740.5/7–1053
The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)1
My Dear Mr. Nash: Reference is made to your letter of July 10, 1953 concerning the deployment of five battalions of 280 millimeter artillery to Europe, enclosing two letters from SACEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff each dated June 13, 1953 on the above subject, and requesting the comments of the Department of State.2
Although the Department of State did not consider that it was necessary or advisable that this Government seek permission for this project either from the North Atlantic Council or from any of the NATO countries or Germany, any more than in the case of the deployment of other weapons, it was considered desirable that the British and French Governments support the deployment.
Therefore, on July the 11th, the Secretary of State mentioned to the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault and the Acting Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Lord Salisbury, that the United States is now willing to send a few 280 millimeter artillery battalions to Europe in support of the NATO forces.3 The Secretary explained that these artillery pieces fired both regular and atomic ammunition, but that atomic ammunition would not be shipped to Europe with the guns, although regular ammunition would be supplied. Both M. Bidault and Lord Salisbury indicated agreement. Lord Salisbury commented that since the guns fired regular ammunition, it would be well to treat this as a routine deployment of units.
Similarly, it was believed desirable to obtain the views of Chancellor Adenauer as to whether the deployment of these units, or any publicity connected therewith, would affect the forthcoming German elections if disclosed prior thereto. After coordination with your Department, the United States High Commissioner in Germany was requested to obtain the views of the Chancellor. He reported that Chancellor Adenauer was strongly opposed to any publicity of the project prior to the German elections and strongly hoped that announcement of embarkation [Page 438] would not be made until at least September the 15th. This information has been informally conveyed to members of your staff.
Insofar as the Department can now foresee, there appears to be no objection to proceeding with this project on a basis which would preclude any publicity prior to September 15th.
It is the view of the Department of State that the deployment of these battalions should be accomplished in a manner consonant with the policy of treating the atomic potential as an integral part of our arsenal, and in a manner best calculated to develop the support of our European allies. To accomplish this end in the most realistic and de-emphasized way, the following program is suggested:
- 1.
- An agreed press release should be issued, approximately at the time that the first unit scheduled for embarkation overseas receives a warning order, which, it is understood, would be approximately thirty days before embarkation from the United States. Arrangements should be made for notification of the program to the Military Representatives Committee and the North Atlantic Council approximately ten days before the issuance of the press release. It is suggested that the United States Deputy Representative to the Standing Group should at that time informally and orally advise the Military Representatives Committee that we will shortly send a few 280 millimeter artillery battalions to Europe in support of the NATO forces. He should not disclose the fact of a prior conversation between the Secretary of State and the two Foreign Ministers, nor that Chancellor Adenauer had been approached on the question of timing. He should add that an announcement will be made at the North Atlantic Council the following day along the same lines as his statement, and might indicate that the first unit would arrive in Europe approximately some six weeks thereafter. He should state that while peace-time deployment would be at the Kaiserslautern area, the battalions would be available to the command of SACEUR in support of such training and other operations as SACEUR might determine. He should emphasize that it is not intended that the battalions would be only in support of United States forces. He should add that it is strongly our view that the dispatch of these battalions to Europe should not be unduly emphasized either as constituting a matter of great political or military significance lest there be read into it undue implications of belligerency or the false idea that these weapons would permit a reduction of other defense efforts. However, these new units will add an element of strength to the defense of Western Europe, and their multi-purpose capability should be accepted, by authorities and by peoples, as a normal development on the part of the West in attempting to balance the effect of the enormous Soviet ground forces and the growing Soviet atomic capability.
- 2.
- The Department of State would instruct the United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council to advise Lord Ismay of the situation so that the day after the statement is made to the Military Representatives Committee, a similar statement may be made in the Council, preferably by Lord Ismay, or in the alternative, by the United States Permanent Representative.
- 3.
- Notification on a private and personal basis should be given by [Page 439] the United States High Commissioner at Bonn to Chancellor Adenauer the day after notification is given to the Council.
- 4.
- No information should be volunteered to the Military Representatives Committee or to the Council to the effect that atomic ammunition is not being shipped to Europe with the guns. If this question is raised by any foreign official, the United States official should state that at the moment, only the guns and conventional ammunition are involved, and should emphasize that this information should be treated for obvious security reasons with the highest degree of secrecy. It should be emphasized that it is the policy of the United States neither to confirm nor deny the location of atomic weapons. Foreign representatives should further be advised that in response to any unavoidable query on this subject the only appropriate public statement that can be made is that security reasons do not permit any comment.
- 5.
- In view of the fact that this deployment cannot be kept secret, publicity will have to be carefully guided and coordinated both in the United States and abroad. Representatives of my Department have already discussed this subject with representatives of your Department, but I should like to further emphasize the importance which I attach to the joint development of appropriate public relations guidance consonant with the general approach set forth in this letter.
- 6.
- Should the route of the transportation of the weapons involve other foreign territory, appropriate arrangements would have to be made. It is requested that members of your staff coordinate with members of my staff on this subject.
If the foregoing procedure commends itself to you, the Department would recommend that this proposal be implemented along the foregoing lines, requesting only that it move forward in consultation with representatives of this Department.
Sincerely yours,
- The source text was drafted by Wolf and cleared inter alia with Lewis, MacArthur, and Bonbright.↩
- The letter and its two enclosures are not printed. The letter asked for the Department of State’s views on any pertinent aspects of the transfer of the battalions to Europe. The first enclosure, a letter from Ridgway to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated June 13, requested that five battalions of 280mm guns be deployed and assigned to the United States Army in Europe; while the second enclosure, also from Ridgway to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also dated June 13, listed the informal views of Embassy Paris, HICOG Bonn, and the Office of the Special Representative in Europe on the political implications involved in deploying the battalions in Europe. (740.5/7–1053)↩
- For a record of Dulles’ conversation with Bidault and Salisbury on July 11, see the memorandum by MacArthur, p. 1641.↩