Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “Ivy”

Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] August 15, 1952.

• Subject:
• Time of the H-Bomb Test This Fall¹

In discussing this problem with the Secretary you may find the following observations helpful:

1. If the target date of November 1 remains unchanged, the actual shot may not take place until later if (a) weather is unfavorable, or (b) technical difficulties arise. Nevertheless the possibility remains that the target date of November 1 could be met on the nose. The question then arises as to when the event will become publicly known. The explosion may be of such magnitude as to be visible and audible for several hundreds of miles in which event knowledge that a very large detonation had taken place might become known from the area itself. On the other hand whether knowledge generates from the area itself or not (and it is thought that the Task Force itself would be hermetically sealed away from public contact for at least a week except for air crews who will fly back to the States radioactive cloud samples for analysis), it appears plain that the danger of leakage in Washington would be very high: from the Pentagon, from the AEC, or from the scientific community.

2. If the target is shifted beyond the date of the election there would be no knowledge of the shot itself publicly available until the campaign was over. However, with the very strong feelings evident in the Pentagon against delay, it appears plain that a decision to postpone until after the election would become widely known in this country prior to November 4. This would catapult the matter into the middle of the campaign in a most unfortunate way and would make the test a political football. In the light of the position taken by Secretary Lovett, namely that he does not want to have any part in any decision calculated to bring about a delay in the test on political grounds, and inasmuch as the Department of State has expressed concern on this matter, it would inevitably develop that the Department of State would be charged with having played politics with the atom.

3. The Department of State has been giving consideration over the past several weeks to the possible foreign policy repercussions of forthcoming thermonuclear events. It has not come up with any strong foreign policy considerations which would require on these grounds alone that the test be postponed until after November 4. We cannot be certain that the test may not produce serious repercussions on the international scene but such repercussions do not appear likely.

4. The political considerations attendant on the forthcoming tests appear to be essentially domestic in nature. Had it been possible (and the discussion with Secretary Lovett this morning clearly indicates it is not) for Defense, State and AEC to agree among themselves to recommend that the test be held over until after the election, this would have been a happy solution. However, in view of (1) the determination of the Department of Defense to proceed on schedule, namely toward the target date of November 1 unless overruled by the President, (2) the fact that while a majority of the Commission would vote in favor of postponement but will not do so unless the proposal is made by someone else, and (3) the fact that no one of the three agencies involved has jurisdictional responsibility for passing upon domestic political considerations as such, it would appear that the matter must be left to the President to decide.

5. The AEC today sent a letter to the President requesting authority to use a certain amount of fissionable and fusionable material for the forthcoming Fall test program. This letter will indicate that the material is to be expended in tests to be held early in November. According to established practice this AEC request will be referred by the President to the Special Committee of NSC for its recommendation before he takes final action. Special Committee consideration of this request would afford a natural occasion to secure a resolution of the problem of time.

6. When the Secretary is called upon to vote on the AEC request, I would recommend that he concur in the release of fissionable and fusionable material as requested but add a comment along the following lines: The Department of State has no strong foreign policy objections to the tests being conducted in the early part of November. It perceives that there may be strong objections on domestic grounds, but feels that this aspect of the matter can be judged only by the President.²

R. Gordon Arneson

1. Preparations for the probable hydrogen bomb tests in the autumn of 1952 (see the editorial note, p. 881) had been proceeding for some time. In a memorandum of a luncheon meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board, June 26, David Bruce recorded agreement that a special panel on the “Psychological implications of projected thermo-nuclear bomb tests” should be estabished with Arneson as chairman. (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, “Atomic Energy”) In a memorandum of Aug. 13, Jeffrey Kitchen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, recorded Acheson’s agreement with Lovett at a White House meeting on Aug. 12 that Lovett should discuss with Bruce various arrangements that would have to be made for the tests including what public announcements should be made and how, and Acheson had subsequently requested that Arneson “prepare to discuss this matter in detail and relay the necessary information to Mr. Bruce”. (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, “Atomic Energy”) For further documentation on the origins and activities of this special panel—designated “L” Panel, see the draft memorandum by Arneson, Sept. 29, p. 1017.

2. As noted above, Gordon Dean, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, sent a memorandum on Aug. 15 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, who were the other members of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, requesting approval for Operation Ivy, the proposed thermonuclear tests scheduled for Nov. 1, 1952. A copy of Lay’s letter of transmittal of Aug. 15 is in G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “Ivy”, with the handwritten notation that Dean’s enclosed memorandum had been returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. On Sept. 10 the President approved the recommendation of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy that Operation Ivy proceed as requested by the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (Memorandum by Lay to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Sept. 10, 1952, G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “Ivy”)

   The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense had already issued a brief press release on Sept. 9 noting that in the autumn months Joint Task Force 132 would hold atomic tests in the Pacific. (Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 590–591)