Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy–Armaments 1952–1953”

Summary of Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy and the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, March 16, 1953¹

top secret

March 16, 1953

• Present were:
• James Lay, Presiding
• Robert Cutler
• Vannevar Bush
• *John Ferguson
• Frank Nash
• Robert Amory
• C. Dillon Glendinning²
• Robert Finley
• George Morgan³
• Frank N. Roberts⁴
• *Charles Noyes
• *Gordon Arneson
• Roy Snapp
• Horace Craig
• Lt. Col. E.F. Black
• Everett Gleason
• Marion Boggs
• Bromley Smith
• Harry Schwartz⁵
• *Philip H. Watts
• Other military officers

Mr. Lay welcomed Dr. Bush and thanked him for his willingness to advise with the Ad Hoc Committee which had been established to study the recommendations of Report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.⁶ Dr. Bush said he was embarrassed to be the only member of the Panel so called upon and suggested that other members be consulted.

Mr. Lay explained that the NSC had discussed the Panel’s Report in some detail, considered it an excellent piece of work, and wanted concrete proposals for carrying out the Report’s recommendations and the implications of any suggested courses of action.

In the ensuing discussion, Mr. Cutler expressed a real sense of urgency in placing before the NSC a study on Recommendation I, dealing with candor to the American Government and People. He directed the Ad Hoc Committee to address itself to this Recommendation in the first instance and to have its report ready early in April. He suggested that it be as short as possible and, to be of maximum effectiveness, it should be in the hands of the Senior Staff before April 6th so that it could be considered by the Council on April 8th.

In the course of the meeting, Mr. Cutler made the following points:

1. The Council is very interested in the Recommendations of the Panel’s Report.

2. In considering Recommendation I, the Council raised questions as to (a) what is to be gained by greater candor with the American people; (b) what are the people to be told after you have scared them; and (c) what courses of action and what programs must be undertaken to alleviate the danger and to assure the people that all is not lost.

3. There is a possibility that conditions behind the iron curtain may be deteriorating.

4. The death of Stalin⁷ introduces a new factor—transfer of power at first looked smooth but indications are that this may not be so.

5. The Administration has pledged itself to balance the budget and cut taxes but if broad programs for continental and civil defense are undertaken this would not be possible.

Dr. Bush made the following points during the meeting:

1. The American public is already being told quite a lot but not officially and authoritatively.

2. There is much greater danger from lethargy on the people’s part than from panic.

3. The Administration has much more to gain from being frank and telling the truth about the seriousness of the situation than from sitting tight and doing nothing about the dangers in spite of the pressures to reduce taxes. By greater candor, a new atmosphere will be created in the country.

4. More frankness is needed also among officials of Government. There has been far too much stress on secrecy.

5. If budget cuts have already been decided upon, then it will be impossible to carry out civilian and continental defense recommendations of Panel’s Report—substantial amounts of money could be saved in Defense Department.

6. People should be told the nature of the atom race, especially that it’s a 2–way affair.

7. The H-bomb changes the nature of the world in which we live. It’s another breed from the A-bomb. New York City could survive 2 or 3 A-bombs but one H-bomb and no more N.Y.C. There is all too little intelligent thought being given to change created by the magnitude of destructiveness of H-bomb. Time is coming when danger of annihilation is imminent on both sides.

8. $3–5 billion over next few years applied to continental and civilian defense would help greatly and postpone day when situation will be acute. There is no air-tight defense but every bit helps to reduce the enemy potential. Also Soviet thinking can be affected and they can be kept in such doubt about the effectiveness of our defenses as to create a real deterrent to attack.

9. Technical advances are important, especially guided missiles and dopier [Doppler] radar.

Mr. Nash suggested that members of the Council would be helped in their thinking if Dr. Bush could lay before them the ugly facts.

Mr. Nash said that the Kelly Committee report was not due until early in April.

Mr. Nash raised the question of whether the peaceful uses of atomic energy could be used as an antidote to the disclosure of facts on the H-bomb.

1. Prepared by Philip H. Watts, Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. According to the source text, the asterisks denote “Members of Ad Hoc Comm”.
2. Deputy Director, Office of International Finance, Treasury Department; Acting Treasury Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.
3. PSB Adviser, NSC Senior Staff.
4. Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, Senior Military Adviser, Mutual Security Agency; MSA Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.
5. Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
6. For the report of the Panel of Consultants, see p. 1056.
7. The death of Stalin had been announced on Mar. 5.