Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “Use Policy 1950–1955”

Informal Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, June 17, 1952

top secret

Washington, June 17, 1952

• Present: The Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson
  • The Under [Deputy] Secretary of Defense, Mr. Foster
  • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley
  • The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Dean
  • The Executive Secretary of NSC, Mr. Lay
  • Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Mr. LeBaron
  • Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Mr. Arneson

Secretary Acheson listed the four issues that were raised by the JCS paper which had been transmitted to the Special Committee by the Secretary of Defense on February 6, 1952.¹ These issues were:

1. The procedures whereby the President may most effectively obtain advice whenever he may be called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons and to decide other related matters such as the deployment of atomic weapons;

2. The question whether an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should be sought which would enable the military to transmit to other nations such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined military operations and which would also permit the exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such operations;

3. The question whether a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons should be turned over to the complete custody of the military; and

4. The manner in which atomic weapons production programs should be established.

It was agreed that these were the issues raised and that they should be dealt with in order.

A. Use Policy

It was agreed that the staff paper which had been prepared by the working group of the Special Committee² was acceptable in all its major aspects and, subject to a modicum of further editing by the working group, should be submitted for approval by the Special Committee and subsequent transmittal to the President.

B. Legislation

General Bradley spoke to the need for greater flexibility in handling atomic weapons information in dealing with United States allies in SHAPE planning. In the present circumstances it was not possible to share any information concerning the characteristics of atomic weapons with the other representatives in SHAPE. SACEUR had been forced to set up special American staff mechanisms to deal with atomic weapons data. This was a most unsatisfactory arrangement and should be corrected. Chairman Dean stated that the AEC would be favorably disposed to any legislation which the Department of Defense might wish to sponsor in order to secure greater flexibility in dealing with atomic weapons data in NATO and other planning. Mr. LeBaron inquired whether some interim arrangement pending the passage of an amendment to the Act might be worked out. Would it be possible, for example, to determine that certain external characteristics of atomic weapons, i.e., size, weight, shape, yield and military effects, were no longer Restricted Data within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946? Chairman Dean stated that he thought this might be possible and certainly ought to be looked into. He felt that if this line of approach were taken it would be necessary, of course, to inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the problem and secure their support. General Bradley said that this sort of interim arrangement would be very helpful and should be worked out if at all possible. Mr. LeBaron pointed out that this session of Congress did not seem a propitious time to attempt to secure the requisite amendment to the Act and thought that this interim proposal would help until such time as legislation could be secured. Secretary Acheson inquired whether the proposal involved complete declassification of the data in question or not. General Bradley replied that the objective would be simply to remove such information from the category of Restricted Data while keeping the necessary security classification thereon. It was not intended that the information be made public.

It was agreed that the AEC, in consultation with Defense, should see what could be done about determining that certain external characteristics of atomic weapons no longer constituted Restricted Data and that the findings should be reported back to the Special Committee for consideration.

C. Custody

Chairman Dean stated that the AEC fully appreciated the need for maximum readiness to use and that every effort should be made to avoid delay in the event of an emergency. The Commission was prepared to support the deployment of atomic weapons to foreign bases as such bases became available for United States use provided the Department of Defense would take the responsibility for the security of the sites, make the necessary arrangements for evacuation, and take the necessary steps to insure that atomic weapons so stored did not suffer any physical deterioration. The Commission was also prepared to support a proposal for turning over to the custody of the military such numbers of atomic weapons as might be agreed should be stored at fully operational bases in the United States. He pointed out that the Commission was also concerned, however, that whatever arrangements were made would be such as to make possible the continuing efforts of the AEC to keep the stockpile of atomic weapons completely up to date and that accordingly arrangements should be made for access of AEC personnel to carry out modernization and major retrofit operations.

General Bradley stated that the JCS felt there was an urgent need for some atomic weapons to be under the custody of the military right away for use in the event of an emergency. The Chiefs were also concerned about the need for improving security in the event of an emergency movement and felt that this might best be fostered if a portion of the stockpile were now placed under military custody. Chairman Dean said that under existing arrangements only a very small number of people knew about movements that might take place. Once a Presidential decision had been obtained only eight people in the AEC were informed, and from the AEC the chain of communication was directly to Sandia and thence to the appropriate storage site. In an instance which had occurred earlier, of the fairly large number of people who knew about the operation by far the greater percentage were military personnel. Under [Deputy] Secretary Foster stated that in his view the primary need for military custody of a portion of an atomic weapon stockpile arose from readiness rather than security requirements.

Mr. LeBaron stated that the JCS was giving consideration to the numbers of atomic weapons which should be placed under military custody. The tentative number which had been suggested seemed to him much too large. Both General Bradley and Under [Deputy] Secretary Foster agreed that this was so and that further study should be given to this question in order to bring the number down to more realistic proportions.

Chairman Dean reiterated that as soon as certain operational bases were prepared to receive atomic weapons the AEC would be willing to turn over full custody of and responsibility for these weapons to the military subject to the requirement that access be given for AEC personnel to maintain the weapons and to make such modifications as were indicated from time to time.

General Bradley spoke about the interest of the Chiefs in utilizing aircraft carriers for storage purposes, the idea being that weapons so stored would not necessarily be carried on strikes directly from the aircraft carriers but might be put in at some land base for strike operations.

It was agreed that the AEC and Defense should work out together the means whereby a portion of the atomic weapons stockpile should be turned over to the custody of the military, this objective being approved in principle. It was further agreed that the results of such joint study should be referred back to the Special Committee for further consideration.

D. Atomic Weapons Production Programs

Chairman Dean felt that the views of the AEC as expressed in its letter of May 27, 1952³ and the views of the JCS were not far apart and could easily be resolved, perhaps simply by greater precision of language.

It was agreed that the AEC and Defense should study the matter further and seek to come up with a joint statement of the position, such statement to be referred back to the Special Committee for further consideration.

Proposed Exchange of Information With the United Kingdom in a Certain Specified Area⁴

At Mr. Lay’s suggestion, Chairman Dean reported briefly on the objections that had been raised to the proposed exchange by certain members of the Joint Committee. He stated that Senator Hickenlooper,⁵ who was in the forefront of opposition, had said he would not raise his voice publicly against the proposed exchange although he would probably vote against it in the Committee.

It was agreed that the Special Committee should recommend to the President that the proposed exchange could go forward as outlined in the NSC paper on the subject, it being understood that in the event that opposition on the part of any member of the Joint Committee appeared likely to take the form of public opposition the proposed exchange should not go forward. It was recognized that in the event public opposition should arise it would not be possible to proceed with the proposed exchange even on an alternative and more truncated basis.

1. Ante, p. 863.
2. Dated June 11, p. 973.
3. Ante, p. 947.
4. By memorandum of June 11 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence, NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated a draft report on a proposed exchange of certain restricted data with the British Government. The recommended exchange was intended to further the collection of intelligence on aspects of the Soviet atomic energy program. The draft report was prepared by designated representatives of State, Defense, AEC, and CIA. In a memorandum of June 26, Lay informed the Secretaries of State and Defense that the President had that day approved the recommendation contained in the report and that the AEC and CIA had been appropriately advised of the decision. The draft report and related documentation are in G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “Nuclear Sharing–UK”. A copy of the report as submitted to President Truman on June 26 and other pertinent papers are in the Truman Library, PSF–Subject file, “NSC Atomic, Atomic Energy–UK”.
5. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa), Member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.