Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “IAEA Policies”
Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith) to the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)
As you suggested today,1 I am setting down for what they may be worth certain ideas bearing on the foreign policy aspects of atomic energy.
In order to point up sharply the probably sham nature of the recent Soviet disarmament proposals it is suggested that the United States propose to the Soviets that United States representatives be permitted to visit Soviet atomic energy installations now in return for which Soviet representatives would be permitted to visit United States atomic energy installations. It is my understanding that such a visit could be arranged on an unclassified basis without loss of any United States security. If, as expected, the Soviets reject the proposal, it would, I think, point up the real nature of their current maneuvering in the UN. If, by some chance, they accepted the offer, gain for United States intelligence would be substantial. I understand that there would be certain domestic political considerations which would have to be kept in mind.
I also suggest that we could gain substantial net advantage by offering to build in the United States a power reactor experiment to which members of the International Agency would have access and in the construction of which they would participate.
This suggestion is made in anticipation of some disillusionment in the world upon the publication of United States technical plans for participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, we will continue to be faced with proposals for construction of power reactors abroad. The construction of such a power reactor experiment would tend to prove our claim that nuclear power is not at the present time economical. It would also be in earnest of United States intentions not to withhold power reactor technology [Page 1532] from nations which have a greater need for nuclear power now than the United States.
Such a move would orient foreign reactor programs toward the United States—at a time when the trend seems to be somewhat away from United States leadership in this field. Such a reactor experiment would be entirely within the physical control of the United States. It is suggested that the possible gains from such a move may well justify that degree of declassification or access to Restricted Data by foreign nationals which would be required. Much as this net gain would also be derived from your thought that a power producing reactor be constructed outside of the United States but at a location in which it has some degree of control—such as Puerto Rico. I think that the reaction from Latin America would be tremendously favorable if such a move were to be made with the understanding that one purpose of the reactor would be to aid Latin American countries in the development of power reactor programs of their own. To gain this end I think foreign participation in the construction phase would be important.
- See the memorandum for the file, supra.↩