Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–2354

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Bidault ¹

secret

Washington, February 23, 1954.

[My Dear Foreign Minister:] Like you and Eden, I am now reporting to our political leadership on the results of the Berlin talks. I am in considerable hot water with reference to the Indochina portion of our Resolution.² However, I am confident that the outcome will be support of my position so long as the French Government proceeds promptly to action on EDC.

I have confidentially explained to many critical persons that I shared your view that refusal on the part of the US or of your Govt to be willing to talk peace in Indochina would put the principal proponents of EDC in a most difficult position in France. If, however, it should turn out that the April 26 conference at Geneva³ was used as a reason for not proceeding promptly with EDC the results would, I think, be grave from the standpoint of Franco-American relations. I am confident that delay is not your purpose. The confirmation of your view at the luncheon which you and Alphand had with Merchant and me then and now satisfied me that the situation in France justified my willingness to support the final version of the Resolution which departed considerably from the original US position.

I feel that the fine relationship which we have had for many years and which was further developed at Berlin permits and, in fact, requires me to tell you frankly what the political situation is here. I think you and President Laniel will thereby better understand why I urge in the strongest possible terms that EDC should be brought to a vote before the Easter holidays and without awaiting the Geneva Conference. Otherwise the outcome could be deferred for many months. Soviet Russia must know that by obstruction and delay at Geneva it could consign EDC “to the archives” (in Molotov’s phrase) and do tragic, lasting damage to Franco-American relations. This would mean that the Soviets would have gained through Geneva all that they failed to gain at Berlin.⁴

I had a good talk with Adenauer at Wahn Airport Thursday night and pressed him on the Saar.⁵

We are hard at work here to put into words of assurance our own particular contribution which you and I discussed. The essential is, however, that all of this be concentrated into quick and decisive action. Otherwise the situation will fall apart not only here but also I fear in Germany.⁶

[

Foster Dulles

]

1. Transmitted to Paris in niact telegram 2914, Feb. 23, with instructions for Achilles to deliver it to Bidault. At the close of the telegram, Dulles informed Achilles “You and Bruce to whom this message should be shown may find it useful to draw on general line my views as expressed in above message during course your conversations on the EDC with French leaders.”
2. The text of the Berlin Conference communiqué, which included a statement on Indochina, is printed in volume vii . For text of the portion on Indochina, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1057.
3. Documentation on the Geneva Conference is presented in volume xvi .
4. In telegram Dulte 89 priority from Berlin, Feb. 18, Dulles reported that he had “mentioned to Bidault at lunch today the fact that if EDC failed ratification in France many unpleasant things would happen, including great pressure in certain American quarters for resumption of special US–UK relationship which existed during World War II” (740.5/2–1854). It has not been determined from Department of State files if this was the same luncheon to which the Secretary alluded in paragraph 2 of the source text.
5. For a memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Adenauer at Wahn Airport, Feb. 20, see the compilation on reports and analyses of the Berlin Conference in volume vii .
6. In telegram 3046 Paris, Feb. 24, Achilles reported delivering the source text to Bidault that morning and pressing the Foreign Minister for a firm date as to when he and Laniel planned to call for debate on the EDC Treaty in the Assembly. Bidault “said that he would want to think carefully and take more soundings than he had yet had time to make before replying to your message.” After further queries from Achilles, Bidault “reiterated his hope that it would start about March 31 and that he would let you have his considered views as soon as he could” (740.5/2–2454).