740.5/7–253: Airgram
The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State
Polto A–6. Ref: Topol 1509.1 Subject: Ismay paper re present position NATO.
Opening today’s restricted session Ismay reviewed reasons for presentation of paper (Polto 2423 of June 182). He said representatives of three principal powers had planned to meet in Bermuda to focus on current problems and he felt there was danger they might “forget” NATO. Even though Bermuda meeting is now postponed he felt Council should not hesitate to pursue objectives of paper. Pointing out NATO must continue to advance and cannot afford to stand still, he said his paper was designed to accomplish the following:
- (1)
- Influence governments to maintain defense efforts.
- (2)
- Influence peoples to make sacrifices to this end.
- (3)
- Influence governments of three major NATO powers to continue to regard NATO as the cornerstone of their foreign policy, regardless of problems they may be called upon to resolve at forthcoming meeting.3
- (4)
- Insure that “private” meeting of Big Three is not interpreted as an indication of slackening on the part of NATO.
- (5)
- Convince Soviet that NATO is a living force and cannot be divided.
General discussion of the paper ensued, followed by specific comments.
The United States Representative applauded Ismay’s efforts, saying many arguments presented in the paper are valid and should receive Council’s serious consideration. He expressed the belief that United States would be willing to play its part in counteracting any impression of relaxation on the part of NATO.
The French Representative stated his government had examined the paper with interest and he wished to congratulate chairman for presenting the problem. He felt this an extremely dangerous period for NATO and West and, no matter what goals NATO governments may have set, public opinion, in contradiction to evaluation of the military, seems to be veering in a dangerous direction. He referred particularly to recent press stories on both sides of the Atlantic which have served to create an impression that some fundamental modification of Soviet attitude toward the West has taken place. The Belgian Representative pointed to a story in Monday’s Paris Herald Tribune stating SHAPE [Page 424] regards recent events in East Germany4 as “definitely reducing aggressive capabilities of Red Army in Europe” as case in point.
Belgian, Turk, Italian, Greek and Canadian approved the philosophy of Ismay’s paper, the Belgian Representative emphasizing the importance of NATO’s association with the forthcoming Big Three conference, saying there should be very close alliance between those taking part in the conference and the NATO Council.
The Netherlands Representative regarded the paper as a valuable contribution but warned that recent Soviet moves are not the sole reason for creation of the impression that NATO is slipping. He cited the lack of progress toward EDC ratification and said that doubts have been expressed in some quarters that it will ever be ratified. In the first two years of NATO’s existence the fear of possible Soviet aggression encouraged the peoples of NATO countries to great efforts. War did not materialize during this period, however, resulting in a great sense of relief and tendency to relax efforts. Also, countries were formerly under the impression that a three- or four-year military build-up would suffice but now the picture has changed and annual recurring costs of military establishments present a serious economic problem. Failure to liberalize trade sufficiently and to eliminate the dollar gap are very important elements of this problem.
The Norwegian Representative agreed re the necessity of strengthening the economic base in view of annual recurring costs problem. While he believed Ismay paper timely, he felt it unduly pessimistic and cited ever increasing Norwegian interest in NATO and in supporting the common defense effort. Only a few days ago the Norwegian Foreign Minister had restated in parliament in very positive terms Norway’s position re NATO. He had seen nothing in recent Soviet moves to indicate a change of Soviet intentions and no reason for slackening NATO effort. Any negotiations undertaken with Soviet must be undertaken from a position of strength.
The United Kingdom Representative said his government approves paper in principle, though he felt it slightly pessimistic. The British Government has made it very clear that it regards NATO as cornerstone of its foreign policy. The North Atlantic Treaty is a long-term instrument and it would be a great mistake to give the impression that the strength of NATO varies inversely with Soviet actions. He emphasized the United Kingdom is not slackening its defense effort though “hard economic facts” had caused the government to take another look at the effort to insure a proper balance is being achieved. The British Government is determined not to relax defense effort since Soviet military menace still exists. He said the discussion of this problem [Page 425] in the Council would doubtless serve useful purpose in the Bermuda meeting.
The Chairman, summing up the general discussion, said that Council apparently agreed there is a general impression of slackening in NATO. He admitted paper possibly on the pessimistic side and might be tied too exclusively to Soviet maneuvers. While it was perhaps wrong for him to suggest remedies, he had done so to encourage a discussion and would welcome any useful suggestion from the Council.
In commenting on specific suggestions on Ismay paper, the United States Representative thought paras. 13, 14 and 15 of Ismay paper (C–M(53) 87)5 were useful points of departure and should be studied further and perhaps amplified. He thought the United States Government would respond favorably to suggestions in paras. 13 (a), (b) and (c) and would favor suitable and timely public declarations as suggested in (d). He agreed with several representatives that Council should avoid the repetitive declaration suggested in para. 14. Para. 15 should be subjected to serious study since it raises problems of implementation in various countries.
The United Kingdom Representative felt that the suggestion in para. 13 (a) had already been accomplished by discussion in the Council and reports which the Permanent Representatives would doubtless send their respective governments, with which the Chairman and Council agreed. Re para. 13 (b), he did not know whether a communiqué would be issued but agreed with the others that it would be helpful to include a statement re NATO if possible. He felt para. 13(c) should not be interpreted as barring discussion at Bermuda of subjects such as Malaya, ANZUS, etc., which are not of direct interest to NATO and referred to the statement made by the United States Representative at the last closed meeting that no decisions will be reached at Bermuda which would prejudice the interests of other NATO governments and there will be consultation with them re conclusions reached.
The French Representative, commenting on para. 13 (d), said the EDC treaty had been submitted to all parliaments and it would be unwise now to press for a debate which might be contra-productive. He felt suggestions made in para. 15 should be subject to further study.
The Netherlands Representative said that communiqué called for in para. 13(b) would depend on tone and content of communiqué itself and decision re mention of NATO could be made at the time the communiqué is issued. He supported wholeheartedly the principle expounded in para. 13 (c). As for para. 13 (d), he felt speeches and declarations are integral part of the Ministers jobs. He felt it unnecessary, however, to make declarations on specific points raised because they [Page 426] have already been overstressed. He thought suggestion in para. 15(a) might create undue expectations of accomplishments at the next Ministerial meeting. He was heartily in favor of paras. 15 (b) and (c).
Norway felt the Bermuda communiqué should stress the importance of NATO because of the possibility that the Three-Power meeting might be considered as taking important problems away from the Council.
He hoped that the Three Powers would not reach “too firm” decisions, since smaller powers would like to make views known before final decisions were made. He felt his government was prepared to follow suggestion in para. 15 (a) if others thought it helpful; he would favor declaration (similar to May 27, 1952, declaration6) and thought it could be made at Bermuda conference; he feared para. 15(c) raised number of problems which should be thoroughly studied.
The Belgian Representative said his government was doing everything possible to bring about the ratification of the EDC treaty before parliament’s vacation.
The United Kingdom Representative said his government had expressed its desire to see the EDC treaty ratified at the earliest possible date but warned that emphasis placed on this particular matter should not be such as to give rise to the feeling that NATO will fail if EDC fails. The Canadian Representative supported this thought. The United Kingdom Representative also expressed his government’s interest in extending the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty to fifty years. He emphasized the importance of handling NATO publicity and said no opportunity should be missed to play up NATO activities and accomplishments. The Chairman said the International Staff cannot carry on a publicity campaign since this is a matter for implementation by governments and it is an unfortunate fact that the press does not consider many NATO developments as newsworthy.
The Italian Representative agreed generally with Ismay’s suggestions in para. 13. Re the EDC he said the Italian Government has decided on urgent action but new parliamentary situation had caused the government to reconsider question of timing.
The Chairman agreed with several representatives that progress in non-military fields was highly important and said that NATO had only paid lip service so far to Article 2. In a reply to his request for suggestions, the Norwegian Representative proposed parliamentary association with NATO through invitation to parliamentary delegations to visit NATO headquarters once a year for a period of several days. He said the Norwegian parliament intensely interested in such an association.
[Page 427]The Chairman proposed the International Staff prepare a paper presenting concrete proposals for bolstering NATO, which he hoped to present for study by the Council in two weeks.
- Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 419.↩
- Ante, p. 410.↩
- For documentation on the Washington Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, July 10–14, see pp. 1582 ff.↩
- Documentation on the demonstrations in the German Democratic Republic, June 16 and 17, 1953 is presented in volume vii .↩
- For the text of paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of C–M (53) 87, see footnote 3, p. 417.↩
- Regarding this declaration, see the editorial note, p. 684.↩