740.5/12–2453
Notes Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) on the Restricted Session of the North Atlantic Council, December 161
Chairman Bidault. Understood in no form press to be given anything of this meeting. Must decide what to discuss.
Lange . All interested in Four Power meeting.2 Could Bermuda participants say bit more on this subject—and on any plans for security arrangements or guarantees—trilateral or multilateral?
Dulles . Will Chairman speak to it?
Chairman. Not sure can reply entirely to legitimate Norwegian curiosity. Glad to try brief report. Considered time and place for Four Power meeting. Considered Russian replies, etc. We gave Jan 4 and Berlin in our reply. Problem posed for France in Presidential election in setting January date.
The subject raised in question of Security guarantees was essentially that of reducing Soviet fears (Adenauer one of first to speak on this). Problem not solved but progress on procedure. One form is a contract; other would be a guaranty. Texts not finished.
Exchange of guarantees best of course.—
Can say no more—experts starting today in Paris to achieve cohesion.3 (Germany will be informed.)
Also talked at Bermuda, with Ismay present, re this NAC Council— no decisions taken.4 Ismay already has reported. My suggestion for restricted meetings of Council for example was mentioned.
Had long debate on EDC—don’t accept all that press said. No need to go further here on that subject.
Talked of China, the Korean Armistice and Indo China. Also Suez Canal.
Eden . Security guaranty is something (if terms agreed) which could be put in at Berlin only if talks there make progress. Not a solution by itself.
[Page 477]Re Soviet intentions and our assessment, military threat may have receded (thanks in part to NATO) but Soviet diplomacy of division has become more skillful. We all here must be careful to promote unity. Soviets play line of “Europe for the Europeans” (Sov. in Eur and US not). We must never forget immense importance Marshall Plan and US presence in NATO.
At Berlin we must make sure we miss no opportunity for negotiation. But cannot be led into another Palais Rose.5
Secretary Dulles. Can supplement with reference to Ger, USSR and US. Germany principal subject at prospective Berlin meeting.
Germany must be treated as a real party at interest and not as defeated, occupied country. Means we must keep contact with Bonn and experts. Also any Security arrangement must be one Germany will accept. Can’t treat her as second class power—to do so promotes what we seek to avoid. Think such arrangement can be found. UN Charter contains provision equally binding USSR (Art II). We must not derogate from that. We rely on that and want to keep it unimpaired as in our own interest. Doubt Soviets seriously will consider unification of Korea or Germany or end Austrian occupation. Hope that will change. Discontent in satellites might lead to chain reactions if Soviets withdraw. We’ll earnestly hope for change in Soviet policies. As indicated, we informed Soviets in advance of President’s UN speech after UK and French thought its proposals sound.
A word on the US—all know tremendous difference between present policy and pre-1914 policy. Cannot leave you with belief that it is easy firmly to hold Congress and public opinion behind it—must not take US for granted. Our present policy is based on US great hopes that future will be different from past. We have serious problem at home— Administration eager to continue along this line. Please take this into account in your actions and statements.
Pearson . Can Eden say anything on Suez?6
Eden . Yes. This negotiation long and difficult. In April negotiations broken off entirely. Resumed informally in May on UK initiative. Considerable progress on number of points. Down to two main issues on which we can’t give way. Described. (Availability and uniforms.) Base vast-—can’t be physically moved as a whole.
Van Z. Heard much of new weapons in NAC. Realize secret but is there any further information US delegation can give.
Dulles . As Wilson and I pointed out, President intends seek liberalization of present law which is restrictive and was passed by Congress when US thought it had monopoly. Soviets have much information [Page 478] by stealing from US and by technical development. Not expert—can’t say anything anyway because bound by law. Might say in confidence this room the following:
US has developed weapons in number and variety such that they are assuming almost conventional role—army, navy, air force. Much cheaper in explosive effect. Raises query on what scale to make because no use make if can’t effectively use them. Possible duplication of expense adding A-weapons to conventional.
When law passed one question to raise thereafter is their use on bases. Soviets will have weapons. This involved series of problems but seemed wise to put this thought in minds around this table. Referred to 280 mm guns. Wilson added all our experimental work looks hopeful in achieving results and application in use.
. . . . . . .
Dulles . This raises technical issues not competent to discuss. There are of course dual purpose guns. Not merely technical problems, however—there are political factors involved. All would prefer I suppose not be first to use A weapons—certainly of mass type. But first to use gains tremendous advantage. Thinking we must do on this subject raises very profound problems.
Chairman. Our military placed in difficult planning situation. Will welcome liberalization of US law. Should come soon lest public say “if miracle weapon available, why waste our money?”
Pearson . There’s another consequence—its political, strategic and economic. Now we know Soviet has it in advanced form. Must protect North America against these weapons. Expressed in US and Canada in new form Continentalism. If US destroyed, not much hope for rest of world. Secretary Dulles pointed out important not to underestimate US public opinion. Canada and US working out calmly Continental defense—only another aspect of NATO defense. This underlines importance US and Canada be kept encouraged by European developments in which we have real stake. Aware great progress made in this area within Atlantic context. No refuge for Canada in isolationism—learned that in 1914, but enemy will attempt to exploit potential divisive forces.
Expressed gratitude for this kind of talk. Underlined interest of all 14 in a security guaranty. Any guaranty would have to cover, he supposed, all 14. Therefore hope when experts near end their task, there will be provided opportunity for Permanent Council to be informed and consider results. Might put in communiqué phrase on Atlantic Community.
Ismay . (On Pearson request) Spoke of useful, closed NAC permanent rep sessions as developed in past year.
Chairman Bidault. Three will certainly think about Pearson suggestion—will study question of security guarantee. Like Pearson’s [Page 479] idea to put in communiqué phrases on Atlantic Community. (“We on the wrong continent” welcome suggestion.)
Dulles . Need to strike balance between defense and offensive. Heart of US and Canada probably first target of any future war. Area now easily in range of atomic attack. If we should build complete defense we’d spend so much we possibly couldn’t spend sufficient on defense here or on SAC as retaliatory force—striking power of latter can equally deter against attack against all—in this way effective where local defense may not be. No panic on North American continent— deterrent striking power requires arrangements for facilities to be available on very short notice, as Gruenther said. Attach hence great importance to developing mechanism which can go into effect instantly on an alert—otherwise collective weapon losses efficacy.
Chairman. Anything else? Thanks to all, etc.
Meeting adjourned at about 12:40 p.m.
- Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Merchant to the Executive Secretariat, dated Dec. 24, which stated that the notes had been edited minimally for the sake of clarity and that no official record of the session had been kept. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the restricted session in telegram Secto 9 from Paris, Dec. 16. (740.5/12–1653) According to Merchant’s notes the session began at 11 a.m.↩
- Documentation on the preparations for the Berlin Four-Power Conference is presented in volume vii .↩
- Documentation on the meetings of the experts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Paris in December and January in preparation for the Berlin Conference is presented ibid .↩
- For reports on Ismay’s meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Bermuda on Dec. 6, see pp. 1787–1793.↩
- Documentation on the Four-Power Deputy Foreign Ministers meetings at Paris, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951 is presented in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.↩
- Documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning the base at Suez is presented in volume ix .↩