Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy–Armaments 1952–1953”

Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] March 10, 1953.

Problem:

To develop a Department of State position on NSC 145—A Report to the National Security Council by the Atomic Energy Commission on the Development of Practical Nuclear Power.¹

Background and Discussion:

See Annex I.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Department of State strongly support the objectives of the Atomic Energy Commission report. In so doing, the following points should be made:

1. The early development of useful nuclear power by the United States, with its tremendous implications for the future of mankind, would be additional and dramatic evidence of the peaceful and humanitarian policies of this government. It would give tangible evidence to refute the oft-repeated Soviet charges that the United States is interested only in the destructive aspects of atomic energy, while the Soviet Union has been developing it for peaceful purposes. If some other country, particularly the Soviet Union, developed useful atomic power first, it would be a major psychological, cold war setback to the United States.

2. The legislation required to permit industry to participate in the development of useful nuclear power should be so drafted as to enable the United States to deal with certain foreign countries in this area, not only to assure the continuance of the flow of uranium and other raw materials to the United States from present suppliers, but also to stimulate such a flow from other potential producers. It might also be possible to use such a card to bind our allies closer to us and even influence certain countries presently neutral to be more positively cooperative.

3. The implications of a relaxation in domestic controls and safeguards over this industry has a bearing on our position on the international control of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Commission should be asked to keep this factor in mind as the proposed program develops in order to determine whether practical experience might give some new ideas and safeguards which might properly become a basis for any modification in the United States position on international control of atomic energy, should such a modification become either necessary or desirable.

R. Gordon Arneson

Annex I

Background and Discussion

The purpose of the subject report is to establish an Administration position on, budgetary support, and appropriate legislative action for, a program for the development of practical nuclear power by the Atomic Energy Commission with the assistance of industry to the extent possible. In order for industry to play a role in this field, legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is necessary. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy will hold hearings on this problem in the near future. The Atomic Energy Commission desires legislative action at this session of the Congress.

Varying types of power reactors are contemplated, with varying degrees of Commission and industry development and construction. The Atomic Energy Commission also hopes to avoid, as not pertinent to the present problem, controversy as between public and private power.

The Department need not become involved in the technical aspects of the matter. However, there are a number of very real foreign policy implications in the development of nuclear power, whether by the Atomic Energy Commission or by industry, or both, and regardless of the reactors used.

It would be a very serious blow to the United States if another country developed useful nuclear power before the United States did. If the Soviet Union did so, it would give tremendous weight to their oft-repeated charges that the United States is developing atomic energy only for destructive purposes, while the Soviet Union has been developing it for peaceful purposes. If some country other than the Soviet Union should do so, a similar but somewhat less damaging comparison might still be made. On the other hand, the development of atomic power together with legislation which would permit of some non-Atomic Energy Commission participation in its development and use could put the United States in a very advantageous position vis-à-vis foreign countries. Those countries which are actual or potential producers of uranium for the United States program have been putting on increasing pressure to acquire from us some of the benefits derived from their uranium. We have, in fact, a specific commitment—yet to be implemented—to Belgium in this regard. If we were in a position to be more forthcoming than present legislation permits, we would be able not only to assure continuance of present supplies of raw materials, but also enhance the possibilities of increasing our sources of supply. This card in our hands might also be of some use in bringing other allies and even neutrals closer to the United States.

Another aspect of this development of real interest to the United States concerns its implications for the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy. This plan provides safeguards against violations and evasions, including not only inspection, but also international ownership of source and fissionable material, and international ownership, operation, and management of facilities making or using dangerous (militarily significant) quantities of fissionable material. These safeguards closely parallel the safeguards provided in our domestic legislation. Under the proposed legislation, there will be some relaxation in such controls and safeguards. We may well be under some pressure, both at home and abroad, to modify our position on the international control of atomic energy accordingly.

At the Senior Staff meeting on Monday, March 9, at 2 p.m., Mr. Nash of the Department of Defense indicated that although neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Secretary of Defense had seen the Atomic Energy Commission report, Mr. Nash felt that the Department of Defense would support the objectives of the report. Mr. Bromley Smith² made the points covered in paragraphs 1 and 2 under Recommendations above. Mr. Cutler was impressed by them and requested that the Secretary of State restate them at the NSC meeting.³

1. Supra.
2. Bromley K. Smith, Alternate Department of State Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.
3. See the extract from the memorandum of discussion at the 136th meeting of the NSC, Mar. 11, infra.