Office of the Historian

S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112

Memorandum by the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board (Cutler) to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)1

top secret
Washington, December 10, 1954.
  • Subject:
  • U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments
1.
This memorandum is addressed to you as members of a Special Committee constituted under NSC Action No. 899 (September 9, 1953) to review the policy contained in NSC 112 (July 6, 1951).2
2.
The Planning Board has received from the members of the Special Committee’s Working Group:
a.
A statement by the Defense Member, with four annexes (August 27, 1954).3
b.
A synopsis of the Defense Member’s position (November 24, 1954).4
c.
A statement by the State Member (November 29, 1954).5
d.
A statement by the AEC Member (December 2, 1954).6 Each member of the Working Group made clear that these statements constituted only working drafts which had not received agency clearance.
3.
The Planning Board has discussed these papers. The Board has not attempted to prepare a summary description or an evaluation of the plans proposed by the State and Defense Members. Instead, the Board has sought to identify the principal issues underlying the two plans and to express succinctly (in the attachment) the positions asserted by the State Member and the Defense Member on these principal issues. The Board feels that this brief indication of opposing views should assist the Special Committee in trying to resolve the principal issues before consideration by the National Security Council on January 6, 1955.
Robert Cutler

[Annex]

Memorandum by the NSC Planning Board

U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments: Agreements and Differences Between the Positions Asserted by State and Defense Working Group Members on Principal Issues

agreements

1. State and Defense agree that:

a.
No disarmament plan should be based on good faith on the part of the USSR.
b.
Continued support of the UN Plan involves unacceptable risk to the U.S. and will be construed as hypocritical by our major allies.

differences

2. a. State: The possibility should be tested that the USSR might consider the elimination or reduction of the threat of nuclear warfare to be in its interests.

b. Defense: There is no possibility of USSR agreement to a disarmament plan acceptable to U.S. security, failing the abandonment of Soviet ambitions. An effort to test this possibility through step by step negotiation and partial implementation will place the U.S. under pressure to accept a disarmament plan inimical to U.S. security.

3. a. State: The State phased plan would entail less risk to U.S. security than the continuation of current armaments trends.

b. Defense: The risk to U.S. survival is less under the U.S. continuing to depend on its safeguarded retaliatory capacity to deter Soviet nuclear attack than under any disarmament plan, unless [Page 1582] there is abandonment of Soviet ambitions or in the absence of world government.

4. a. State: Proceed by safeguarded phases, each beneficial to U.S. security, to a system which might become progressively more reliable and extensive (learning by experience and with the ability to discontinue if necessary, without having impaired U.S. security).

b. Defense: As an essential pre-condition, have a comprehensive and enforcible system before any disarmament action is taken.

5. a. State: The State plan will reduce the likelihood of total nuclear war as compared to reliance on current armament trends.

b. Defense: There is less likelihood of total nuclear war in reliance on current armament trends than in reliance on any feasible disarmament plan, unless there is abandonment of Soviet ambitions or in the absence of world government.

6. a. State: It is feasible to phase proportionate reduction of atomic stockpiles so that the U.S. will always have more atomic material than the USSR, even allowing for some Soviet secretion and diversion.

b. Defense: It is unrealistic to presume that the Soviets will agree to any plan which continues the U.S. in a position of atomic superiority.

7. a. State: Stoppage in production of atomic material and a partial reduction in atomic stockpiles under State’s phased plan would be better, or no worse, than a continuation of current armament trends.

b. Defense: Stoppage in production of atomic material and initiation of partial reduction in atomic stockpiles will put the U.S. at a greater disadvantage in conventional power relations than a continuation of current armament trends and, among other things, will lead to pressure from allies and uncommitted countries for further reductions unacceptable to U.S. security.

8. a. State: Agreement and execution of control and reduction of conventional weapons will be aggressively sought, but will not be a precondition to agreement and execution of control and reduction of nuclear weapons in the initial phases.

b. Defense: Agreement on control and reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons must be the first step; subsequently, the execution of control and reduction of both types of weapons would proceed in concurrent stages to be defined in the plan.

9. a. Defense: The State plan is technically inadequate to accomplish the purposes for which designed.

b. State: According to the Defense report, any plan, including the State and Defense plans, is technically infeasible.

  1. By memorandum of Dec. 10, NSC Acting Executive Secretary Gleason transmitted copies of this memorandum to the members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.↩
  2. See the memorandum of discussion at the 161st meeting of the NSC, Sept. 9, 1953, p. 1210.↩
  3. Not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Armed Forces and Armaments”)↩
  4. Not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112)↩
  5. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112)↩
  6. Not found in Department of State files.↩