Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

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Paris, March 25, 1954—1 p.m.

3530. Last night Maurice Schumann asked Harvey and me to come and see him this morning. Our appointment was set for 11:00 and I obtained an appointment with Bidault at 11:30 to deliver letter from Secretary contained in Deptel 3286.² When Harvey and I arrived, Maurice Schumann said that he had sent for us to tell us that the French Government had become disturbed over the public airing of the problem of the signature of the protocols and the ratification of the German constitutional amendments by the AHC. He said they had been particularly concerned by the press story attributed to a source in the Quai d’Orsay stating that France was demanding a satisfactory solution of the protocol signature problem prior to giving her assent in the AHC to German constitutional reform. Therefore, he said, the French Government had now decided to instruct Francois-Poncet this morning that he could agree in the AHC to the prompt approval of the German constitutional amendments, in accordance with the text which had previously been agreed upon.

Schumann then reiterated what he had told both of us previously, that the signature of the protocols by Germany in the name of the Chief of State was an absolute unqualified necessity if EDC was to be debated and passed in the French Parliament. Harvey assured him of the British Government’s support for this position with the single reservation that it would not require further action by the German Parliament. Schumann replied that it was the view of the French legal experts that the German constitution did not require parliamentary action for the president to delegate the right to sign the protocols in his name and with his authority. He said that the French legal expert had been in informal contact with Ophuls, the German legal expert on this subject, and that Ophuls’ informal reaction had seemed favorable to the French view. In view of contents of Secretary’s letter regarding protocols I said nothing on this matter except to assure Schumann that we now fully understood the French position on this subject and the importance of it to EDC ratification in France.

In view of the fact French, through Schumann, had agreed to go ahead immediately with ratification in the AHC and that Schumann had taken some pride in saying that this was a decision that they had taken completely on their own and without public pressure from either of our governments, I decided not to deliver letter contained in Deptel 3286 to Bidault. I told Schumann that I now had no reason to see Bidault as my visit to him was to have been for the purpose of delivering a letter from the Secretary urging them to take the action that they had already decided to take.

Bidault wished to see me anyway, primarily on other matters, but during my visit to him he also emphasized the absolute necessity of obtaining signature of the protocols in the name of the German Chief of State. As I pointed out yesterday in Embtel 3508³ this subject is also felt by Bidault to concern his personal honor in view of public statements which he has made from time to time in the French Assembly and the French Senate.

British view, as expressed by Harvey to Schumann, is that French position on protocol signature is reasonable and that they will give it full support. Therefore, in the interest of prompt action on EDC here in France, I must recommend most strongly that we reconsider position outlined in Deptel 3286 and use our influence to help find a way in which Germans can sign the protocols in the name of the Chief of State without again going to the Bundestag.

After my interviews I called Conant on the phone and told him that French had agreed to go ahead prior to the delivery of the letter so that I had not delivered letter.

Dillon

1. Repeated to Bonn and London.
2. Not printed; it transmitted the text of Dulles’ letter to Bidault, supra.
3. Not printed; it reported inter alia that Bidault had told Dillon “that unless the protocols were signed by Germany in the name of the Chief of State, there was no further hope for EDC” (740.5/3–2454).