711.5611/11–2053
Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Smith)1
Statement by the Under Secretary of State Concerning Legislation Designed to Foster the Development of Atomic Power June 25, 1953
As a general proposition, the Department of State believes that atomic energy should, as rapidly as, and to the extent that, security [Page 1181] considerations permit, become integrated into the national economy.
Since legislation designed to promote the development of nuclear power in the United States concerns domestic matters primarily, the Department does not consider that it should comment on the details of such legislation. Legislation to this end, however, does have important implications for our relationships with other nations and I welcome the opportunity to comment on these implications.
It is of paramount importance to our international relationships generally that the United States maintain and improve its leadership in atomic energy development. It is important, therefore, that we press ahead with the development of nuclear power. There is every reason to believe we will be the first to have nuclear power if we are prepared to move with vigor in this direction. It would be very damaging to the position of the United States if another country were to be first in this field of endeavor. It would be especially damaging if the Soviet Union were to precede us in the development of atomic power. If this were to happen, the Soviet Union would cite their achievement as proof of their propaganda line that the United States is interested in atomic energy only for destructive purposes while the Soviets are interested in developing it for peaceful purposes.
On the positive side, by being first to develop nuclear power we will have further demonstrated to all the world that we are intensely interested in the peaceful aspects of atomic energy with all its implications for the future of mankind. This achievement would provide additional and positive evidence of the humanitarian policies of this Government, and its desire to further the economic well-being of the free world.
This Government has long and vigorously supported the United Nations plan or any other no less effective plan for the international control of atomic energy. President Eisenhower, in his speech of April 16, re-emphasized the willingness of the United States to enter, at an appropriate time, into solemn agreements in the field of disarmament providing for effective safeguards, including “the international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only, and to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons”.
[Page 1182]The United Nations plan, as you know, has a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it would promote and foster the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Efforts to hasten the day when atomic power will be economically feasible are consistent with this purpose.
On the other hand, in order to ensure against the misuse of atomic energy, the United Nations plan provides for safeguards which would effectively prohibit the manufacture, possession, or use of atomic weapons, by nations. In considering legislation designed to foster the development of nuclear power, it would be well to recall the nature of the principal safeguards against violations and evasions provided in the United Nations plan.
The United Nations plan provides for an international system of inspection designed primarily to prevent and detect clandestine operations in the field of atomic energy. This inspection system would guard against the possibility of an atomic energy program being developed outside the international control system.
The other major safeguards are designed to meet the danger of diversion of fissionable materials from known plants. This is a very real danger and a difficult problem to cope with because, starting with the mines, the processes and facilities involved in developing atomic energy for peaceful or for military uses are identical and similar up to a very advanced stage. To guard against the danger of diversion of materials from these facilities, the United Nations plan provides for the international ownership of source and fissionable materials, and international ownership, operation and management of facilities making or using these materials in dangerous quantities.
Because the technology of atomic energy is a changing art, dangerous facilities were not precisely defined in the United Nations plan, but were defined as those which, if misused, would be a threat to international security. In the United Nations plan, the international control agency would determine, in the light of the state of knowledge at the time, which facilities are dangerous and, accordingly, what kinds of controls are required.
The safeguards of the United Nations plan closely parallel those provided in our existing domestic legislation. To the extent that new legislation results in some relaxation or modification of domestic controls and safeguards, questions will arise as to whether we should modify our position on international control of atomic energy.
We are continually examining new developments in the field of atomic energy that might have a bearing on the problem of international control. If, in the course of developing a domestic program of nuclear power, we acquire experience which would call for modifications [Page 1183] in our position on international control of atomic energy, we would not hesitate to modify our position accordingly. Such experience may well provide useful guidance if and when a system of effective international control can one day be negotiated.
Because of Soviet intransigence, present prospects for international control of atomic energy are dim. However, we must at all times be prepared to enter into an arrangement, no less effective than the United Nations plan, for the international control of atomic energy. Therefore, I would strongly urge that any legislation that is considered should take account of this Government’s continuing interest in bringing about effective international control. Not to do so would, in our view, be a mistake.
It is well known that an important part of the uranium ore needed for the United States atomic energy program is derived from foreign sources. This ore has been made available to the United States as a part of the common defense effort. The growing need of the United States for uranium to supply and expand our atomic weapons program is well understood and appreciated.
There has always been a natural and understandable interest on the part of foreign governments supplying uranium ore to the United States to assure that they will be able to enjoy the peaceful uses of atomic energy when the state of world conditions and atomic technology permit.
Enactment by the United States Congress of legislation designed to promote the development of atomic power will tend to increase the natural interest of all foreign countries in participating in this development and in the many benefits which are hoped for from it. This will be especially true in the case of nations which produce uranium ore.
We believe that legislation designed to foster the development of atomic power in the United States should include provisions which—recognizing this natural aspiration of foreign countries—would enable the United States to make available, in appropriate cases and under suitable safeguards, information and material to assist them in making progress in this field.
In summary, the Department of State favors legislation which would hasten the day that atomic power can be made a reality. Such legislation would re-affirm our leadership in this field and our desire to develop this source of energy for the greater well-being of mankind. Development of atomic power is consistent with this Government’s support for an effective system of international control which would prohibit atomic weapons by ensuring and promoting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
- The unsigned source text constitutes the statement delivered by the Under Secretary before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy on June 25, 1953, during exploratory hearings on problems of nuclear power development. It is accompanied in the files by a similar draft dated June 4. An additional expression of the views of Under Secretary Smith regarding the international implications of nuclear power development is contained in his letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Aug. 18, 1953; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 7, 1953, pp. 330–332.↩