740.5/12–1053
Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson)
Disclosure of Weapons Effects Information
We have come to the conclusion that in order for NATO planning to proceed on a more realistic basis it is necessary that more information concerning atomic weapons be made available. A policy of greater disclosure in the atomic weapons field would enable NATO countries to participate more fully in military planning for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations with the United States thereby bringing about concerted action in the event of crisis. This policy would also enable NATO countries to provide an effective program of non-military defense measures such as continuity of civil government and adequate civil defense to minimize the effects of enemy attack on lives, property, and industrial production.
This policy, of course, can be carried out only after appropriate amendments have been made to existing law. We intend to seek such amendments at the next session of Congress. Once the legal obstacles have been removed, we would propose that the requisite information be made available through military channels to the Standing Group, thence to SHAPE for use by the major NATO commands to the extent required for planning purposes. The program of disclosure which [Page 449] we now contemplate would, of course, not include detailed information concerning the design and fabrication of atomic weapons.
This program should also be distinguished from the reciprocal exchange of information on weapons effects which has recently been undertaken with the United Kingdom and Canada as part of our special relationships in this field. The latter exchange will be on a reciprocal basis in which certain scientific and technical information from United States and United Kingdom atomic weapon test programs will be shared. It will be part of a general program of scientific and technical interchange which grew out of the close wartime association in the atomic energy field and was continued since the war in modified form. Such results of this interchange as may be useful for NATO planning will doubtless be made available in due course and in appropriate form.