such segments include gradual liquidation refugee problem, status of Jerusalem, assurance against Israeli aggression, to which Israeli leaders agree, distribution of economic and military aid showing more balance between Arab and Israel countries, et cetera.

5. Believe that if problem of Israel peace and Arab good will is dealt with on piecemeal basis, there need not be identical approach as regards all Arab countries. We had come here with belief Egypt afforded best opportunity for Arab leadership toward better relations with Israel and the West. However, we believe that present British tension even if presently relieved will be recurrent so long as any British remain in the area, and we shall be under corresponding pressure from British to withhold military and economic aid to Egypt. Also we feel Naguib is primarily a popular figure through which revolutionary group operates and that dominant factors have little political experience or understanding of international problem.

6. Syria offers some promise. Shishikli has both personal authority and understanding of world situation. Syria furthermore has greater opportunity for economic development at less cost and is only Arab country that could absorb large amount of refugees and thus make good start for liquidation problems which poisons all Arab relations. Also Syria less engrossed with Suez problem and more aware of Soviet threat, because of proximity of Soviet frontier. While no one can guarantee tenure or even life of dictator like Shishikli, he seems able and disposed to take initiative. However, Syria very unpopular with neighbors and no adequate substitute for Egypt if UK problem there could be solved.

7. We do not now make specific recommendations, but think useful supply promptly orientation of our thinking so that you and NSC may also be thinking along similar lines with view to developing readiness for prompt policy decisions upon our return.

Berry

1. Transmitted in two sections.
2. For documentation on U. S. interest in relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt, see Documents 947 ff.
3. See footnote 4, Document 4.
4. Not further identified.