Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 134th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 25, 19531
[Extracts]
eyes only
Present at the 134th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3 only); General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for Items 1, 2 and 3 only); the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
. . . . . . .
3. Armaments and American Policy2 (Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953)3
As the Council turned to this report, Chairman Dean of the Atomic Energy Commission entered the Cabinet Room and took his place at the table.
Mr. Cutler briefly explained the background of the paper and read its five principal recommendations.
Thereafter the President inquired who had set up the Panel, and was informed that it had been done by the State Department. The President said that it seemed to him strange that two eminent scientists had been put on the Panel and that they had immediately moved out of the scientific realm into the realms of policy and psychology. Their recommendations plainly went beyond the law, by which the President presumably meant the Atomic Act of 1946. The President stated that he could see no sense in this and in his [Page 1111] experience, notably as President of Columbia, most scientists concerned with atomic problems had no real grasp of the security issue and were generally anxious to reveal what they knew to any and all their fellow scientists. It would have seemed better, said the President, to have had two panels rather than one.
Mr. Dulles,4 as a member of the Panel, explained to the President that he and his colleagues had never been expected to approach the problem as a scientific one, and they had all been tremendously impressed with what he called the problem of “enoughness”. This he explained as the problem which would exist when the Soviet Union possessed a stockpile sufficient to deal the United States a damaging blow, regardless of the fact that the United States might itself possess a much larger stockpile of weapons.
Mr. Cutler added that it seemed clear to him from his reading of the report that the members of the Panel were very greatly disturbed at the public apathy and lethargy about the atomic problem. It was for this reason that their first recommendation, with respect to explaining to the American people the “enoughness”, had been made.
The President expressed his opposition at this stage to indicating to the American people anything about the size of our stockpile of weapons, and Secretary Wilson joined him by stating that it seemed foolish to scare our people to death if we don’t need to and can’t really do anything about the problem.
Mr. Dulles replied that the recommendation to inform the American people more fully about the situation which would prevail when the Soviet stockpile had grown large enough to deal this country a critical blow, was not for the purpose of scaring our people but of giving them a realistic picture of the dilemma in which they would find themselves.
Secretary Humphrey said that in any case there was no use whatever in blowing hot and cold with the public on the atomic situation, frightening them one day and reassuring them the next. As he saw it, the present Administration was engaged in a dual effort to restore a more normal American economy and at the same time to put the nation in a posture of prolonged preparedness, the idea being that this would frustrate Stalin’s design of destroying the power of the United States without war through the sapping of its economic health. Accordingly, continued Secretary Humphrey, we must presently make a choice between this twin objective of a stronger and more normal economy together with an adequate posture of defense, or if it was deemed necessary we must take a much more aggressive position vis-à-vis the Soviet menace and raise to [Page 1112] new heights our defense expenditures. If we chose the latter alternative it would certainly be necessary to revert to controls over the economy.
The President replied that in his opinion the Administration had certainly not removed controls in order to give our citizens an easier time. It had been done because the Administration was convinced that a freer and a more normal economy would in the long run provide the nation with greater economic strength. It seemed to the President much better not to scare the people now, because if we do so they are bound to ask why we let up on the controls.
Mr. Stassen noted that in any case we must make clear to the public that the Administration’s decision to drop controls was by no means to be interpreted as a proposal to let down our defense program.
At this point the President inquired as to Mr. Dean’s reaction to the first recommendation of the Panel’s report.
With respect to blowing hot and cold, Mr. Dean asked permission to restate the philosophy of the Atomic Energy Commission when it had presented to the Congress its most recent expansion program in the field of atomic energy. The Commission had argued that in the matter of atomic preparedness time was of the essence and that by virtue of the proposed expansion program we would obtain our objectives much sooner than otherwise. The vote in Congress had been very close, and Mr. Dean expressed the hope that the Commission’s approach had been the right one and that when they had to go through the process again next spring the Council would feel that they should follow the same line.
The President said that it would make us look very silly if at this stage we reversed the field and called off the expansion program which had been approved. The facilities under it would have been half built and therefore a complete loss, and further losses would result from the cancellation of contracts which had been entered into.
Mr. Dean expressed vigorous support of the President’s view, as well as the hope that nothing would be done to stop the present expansion program.
The President then reverted to the “enoughness” problem and inquired whether, when we finally achieved a sufficient stockpile of weapons, it would be possible to turn the atomic energy program toward peaceful uses.
Mr. Dean replied that with respect to fissionable material the answer was in the affirmative, but that it would be deceiving our people if we were to allow them to believe that the expensive gaseous diffusion plants which existed or were being built could ever be exploited for peaceful purposes.
[Page 1113]Mr. Cutler then turned to Mr. Dean and asked him expressly for his views on the first recommendation of the Panel report. Should we give to the American people the information recommended therein?
In reply, Mr. Dean stated that he was more anxious that the USSR should be aware of our very great atomic strength than anyone else. He dreaded to think what might happen if, when Marshal Stalin retired from his office, it should occur to him to make some such statement as President Truman had made when he returned to Independence.5 It would be utterly tragic if by some such occurrence the Soviet Government and people were left with the impression that the United States did not have a very great atomic capability, since they might then feel that they could move against us with comparative impunity.
The President then inquired of Mr. Dean why the AEC wanted to have one “open” shot in its forthcoming test series in Nevada.
Mr. Dean explained that the chief purpose of the “open” shot was to provide the Federal Civil Defense Administration with information as to the effect of such a shot.
The President asked if the Russians wouldn’t know that we had in fact made ten shots. Was there any way of disguising this, and if there was not, could the Russians possibly underestimate the size of our stockpile? In short, asked the President, isn’t it a plain fact that the information which the members of the Panel were so anxious to give to the American people was indeed already getting out to them?
Mr. Cutler broke in to say that according to his understanding the Panel was making a strong recommendation that the people of the United States be informed about what was called the “enoughness” problem and its significance for them. “I read in this report”, continued Mr. Cutler, “that the people of the United States are mature and should be informed in so far as compatible with security.”
The President agreed with Mr. Cutler’s statement as to the maturity of the American people, but remained unconvinced of the desirability of the first recommendation. He then inquired as to the next move.
[Page 1114]Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council turn the Panel report over to the Senior NSC Staff to come up with a study of ways and means of carrying out its five major recommendations.
Mr. Dean added that he thought a small ad hoc group should study how best to implement these recommendations, on the theory that this was the only way that their feasibility could be tested. Mr. Dean suggested that Dr. Vannevar Bush seemed a very suitable person to head such an ad hoc committee.
The National Security Council:6
- a.
- Discussed the recommendations of the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament contained in the report on the subject circulated by the reference memorandum.
- b.
- Referred the report to the Senior NSC Staff, directing it, with the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush, one of the Panel, to report back to the Council on possible means of carrying out the recommendations.
. . . . . . .
- Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Feb. 26.↩
- Copies of a briefing paper for the Secretary of State prepared apparently within the Policy Planning Staff, in anticipation of this discussion, are in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy–Armaments”, and in S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112.↩
- Lay’s memorandum transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff the Report by the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.↩
- Allen W. Dulles.↩
- On Jan. 26, 1953, former President Truman told the press that he doubted that the Soviet Union actually possessed the atomic bomb. On Jan. 30, AEC Chairman Dean issued a formal reply taking issue with Truman’s statement. Senator Hickenlooper and Representative Cole of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy also issued a statement denying the validity of the former President’s contention. For these statements and additional information on the reaction to Truman’s remarks, see Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1953, pp. 43, 45.↩
- Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 725. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)↩