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The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill 1
I am gravely disturbed at the situation at Brussels. We simply cannot afford the consequences inherent in failure. I am asking Winthrop [Aldrich] to inform your officials of the reports which we have received [Page 1061] from Brussels and which have prompted me to send the attached messages to Spaak and Mendes-France.
I know that you share my views on the importance of a German defense contribution. If we should have to explore alternative means of achieving it, we would face further protracted delays during which Adenauer’s situation will deteriorate. And we would still face the problem of a French veto.
In this situation there are in my opinion two essentials: First, in line with the decisions you and the President reached,2 we must while there is still a chance for the EDC keep our eyes exclusively on the EDC; we must do everything possible to ensure success at Brussels, which would permit early implementation of our plans. Secondly, we must not permit Mendes-France to think that in the event of failure we can forget all that has happened and start afresh with France in a position to block what we know to be vital to our interests. We cannot and do not desire to ignore France, but decisions of this importance must be related to a sense of responsibility.
I hope you will feel able to support me in the substance of the positions set forth in my messages to Spaak and Mendes-France. We need to stand together on this.
- The source text was transmitted in niact telegram 1041 to London at 4:21 p.m. Aug. 21, with the instruction that it not be delivered to Churchill unless Bruce reported that he had delivered one or both of the messages to Spaak and Mendès-France (p. 1058 and supra). London was also instructed to inform the British of the substance of Brussels telegrams 157 and 158, Aug. 20, pp. 1054 and 1056.↩
- Regarding the U.S.–U.K. talks, June 25–29, see the editorial note, p. 984, and subsequent documents.↩