Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “Chron”
Memorandum of Conversation, by Bernhard G. Bechhoefer1
- Subject:
- Disarmament—Control of Atomic Energy
- Participants:
- Ambassador Cohen
- Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, Department of State Consultant
- M. Jules Moch, French Representative
- M. Jacques Tine, French Embassy
- Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, State Department Adviser on Atomic Energy
- Mr. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, U.S. Delegation
At a lunch on December 3 in Ambassador Cohen’s suite, Vanderbilt Hotel, M. Moch reiterated a number of views which he had previously expressed either in public or to Ambassador Cohen in discussions in connection with the work of the Disarmament Commission.
[Page 1047]He stated that he had no doubt that the dominant motive of the Soviet Union was to control the entire world and that the Soviet Union would use the most devious techniques to accomplish its objectives. He inferred that the present stress on rearmament in Europe was playing into the hands of the Soviet Union. He stated that without question the living conditions in the Soviet Union had materially improved since 1945. He further stated that the present Five-Year Plan placed greater stress on consumer goods and that if the present objectives were attained, the standard of living in the Soviet Union in 1956 might be as high as in Western Europe. In that event, it would be difficult to keep Western Europe non-communistic. He, therefore, felt that less stress should be placed upon armaments and more stress upon improving living conditions in Western Europe.
Ambassador Cohen wondered if M. Moch’s interpretation of the objectives of the Five-Year Plan were sound. He showed M. Moch an article in the Reporter which analyzed the Five-Year Plan and came to the opposite conclusions, i.e., the new Five-Year Plan continued to place greater stress upon arms than upon bread and butter.
M. Moch pointed out that the present emphasis on rearmament of necessity was leading Western Europe to permit the rearmament of Western Germany. He stated that he would personally vote against and oppose any move which permitted the rearmament of Western Germany and he doubted whether more than one-third of the deputies would support such a move.
M. Moch suggested that the time might be ripe for bringing forward a new atomic energy plan which would avoid the concept of international ownership that had been so distasteful to the Soviet Union. He stated that as an international socialist he personally strongly favored international ownership of atomic energy installations. However, control of atomic energy through continuous inspection might be adequate and might be acceptable to the Soviet Union. He believed that the Soviet Union had made a significant change in its policies through agreeing to “continuous inspection” of atomic installations. Ambassador Cohen and Dr. Oppenheimer both took issue with M. Moch on this subject. Ambassador Cohen pointed out that we had made it perfectly clear to the Soviet Union both in a statement in the Disarmament Commission and informally, that we attached no magical significance to the term “ownership”. Nevertheless, we had no responses to our overtures and the Soviet Union refused even to discuss what it meant by “continuous inspection”.
Dr. Oppenheimer stated that if our sole important difference on control of atomic energy centered on the problem of ownership, he [Page 1048] would have few worries. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was quite prepared to continue their existing policies of building up stockpiles of fissionable materials without any international supervision. The crux of the matter was that the Soviet Union was unable to accept a friendly solution of the armament problem which would pierce the Iron Curtain.
Dr. Oppenheimer indicated that he had no easy solution for the armament problems. The one thing, of which he personally was certain however, was that realistic negotiations for disarmament could not be successfully carried out in the United Nations. It would be impossible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to introduce into the United Nations any proposal which would have the effect of even slightly diminishing their security. In other words, each United States proposal must help us from a security standpoint more than it helps the Soviet Union; and any Soviet proposal must help the Soviet Union more than it helps us. With such an approach, there is no possibility of agreement. He felt that if we could come to grips with this problem at all, it will be through a forum that is not exposed to the public gaze. Even secret discussions in the United Nations would be unsatisfactory since the only assurance of a secrecy which the United Nations can give is limited both in extent and from the standpoint of time.
M. Moch brought up the question of adequacy of the United Nations atomic energy plan in the light of recent developments in the field of thermodynamics. Dr. Oppenheimer assured M. Moch that this development had been foreseen and taken into consideration at the time that the United States originally proposed the plan. Therefore, this factor would not affect the plan.
Dr. Oppenheimer admitted that the present plan was not entirely artistic or logical or feasible. However, he pointed out that the plan emerged from an international situation which was far less tense than that existing body. If today we should decide to attempt to produce a new plan, because of existing international tension, it would be far less artistic and far less adequate than the old plan.
M. Moch referred to the draft treaty which he had prepared the past winter and repeated that this treaty represented the policy of the French Government. Ambassador Cohen and Dr. Oppenheimer both agreed with M. Moch that at some time it would be necessary to indicate the exact stage in disarmament when we would cease to produce atomic weapons and when we would dispose of existing stockpiles of weapons and existing fissionable material. However, it would be next to impossible to propose a treaty suggesting the exact sequence of events in connection with such processes, until we had at least some idea of the type of approach to the problem [Page 1049] that would be satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and to Western democracies.
M. Moch recited with great pride his own achievements in resisting communism in France. When he became Minister of the Interior, the Ministry was riddled with communists and the security forces, upon which he could place reliance, were few and weak. He recalled that in the first week, when he was Minister of the Interior, the communist trade unions called a general strike. He arranged for technicians from the Navy to take over and operate the power plants and subways in Paris. However, he purposely avoided actually taking over the power plants and subways until the communist newspapers had gone to press. Therefore, the morning after the strike had been called, the average Parisian was confronted with the following situation. He was sold a communist newspaper which had headlines “Paris has not electricity, nor subways”. After purchasing the communist newspaper, the average Parisian would then notice that the electric lights were operating and would go down into the subway and find the subways also in operation. He said that this dramatic episode destroyed the threat of the strike.
M. Moch indicated that he would return to France next week and probably would not be present when the General Assembly finally got around to dealing with the disarmament problem. He seemed to be extremely gratified to have the opportunity to discuss problems in connection with atomic energy on a frank and informal basis with Dr. Oppenheimer and Mr. Arneson.
Officer in Charge of International Security Affairs, Department of State; member of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.
According to the dateline of the source text, this memorandum was drafted on Dec. 5 and typed on Dec. 6.
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