Eisenhower Library, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 23, 1953
eyes only
Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board (for Items 7 and 8); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, [Page 480] and the Air Force (for Items 7 and 8); the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (all for Items 7 and 8). Also present for Items 7 and 8 were the following members of the NSC Planning Board: Robert R. Bowie, State; Frank C. Nash, Defense; Gen. Porter, FOA; W. Y. Elliott, ODM; Elbert P. Tuttle, Treasury; Col. Hugh Cort, JCS; Robert Amory, Jr., CIA; George A. Morgan, OCB, and Paul L. Morrison, Budget. Philip H. Watts, Department of State; Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Department of Defense; and Christian Herter, Jr., of The Vice President’s Office, were also attending the meeting for Items 7 and 8. Also present were the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Arthur Minnich, Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Ina Holtzscheiter, NSC Staff (for Items 7 and 8).
There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.
[Here follow items 1–6, dealing with the security of NSC documents, NSC meetings and actions, significant world developments affecting United States security, United States policy toward the Soviet satellites, United States civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands, and the military program under NSC Action No. 987e.]
7. The NATO Ministers Meeting
Secretary Dulles said that the NATO Ministers Meeting had been regarded by other members as being as successful as any such meeting ever held. They all felt much greater serenity and confidence, whereas last April’s meeting had been “pretty jittery”. Secretary Dulles said that we have successfully introduced the concept of the long haul.
The military situation, said Secretary Dulles, was brilliantly presented by General Gruenther in an extemporaneous talk without notes. General Gruenther presented a picture which was by no means uniformly satisfactory, but which nevertheless contained elements of great strength and which indicated that any aggression would meet with great difficulty.
One important feature, and an innovation, was a private meeting of a few of the leading NATO Ministers, with only one staff adviser permitted each Minister.1 This meeting had taken place on the last day of the conference, and both he and Secretary Wilson had attended. They talked confidentially about a number of matters, and the other [Page 481] NATO Ministers had told Secretary Dulles that they thought the occasion particularly helpful. Since it stressed something more than the usual military aspects of NATO, there was a real sense of political unity.
Secretary Dulles went on to point out that he and Secretary Wilson had made every effort to get the other NATO Ministers to thinking in something like our terms of atomic weapons and of the atomic age. This had not been wholly successful, and the other Ministers were still very frightened at the atomic prospect. Secretary Dulles said that he had explained how very difficult it would be for the United States to continue to finance the cost of two separate kinds of armament and to plan for two possible kinds of war. Accordingly, we were reaching a point of decision as to the use of atomic weapons. We could not go on forever making both types of armaments, and our allies must try to understand the problem. From this discussion Secretary Dulles deduced that the United States would be unable to secure from its allies any agreement in advance to the use of new weapons. But there would be agreement by them on the creation of an alert system which could quickly be put into effect if and when war came. Beyond this our campaign of education for our allies on atomic weapons must go on, and this little informal meeting was a long step in this direction. Indeed, said Secretary Dulles, it may well turn out to have been the most significant achievement of the whole NATO Ministers Meeting.
There had also been some discussion, said Secretary Dulles, of U.S. continental defense and the part it would play in the total defense of the free world. We reassured our NATO allies, said Secretary Dulles, that we had no intention of cutting down our striking power to assist Europe, and he promised that we would maintain an appropriate balance between the offense and the defense. Secretary Dulles also noted the great interest of our allies in the proposed legislation to provide for freer exchange of atomic information.
. . . . . . .
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed a report by the Secretary of State on the NATO Ministers Meeting.2
[Here follows item 8 in which Vice President Nixon reported on his trip to the Near East, South Asia, and the Far East.]
- For a record of this meeting, see the notes on the restricted session, Dec. 16, p. 476.↩
- Following the NSC meeting the White House issued a press release saying that Secretaries Dulles, Humphrey, and Wilson and Director Stassen had reported to the President on the North Atlantic Council meeting. They reported that NATO was functioning efficiently and was “continuing to develop the strength and cohesion needed to provide security on a long-term collective basis.” For the full text of the press release, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 7.↩